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 Abstract 
The topic of infectious disease epidemics has recently attracted substantial attentions in 
research communities and it has been shown that the changes of human behaviors have significant 
impacts on the dynamics of disease transmission. However, the study and understanding of human 
reactions into spread of infectious disease are still in the very beginning phase and how human 
behaviors change during the spread of infectious disease has not been systematically investigated. 
Moreover, the study of human behaviors includes not only various enforced measures by public 
authorities such as school closure, quarantine, vaccination, etc, but also the spontaneous self-
protective actions which are triggered by risk perception and fear of diseases. Hence, the goal of 
this research is to study the impacts of human behaviors to the epidemic from these two 
perspectives: spontaneous behavioral changes and public intervention strategies.   
For the sake of studying spontaneous changes of human behaviors, this research first time 
applied evolutionary spatial game into the study of human reactions to the spread of infectious 
disease. This method integrated contact structures and epidemics information into the individuals’ 
decision processes, by adding two different types of information into the payoff functions: the 
local information and global information. The new method would not only advance the field of 
game theory, but also the field of epidemiology. In addition, this method was also applied to a 
classic compartmental dynamic system which is a widely used model for studying the disease 
transmission. With extensive numerical studies, the results first proved the consistency of two 
models for the sake of validating the effectiveness of the spatial evolutionary game. Then the 
impacts of changes of human behaviors to the dynamics of disease transmission and how 
information impacts human behaviors were discussed temporally and spatially.  
 In addition to the spontaneous behavioral changes, the corresponding intervention 
strategies by policy-makers played the key role in process of mitigating the spread of infectious 
disease. For the purpose of minimizing the total lost, including the social costs and number of 
infected individuals, the intervention strategies should be optimized.  Sensitivity analysis, stability 
analysis, bifurcation analysis, and optimal control methods are possible tools to understand the 
effects of different combination of intervention strategies or even find an appropriate policy to 
mitigate the disease transmission. One zoonotic disease, named Zoonotic Visceral Leishmaniasis 
(ZVL), was studied by adopting different methods and assumptions. Particularly, a special case, 
backward bifurcation, was discussed for the transmission of ZVL.  
 Last but not least, the methodology and modeling framework used in this dissertation can 
be expanded to other disease situations and intervention applications, and have a broad impact to 
the research area related to mathematical modeling, epidemiology, decision-making processes, and 
industrial engineering. The further studies can combine the changes of human behaviors and 
intervention strategies by policy-makers so as to seek an optimal information dissemination to 
minimize the social costs and the number of infected individuals. If successful, this research should 
aid policy-makers by improving communication between them and the public, by directing 
educational efforts, and by predicting public response to infectious diseases and new risk 
management strategies (regulations, vaccination, quarantine, etc.). 
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strategies by policy-makers played the key role in process of mitigating the spread of infectious 
disease. For the purpose of minimizing the total lost, including the social costs and number of 
infected individuals, the intervention strategies should be optimized.  Sensitivity analysis, stability 
analysis, bifurcation analysis, and optimal control methods are possible tools to understand the 
effects of different combination of intervention strategies or even find an appropriate policy to 
mitigate the disease transmission. One zoonotic disease, named Zoonotic Visceral Leishmaniasis 
(ZVL), was studied by adopting different methods and assumptions. Particularly, a special case, 
backward bifurcation, was discussed for the transmission of ZVL.  
 Last but not least, the methodology and modeling framework used in this dissertation can 
be expanded to other disease situations and intervention applications, and have a broad impact to 
the research area related to mathematical modeling, epidemiology, decision-making processes, and 
industrial engineering. The further studies can combine the changes of human behaviors and 
intervention strategies by policy-makers so as to seek an optimal information dissemination to 
minimize the social costs and the number of infected individuals. If successful, this research should 
aid policy-makers by improving communication between them and the public, by directing 
educational efforts, and by predicting public response to infectious diseases and new risk 
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1 
Chapter 1 - Research Summary 
 1.1 Introduction and background 
The infectious disease is a continuous threat to the human communities. In 1918, the 
influenza pandemic, called Spanish influenza, infected around “500 million people across the 
world and killed 50 to 100 millions of them” (1). Between November 2002 and July 2003, an 
infectious disease called severe acute respiratory syndrome, abbreviated as SARS, outbreak in 
China. It resulted in 775 deaths worldwide from the WHO report. In 2009, the second influenza 
pandemic involving H1N1 after 1918 appeared and more than 14,000 people dead because of this 
disease based on WHO report. Besides these new diseases showing up in the world, human beings 
are still suffering from some other infectious diseases, such as measles, HIV, malaria, etc. 
Human behaviors, as one of the most important factors which impact the dynamics of 
disease transmission, play a key role on mitigating and controlling the epidemic. However, the 
study and understanding of human reactions to the spread of infectious diseases are still in the very 
beginning phase and how human behaviors change during the spread of infectious disease has not 
been systematically investigated(2). Moreover, the study of human behaviors includes not only 
various enforced measures by public authorities such as school closure, quarantine, vaccination, 
etc, but also the spontaneous self-protective actions which are triggered by risk perception and fear 
of diseases. 
When an infectious disease spreads out into human communities, individuals may alter 
their behaviors to protect themselves from becoming infected. Such changes include improvement 
of personal hygiene, taking antiviral medicine, voluntary social distancing, voluntary vaccination, 
and other protective measures.  As an example, the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in 2003 caused 
many people to change their behaviors by taking several preventative measures (3,4).  
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On the other hand, the appropriate response from the public health authorities is essential 
to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases. However, the corresponding control strategies are not 
always known or the optimal policies are very difficult to quantify from the known facts or 
experiments for some diseases, especially those resulting in high mortality or huge loss on 
economics. One example is the Visceral Leishmaniasis (VL), which is a protozoan disease caused 
by parasites of the genus Leishmania and transmitted through the bite of infected sandflies. The 
current annual estimate of VL mortality is more than 50000 (5), an assumed underestimation 
because not all cases are reported and VL is often undiagnosed or unrecognized. However, 
quantitative conditions that are required to control or eradicate VL transmission have not been 
provided and there are no mathematical methods proposed to quantitatively calculate optimal 
control strategies for VL transmission. 
Hence, understanding the impacts of human behaviors to the dynamics of disease 
transmission and seeking the appropriated control strategies are two significant tasks to help 
policy-makers mitigate or control the spread of infectious diseases, which direct the needs of new 
models and methodologies in future public disease research. 
 1.2 Research objectives 
Several studies have been conducted in order to understand how these spontaneous 
behavioral changes help mitigate the spread of infection.  Funk reviewed the recent work on the 
influence of human behavior on the spread of infectious diseases, including using game theory to 
study the human response to epidemics (2).  Reluga constructed a differential game to study the 
benefit of social distancing behaviors (6).  Another differential model showing that changes to 
human behaviors significantly impact the spread of epidemics was proposed by Poletti, Ajelli, and 
Merler (7). To model the spontaneous changes of human behaviors, the susceptible individuals 
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were assumed to adopt two mutually exclusive behaviors, “normal” and “altered”, based on the 
perceived risk of infection. Regula, Bauch, and Galvani, in an epidemiological game examining 
voluntary vaccination, claimed disease eradication is hard to achieve by voluntary vaccination in 
a homogeneous population (8). All three models considered only the cases in a well-mixed 
population and failed to address the importance of contact structure over a heterogeneous 
population. On the other hand, studies focusing on a heterogeneous and spatially structured 
population can be shown to be more realistic and flexible successful when a social contact network 
is incorporated into the model (9-11). Hence, models that combines both a spatially contact 
structure and spontaneous behavior changes are could be a more suitable way to improve the 
existing models, and hence this is one the main objectives of this research. In addition, adoption 
of intervention strategies to different infectious diseases were studied under different scenarios. 
For different scenarios, the corresponding optimal strategies were taken into consideration. For 
demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach, one case study is chosen in this research to 
discuss the appropriate intervention strategies in epidemic.   
The motivation of this research was inspired by the evidences and discussion above. This 
research is aimed to develop new models and analytical methodologies to study the impacts of 
human behaviors in epidemic, which includes two main research tasks as follows: 
1. Understanding spontaneous changes of human behaviors: Adopt game theory 
to study the decision making process for changes of human behaviors. Develop 
temporal and spatial analytical models to simulate the changes of human behaviors 
by integrating the game theory into spatial contact structure. During this task, 
specific tasks are as follows: 
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 Study the risk perception of individuals to the information about infectious 
disease 
 Develop a novel spatial evolutionary game for decision making of 
individuals based on their risk perception 
 Identify key factors which impacts human decisions. 
 Evaluate the effects of human behavioral changes to the dynamics of disease 
transmission temporally and spatially.  
2. Seeking appropriate intervention strategies: Build mathematical models for VL 
transmissions. Conduct a variety of analyses to seek the feasible or optimal control 
strategies and provide recommendations on control strategy combinations for the 
different scenarios. During this tasks, specific methods are used as follows: 
 Develop mathematical models for VL disease 
 Identify key factors for transmission of VL through sensitivity analysis. 
 Study models’ behaviors at equilibrium points through stability and 
bifurcation analysis 
 Discuss the appropriate intervention strategies and seek optimal control 
strategies if possible.  
 1.3 Proposed methodologies 
To understand the spontaneous changes of human behaviors, a key concept is emphasized–
the balance of benefits and costs from such changes. With the assumption of rationality and self-
interest, people make decisions according to the information they acquire about a disease. Hence, 
information dissemination and individuals’ perception about the prevalence of infectious disease 
play crucial roles in the tradeoff between benefits and costs. In this research, a new methodology, 
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which combines the information transmission, contact networks, and changes of human behaviors 
with the dynamics of an epidemic is demonstrated. The methodology uses a spatial evolutionary 
game to model human behavior change and its impacts on the transmission process of infectious 
disease.  One advantage of adopting a spatial evolutionary game is the “spatial decision” The 
spatial game take the location information into consideration when individuals balance their costs 
and benefits, i.e. individuals in different locations may choose different strategies based on their 
local and global situations.  The other advantage of adopting a spatial evolutionary game is the 
convenience for studying the impacts of local information and global information related to 
behavior change.  The assumption on the impact of local information transmission is different from 
the impact of global information transmission and each individual will make behavior change 
decisions based on these two different pieces of information. Sensitivity analysis and numerical 
simulation are then carried out to study what are the key parameters that can significantly impact 
of human behaviors. This methodology is also applied to classic dynamic systems, which is widely 
used in the study of epidemiology. This application to dynamic system not only validate the 
correctness of the methodology, but also further discusses the impact of information dissemination 
to human decisions. A detailed description of the mathematical models is presented in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4. 
For the sake of understanding the intervention strategies, a collaborative research with 
researchers in the Department of Entomology at Kansas State University is conducted for 
transmission of VL. This study is focusing on the Visceral Leishmaniasis (VL) transmission. The 
VL is a vector-borne disease caused by protozoan flagellates of the genus Leishmania, is 
transmitted by sand flies. Except malaria, VL is the second-largest parasitic killer, responsible for 
an estimated 500,000 infections and 51,000 deaths annually worldwide. Mathematical models 
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proposed for VL have included the impact of dogs versus wild canids in disease dissemination and 
models developed to assist in control approaches. However, quantitative conditions that are 
required to control or eradicate VL transmission are not provided and there are no mathematical 
methods proposed to quantitatively calculate optimal control strategies for VL transmission. The 
research objective of this work was to model VL disease transmission system (specifically 
Zoonotic VL), perform bifurcation analysis to discuss control conditions, and calculate optimal 
control strategies. Three time-dependent control strategies involving dog populations, sand fly 
population, and humans are mainly discussed. Another strategy sometimes used in attempts to 
control zoonotic VL transmission, dog culling, is also evaluated. A detailed description of the 
mathematical models and analyses is presented in Chapter 5. 
 1.4 Research map 
This research plans to provide scientific and effective mathematical models for studying 
the impacts of human behaviors to the spread of infectious disease. Both of spontaneous changes 
of human behaviors and those changes by enforced measurements due to the intervention strategies 
are taken into consideration and this research should aid policy-makers by improving 
communication between them and the public, by directing educational efforts, and by predicting 
public response to infectious diseases and new risk management strategies. 
Figure 1.1 shows a research map that describes the research objective, research 
methodologies, and potential research contributions. 
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Figure 1.1 Research map 
Research 
Objective
Develop mathematical models 
to study impacts of human 
behaviors in epidemic
Develop modeling framework for 
spontaneous changes of human 
behaviors
Develop mathematical models to 
seek appropriate intervention 
strategies for VL.
Literature review for game theory 
in epidemic
Construct a spatial evolutionary 
game for human behaviors
Apply the new game to the disease 
transmission and information 
dissemination. 
Literature review 
for VL
Construct a 
mathematical model 
to simulate VL 
transmission
Seek optimal 
control strategies
Research 
Methodology
Contribution 1 Contribution 2
 
 1.5 Outlines 
The rest of dissertation is organized into five chapters: 1) Literature Review: for the study 
of spontaneous changes of human behaviors, the application of game theory to the epidemiology 
are reviewed and the basic spatial evolutionary game is introduced. For the study of intervention 
strategies, the optimal control theory in dynamic system and its application to infectious disease 
are discussed. 2) Modeling Infection Spread and Behavioral Change Using Spatial Games: for the 
first time, the new spatial evolutionary game to spontaneous changes of human behaviors is 
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developed and main numerical results are discussed. 3) Temporal and Spatial Analysis for Human 
Behaviors in Epidemic: The spatial evolutionary game built in Chapter 2 is applied to a dynamic 
system for validating the effectiveness of implementing the new game. More impacts of 
information dissemination are discussed temporally and spatially. 4) Zoonotic Visceral 
Leishmaniasis Transmission: Modeling, Backward Bifurcation, and Optimal Control: 
mathematical model is developed for better understanding the transmission of VL and seeking the 
optimal control strategies. 5) Conclusions, Contributions, and Future Works: the main conclusions 
and contributions are summarized and the potential future works are discussed. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 2.1 Game theory for human behaviors in epidemic  
 2.1.1 Introduction 
Infectious diseases continue to pose a threat to human society. In order to control the spread 
of infectious diseases and mitigate their impact, various strategies may be implemented such as 
pharmaceutical interventions (i.e. vaccine and antivirals) and non-pharmaceutical interventions 
(i.e. quarantine, isolation, social distancing, and school closure) (12). In addition, effective control 
of an epidemic outbreak requires rapid logistics operation. Allocation and transportation of 
medical supplies and human resources are of critical importance since rapid responses may contain 
the spread of infectious disease under control (13). Recently, self-initiated human behaviors (i.e. 
voluntary vaccination, voluntary quarantine, or public avoidance), as important factors that affect 
the spread of infectious disease, have attracted increasing attentions (2). Understanding the impact 
of human behaviors on the spread of disease can not only be a key to improving control efforts, 
but also can guide policy-maker to determine necessary intervention strategies. Regardless of 
whether human behavior is spontaneous or regulated; individuals’ decisions do not merely depend 
on themselves, but also on others’ choices. Thus, game theory, as a study of conflict and 
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers, plays an important role in the control of 
the spread of infectious diseases.  
Game theory is a commonly used approach for modeling competing behaviors of 
interacting decision-makers. It has been applied to a variety of fields, including economics, 
politics, resource allocation and networking, biology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, and so on. 
In recent decades, game theory has also been used in epidemiology, especially involving epidemic 
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problems related to human behaviors.  A variety of topics are covered, such as vaccination, social 
distancing, preparedness for disasters (including epidemics), and so on.  
Here, we aim to systematically review the applications of game theory to epidemic control. 
The literature classification is based on intervention/prevention strategies. There are a total of four 
categories taken into consideration: vaccination, antivirals/antibiotics, social distancing, and 
logistic operations.  More specifically, vaccination and antivirals/antibiotics correspond to reduce 
the intensity of the infection, social distancing corresponds to the reduction of contact rates 
(sometimes social distancing also includes the reduction of intensity of the infection in general 
models which do not specify certain type of strategies), and logistic operations correspond to 
resource allocations and preparedness for pandemics. We do not combine vaccination and 
antivirals/antibiotics into one category since effects of vaccination and usage of drugs are quite 
different and there are substantial papers focusing on vaccination instead of usage of 
antivirals/antibiotics. Considering the vast amount of literature, only human disease is considered 
in this paper. All other diseases are excluded.  
This section is organized as follows: basic concept of game theory and Nash Equilibrium 
are introduced in Section 2.1.2. Section 2.1.3 illustrates the classification of game theory in 
epidemiology with applications, and Section 2.1.4 is a summary with further discussion. 
 2.1.2 Game theory and Nash equilibrium 
Individuals have to make decisions regarding a variety of prevention strategies during 
epidemics such as vaccination, usage of antiviral/antibiotic drugs, avoidance of public places, etc. 
Not all of these decisions are made depending on individuals themselves, but also determined by 
others’ choices. Game theory, as a commonly used tool to study conflicts among decision-makers, 
is an appropriate approach to study human behaviors during the epidemic.  
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In a classic game, there are three elementary components: players, strategies, and payoffs. 
Each player has the complete information about the game and rationally (but non-cooperatively) 
chooses the strategy which could maximize his/her own payoff.  As such, players make the best 
decisions for themselves after a game; however, the outcome is not necessarily optimal for the 
entire system. One of the most famous games is the one called “prisoner’s dilemma”, which 
describes a scenario in which two prisoners could either betray the other by testifying the other’s 
crime or remain silent. The payoff matrix is shown below: 
Table 2.1 Payoff Matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma  
 Cooperate Betray 
Cooperate R, R S, T 
Betray T, S P, P 
In Table 2.1, the relationship among R, S, T, and P is T > R > P > S. In this case, both 
prisoners always choose to betray the other. By using this strategy they both maximize their own 
payoff regardless of what choice the other makes. Hence, in the end the payoff for both of them is 
P. However, it is apparent that prisoners can gain some payoff if both of them choose to cooperate 
with the other one since R is greater than P. From this point of view, one could argue that the self-
interest behavior sometimes is not the best choice for individuals. 
In game theory, if no players can gain any payoff by changing only their own strategies, 
we called it “Nash Equilibrium”. The outcome “betray – betray” in the prisoner’s dilemma is the 
Nash Equilibrium since the prisoner will lose payoff if he only changes his own strategy. The Nash 
Equilibrium concept is commonly used to analyze a game and study the interaction among 
decision-makers. However, the Nash Equilibrium in the classic game cannot explain the 
cooperation phenomena which could optimize the entire system’s payoff due to the self-interest 
behaviors of players.   
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In reality, sometimes individuals will cooperate with others, leading to an optimization for 
all players. To explain this phenomenon, one extension of the classic game is that individuals have 
a chance to change their strategies based on a rule, called “revision protocol”, if they play the game 
repeatedly. For instance, individuals could imitate others’ strategies based on the previous game’s 
outcome. As such, individuals do not have to play the game rationally, but instead, they are able 
to test how well their strategies are. This style of game is referenced as “evolutionary game” which 
is originally studied in biology. Many variations of the revision protocol could be applied to the 
evolutionary game and, in turn, the outcome of game could be shifted to the global optimal solution 
with different degrees. Particularly, if the contact network is taken into consideration for revision 
protocol, the game is called spatial game.  
In epidemiology, game theory can be adopted to explain a variety of self-interest behaviors 
during the epidemic, for instance, free riders in vaccination problem. When a large number of 
people in a population are immune to a certain type of infectious disease, the spread of this disease 
will be stopped or slowed down and people who do not have immunity to this disease are protected 
indirectly by others. This phenomenon is called “herd immunity” and people who are not immune 
to the disease are called “free riders”. In this case, game theory becomes an appropriate method to 
analyze human behaviors for voluntary vaccination problems. More details of vaccination 
problems and other applications of game theory in epidemiology are discussed in the next section. 
 2.1.3 Classification of game theory in epidemiology 
The application of game theory in epidemiology is categorized as four parts: vaccination, 
antivirals/antibiotics, social distancing, and logistic operations. The distribution of article 
references within the mentioned four categories is shown in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2 Distribution of paper in literature 
Category Number of papers 
Vaccination 23 
Antivirals/antibiotics 4 
Social distancing 8 
Logistics operations 2 
In Table 2.2, it is obvious that game theory is most commonly linked to a vaccination topic. 
Very few papers discuss usage of drugs and logistics operations using game theory. For 
antivirals/antibiotics, one reason is that it is very difficult to evaluate the effect of usage of drugs; 
on the other hand, some models integrate usage of antivirals/antibiotics into social distancing 
which do not focus on the study of usage of drugs itself. For logistics operations, very few topics 
are related to competing behaviors among individuals so that game theory is not a proper approach 
in most cases. However, there are still a few applications when considering the competition among 
organizations or countries.    
 2.1.3.1 Vaccination 
Vaccination is referenced as “the most effective approach to preventing transmission of 
vaccine-preventable diseases, such as seasonal influenza and influenza-alike epidemics, as well as 
reducing morbidity and mortality” (14). However, to date, smallpox is the only human disease that 
has been entirely eliminated because of the use of vaccination (15). “Herd immunity” and vaccine 
scares is part of reasons for the resiliency of vaccine-preventable diseases and extensive efforts 
have been contributed to studying interplay between disease transmission, vaccine coverage, and 
human behaviors by integrating game theory into a traditional epidemiological models (2,8,14,16-
35). The main topics of this review could be classified into three parts: self-interest vs group-
interest in a homogeneous population, self-interest vs group-interest in a heterogeneous 
population, and others. 
Self-interest vs group-interest in a homogeneous population 
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A basic vaccination game was developed by Bauch et al (17) to study the smallpox 
vaccination which integrated game theory into the epidemic modelling. Based on the model, the 
author concluded that the global optimality could be achieved only by voluntary vaccination. The 
simple version of a vaccination game in (17) is shown below: 
Considering a population with N individuals, all of them are players in the game. There are 
two strategies available to them: vaccination and non-vaccination. The risk associated to the 
vaccination is denoted by r and the risk of infection is denoted by πθ whose value is related to θ 
which represents the fraction of the population that is vaccinated. The player who chooses 
vaccination get payoff –r while the player who chooses non-vaccination gets payoff -πθ. Hence, 
the expected payoff for individuals who choose strategy P is  
𝐸(𝑃, 𝜃) = −𝑟𝑃 − 𝜋𝜃(1 − 𝑃) (2.1) 
In epidemiology, the basic reproduction number R0, which is defined as the secondary 
attack rate when an infectious individual invades into an entire susceptible population, is a critical 
indicator. When R0 is smaller than 1, the spread of infectious disease could be controlled; while 
the infectious disease will spread out if R0 is larger than 1.  
By coupling game theory into epidemical model, the vaccination coverage levels in Nash 
Equilibrium 𝑃∗ and optimal solution 𝑃𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 could be solved respectively and the results are shown 
below: 
𝑃∗ = 1 −
1
𝑅0(1−𝑟)
 (2.2) 
𝑃𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1 −
1
𝑅0
 (2.3) 
where 0 < r < 1. As such, the vaccination coverage level in Nash Equilibrium is unlikely 
to reach the level in optimal solution. A similar conclusion was also drawn in model (21), which 
considered self-interested people in a voluntary vaccination problem using a vaccination game.  
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Many variations are studied based on the above vaccination game, including include 
imitation/learning behaviors in well-mixed population (8,22) and in complex networks (19,20,34), 
incentives offered (18), and altruism (23). 
Vardavas et al (18) used computational modelling to determine whether the vaccination 
coverage level, which is necessary for preventing influenza epidemics, can be reached when 
offering incentives to individuals. In their work, they proposed that “the severe epidemics will not 
be prevented if vaccination is voluntary and no incentives are offered”. In contrast, Reluga (8) 
claimed that “optimal individual behavior can vary between universal vaccination and no 
vaccination, depending on the relative costs and benefits to individuals”. Self-interested behaviors 
can lead to oscillations in vaccination coverage levels over time. 
People’s behavior and decisions are often influenced by many external factors, such as the 
opinions of friends and families, rumors, fear, information from news, radio, report, and so on. 
Instead of choosing static strategies, dynamic behaviors are studied when the imitation or learning 
behaviors are taken into consideration. Considering learning behaviors, Bauch (22) developed a 
game dynamic model and assumed “people adopt strategies according to an imitation dynamic, 
and subsequently base vaccination decisions on disease prevalence and perceived risks of vaccines 
and disease”. Instead of obtaining a stable state, oscillations in vaccination coverage levels are 
more possible when people dynamically change their strategies based on the disease prevalence 
and others’ behaviors. More recently, the dynamics of vaccination behaviors are studied in more 
complex network. Particularly in (20), two different game rules lead to very different outcomes. 
The results from memory-based model, which means individuals choose strategies based on past 
experience, and from risk-evaluation model, which means individuals choose strategies based on 
the prevalence, are opposite when we consider different costs of vaccination.   
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In game theory, a basic assumption is that individuals interplay with others according to 
self-interest and always want to maximize their own payoffs. However, it may not be always true 
in reality. Shim et al (23) conducted a survey to test how altruism affected individuals’ decisions 
in vaccination problem. They claimed that “that altruism plays an important role in vaccination 
decisions”. A game-based epidemiological model was developed for influenza vaccination and it 
turned out that the Nash Equilibrium moved towards the optimal solution when the altruism was 
taken into consideration. 
Self-interest vs group-interest in heterogeneous population 
The population is considered to be heterogeneous, when its individuals are divided into a 
finite number of distinct population groups, where each group may have distinct perceptions about 
vaccine and risks’ evaluation. According to the specific disease, the group could be classified by 
age and gender. For example, transmission of influenza indicate that elderly individuals face the 
highest mortality risk, but children contribute most to disease transmission. In this case, elderly 
individuals face the higher disease risks than adults and should be protected through vaccination 
of adults.  
In (24,31), Cojcaru et al analyzed the dynamics of the vaccinating behavior in a population 
consisting of two distinct social groups, a “vaccine-inclined majority group” and a “vaccine-averse 
minority group”. It turned out that the vaccine coverage level in this heterogeneous population is 
higher than the corresponding homogeneous population. In addition, it is possible that there is a 
high vaccination rate for majority group and a low vaccination rate for minority group under 
certain conditions. 
As the previous discussion, the elderly has the highest risk of influenza mortality. The 
Centers for Disease Control follow the principles of voluntary vaccination and vaccinate the 
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elderly with higher priority. However, preferentially vaccinating children may be more efficient 
to reduce the influenza transmission. Galvani et al (25) parameterized a game-theoretic model of 
influenza vaccination according to “a questionnaire data on actual perceptions of influenza and its 
vaccine”. Their results proposed that it is possible to align Nash Equilibrium with global optimal 
solution.  Another age-structured model is constructed by Shim et al (26). Their results claimed 
that priorities of vaccination for different age groups are different compared Nash Equilibrium and 
optimal solution. To imitate the real world transmission of influenza, a game theory experiment 
was conducted by Chapman et al (27). The results of this experiment are consistent with the general 
conclusion which self-interested players lead to Nash Equilibrium and global-interested players 
lead to optimal solution. 
Instead of grouping population by age, a disease which could be transmitted from a mother 
to a fetus results in gender-specific vaccination.  
For example, rubella is a highly contagious childhood disease and rubella can result in 
severe congenital defects if transmitted from a mother to a fetus. Shim et al (28) developed a game 
theoretic epidemiological model for rubella transmission and vaccination.  Their results showed 
that high vaccination coverage levels for both of males and females are required for optimal 
solutions, while Nash Equilibrium indicated that demands for vaccines among males and females 
are 0% and 100%, respectively. 
When a heterogeneous population is taken into consideration, the general conclusion -- 
self-interest optimal coverage is lower than group-interest optimal coverage -- may not be always 
true. The typical relationship was reversed. In (29), where an age-depend game-theory epidemic 
model was applied to the USA and Israel for chickenpox. 
Others 
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Although most of research focuses on Nash vaccination and global optimal vaccination, 
game theory is also applied to other topics in vaccination. Barrett (30) developed a model which 
combined epidemiology, economics, and game theory to study the global disease eradication, 
showing that “even epidemiology favors eradication, but a global disease eradication program may 
fail for institutional reasons”. Wu et al (32) took the imperfect vaccine into account. The results in 
their study showed that the number of effectively vaccinated individuals increased when the 
effectiveness of vaccination increased and therefore contain the epidemic spread. The results 
suggested that the impact of the epidemic can be better mitigated if vaccination effectiveness was 
increased. Another topic was discussed in (33) which focused on the incentives’ effect in influenza 
vaccination policy. Results suggested that “the optimal incentives should be greater when less 
contagious seasonal strains of influenza are involved and greater for the nonelderly population 
rather than the elderly”. Moreover, a phenomenon known as the “wait and see” vaccinating 
behavior during 2009 H1N1 pandemic was studied in (35). Many individuals prefer to “wait and 
see” until further information was available instead of choosing vaccination in the beginning. The 
delay-vaccinators either are protected by early vaccinators due to herd immunity or get vaccination 
after the safety of vaccine tested by early vaccinators. This adaptive behavior lead to “the timing 
of the epidemic peak to be strongly conserved”. 
Summary 
Vaccination problem is most commonly studied by using game theory in epidemiology. In 
vaccination game, all individuals in the population are players. Strategies are vaccination or non-
vaccination. Payoff functions and revision protocols could be different but the basic concept for 
payoff function is utility function (cost function) and for revision protocols are memory-based or 
risk evaluation. Most of research focus on the comparison of Nash Equilibrium and global optimal 
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solution. In general, the vaccination coverage level is lower in Nash Equilibrium than that in 
optimal solution. However, the conclusion may vary under different extensions and assumptions. 
Adaptive behaviors such as imitation, risk evaluation, wait and see, etc, may shift the Nash 
Equilibrium towards the optimal solution. When it comes to different groups of individuals, the 
typical conclusion could be reversed. In sum, voluntary vaccination program is very difficult to 
eradicate the infectious disease but better solutions could be obtained if individuals are motivated 
or instructed correctly. 
 2.1.3.2 Antivirals/Antibiotics 
Only four papers are selected in the topic of antivirals/ antibiotics. The concept of 
application of game theory are also quite different among different authors. In the usage of drugs 
games, all individuals in the population are players and their strategies include drug-acceptance 
and drug-refusal. Payoff functions are defined in different ways in different papers, including cost 
function (36), life expectancy (37), and lengths of infected period in terms of drug-resistance 
(38,39). 
In (36), Shim et al studied antiviral intervention during an influenza pandemic through 
evaluating optimal coverage level for antiviral drug use, from both of individual and the population 
sides, which is similar to the method of studying vaccination game. Their results showed that the 
self-interest driven demand for antiviral drugs during a pandemic would be much lowered than the 
optimal solution. The cost of drugs plays a key role when individuals make decisions. And 
therefore, it is almost impossible to control infectious disease through only usage of drugs if no 
incentives are offered. A similar conclusion was drawn by van Boven et al. (37) when considering 
the costs of treatment.    
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Another two papers focused on the use of antibiotic drugs. Overuse of antibiotic drugs may 
lead to an increase of the number of drug-resistance strains which make a “tragedy of commons” 
while antibiotics could protect individuals from infectious diseases.  The conflict of self-interest 
use and global-interest use could be analyzed by game theory. In (38), Porco el at developed a 
simple transmission model which study the development and spread of drug resistant organisms. 
According to their results, “antibiotic use may indeed lead to a tragedy of the commons, in which 
individual incentives lead to antibiotic use rates that are too high to yield the best community 
outcome”. A similar result was obtained in (39) when Gao el at proposed a simple two-disease 
epidemic model, where there is only one drug-sensitives strain for first disease, while there are 
both drug-sensitive and drug-resistant strains for second disease. 
 2.1.3.3 Social distancing 
Social distancing is the prevention strategy by reducing daily contact rates to other 
individuals. It includes school closure, isolation, public avoidance, and so on.  Sometimes social 
distancing also includes the behavior which reduces the intensity of infection.  In literature, some 
models are developed in a general way, which fail to specify the certain type of human behaviors. 
All of these human behaviors are considered as social distancing. In social distancing game, all 
individuals in the population are players, and their strategies include normal behaviors (which is 
not changed at all during the epidemic) and altered behaviors (individuals protect themselves 
through changing their behaviors, including reduction of intensity of contacts and reduction of 
contact rate to others.) Change of human behaviors could be extended into different levels but we 
refer to “altered behaviors” to represent individuals who change their behaviors to protect 
themselves. The payoff function is an utility function or cost function since individuals have to 
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pay extra costs if they would like to protect themselves but they have less risks than normal 
individuals.  
People are sometimes reluctant to pay the costs for social distancing, which will impact the 
effectiveness as a control measure. A differential game was used by Reluga (6) to study the impacts 
of social distancing by calculating the equilibrium behaviors based on different cost-functions. 
Their results showed that individuals can have benefits through social distancing but only social 
distancing cannot stop the spread of infectious disease. In (40,41), Chen adopted different players’ 
responses to study the equilibrium of the public avoidance game. The results showed that, “in some 
cases, the Nash equilibrium could also be the social optimum but for other cases, Nash equilibrium 
is typically not socially optimal in the public avoidance game. “ 
In (7), two mutually exclusive behaviors “normal” and “altered” are incorporated into SIR 
models to study the spontaneous changes of human behaviors. The altered individuals have a 
reduced infection rate, which could be achieved by social distancing, vaccination, or antivirals. 
Game theory is applied to the process by which individuals choose to be normal or altered. A 
similar concept is adopted in (42) which also takes the spatial structure into consideration.  
An interesting topic about contact tracing, defined as “the identification of individuals who 
have come into contact with an infectious case and may be infected”, is studied by Sippl-Swezey 
(43). A small group of individuals are investigated and a mathematical model with game theory 
was proposed to study conflicts of interests considering the perceived costs of disclosure. The 
results showed that the optimal decision is to choose not disclose to others if the costs are taken 
into consideration. However, if all individuals disclose all contacts, it turns out the alignment of 
individual and group optimality.  
 2.1.3.4 Logistic operations 
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Very few models are studied for the application of game theory in the topic of logistics 
operation in epidemiology. A systematic review about epidemics control and logistics operations 
is written by Dasaklis (13). However, only two papers are related to game theory, one for the 
allocation of influenza vaccines (44) and the other one for stockpile of medical supplies for 
hospitals before a disaster (45). In logistics operation game, the players are not individuals, but 
hospitals, health organizations, countries, etc. Strategies and payoff functions varied in different 
scenarios. Both of studies focus on comparing decentralized model and centralized model, which 
corresponds to the self-interest solution and optimal solution. 
 2.1.4 Summary and discussion 
From the selected literature, game theory has been applied to most topics that are related 
to mitigation strategies in epidemiology. Most of efforts are focused on the vaccination program, 
which is the most effective approach for vaccine-preventable infectious diseases. In order to solve 
the game in epidemiology, researchers mainly compare the Nash Equilibrium and optimal solution.  
Different assumptions lead to different conclusions and sometimes Nash Equilibrium could be 
shifted to the optimal solution. In addition, the impacts of game to the spread of infectious disease 
are also studied. Through changing the value of parameters in payoff functions or revision 
protocols, the solution could be shifted to the optimal solution.  
Despite the fact that game theory has been successfully applied to epidemiology, the 
application of game theory still remains a promising research area. We believe that there is a great 
opportunity for future research efforts. More precisely, future research directions may include: 
• Incomplete information for individuals: most of research in game theory assumes 
that people have complete information and estimates the risk based on the correct information. 
However, lacking information may lead people to make wrong decisions. 
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• Media broadcast: information dissemination mainly depends on mass media. Thus, 
media plays an essential role in the game. Involving media into the game portion could impact 
human behaviors, so that may indirectly impact the spread of infectious disease.  
• Involve policy-makers: most of game theory in epidemiology studies the change of 
human behaviors and how to align Nash equilibrium to global-optimum. However, policy-makers, 
who is a very crucial player in the game, could be involved in the epidemic game.  
• Incentives of individuals: there are a few articles mentioning the incentives of 
individuals. To motivate individuals to be global-interested, different motivation programs could 
be played by policy-makers. 
• Development of harmonized approaches: Most models only consider one strategy 
or one topic. More harmonized models could be developed, such as combining pharmaceutical 
interventions with non-pharmaceutical ones, or human behaviors with logistic operation plans. 
• Spatial Game: most of game theories do not consider the contact network which 
has a significant impact on both of spread of infectious disease and individuals’ decisions.  
• Analysis of models: after we compare the Nash Equilibrium and optimal solution, 
the corresponding policy should be studied so that Nash Equilibrium could be shifted to optimal 
solution. The effectiveness of these policies should be studied as well. 
 2.2 Spatial evolutionary game 
The spatial evolutionary game is a combination of classic game theory and cellular 
automaton, representing strategies, players, payoff function, structure of population, and an 
updating rule.  It is first introduced to study the local cooperation phenomena in prisoner dilemma 
by Nowak and May (46). This methodology can analyze various structures of populations using a 
regular lattice (47), scale-free networks (48), and real social networks (49).  Evolutionary games 
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on graphs are reviewed by Szabo and Fath (49). This concept requires an updating policy based 
on the payoff function with different updating schemes such as synchronous or asynchronous 
updates. Several common updating schemes are reviewed by Newth (50) and update rules are 
summarized by Roca, Cuesta, and Sanchez (51). 
A simple example of spatial evolutionary game in lattice is shown below for the purpose 
of introduction. Assume two types of players play a game, and two strategies are available to each 
player. The payoff matrix is shown in Table 2.3. Players could choose either strategy A or strategy 
B and payoff value could be a, b, c, or d correspondingly according to players’ strategies. Figure 
2.1 describes the location of each player. The contact pattern in this game is von Neumann 
neighborhood (four nearest neighborhood). The player would play the game with all neighbors 
and the summation of payoff value in the game against each neighbor is the final payoff value for 
each player. The result is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Spatial evolutionary game example 
 
After each turn, players could reconsider their own strategies based on their own payoff 
values and other players’ payoff values. In addition, players update their strategies synchronously 
or asynchronously. 
Table 2.3 Payoff Matrix  
 A B 
A a b 
B c d 
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 2.3 Optimal control for intervention strategies 
 2.3.1 Introduction 
For a given system, an optimal control problem is to find a control strategy which reaches 
a certain optimality criterion. Specifically, a set of differential equations are given to describe the 
trajectory of the control variables which minimize the objective function. The optimal control can 
be calculated by Pontryagin's maximum principle or solving the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman 
equation. In this section, the basic definition of optimal control problem and Pontryagin's 
maximum principle are introduced based on the book by Evans L.C.(52). 
Given an ordinary differential equation(ODE) with the form below: 
{
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑥(𝑡))  (𝑡 > 0)
𝑥(0) = 𝑥0                           
 (2.4) 
Assume the initial point 𝑥0 ∈ 𝑅𝑛 and the function 𝑓: 𝑅𝑛 → 𝑅𝑛, our goal is to study the 
dynamical evolution of the state of the system, which is the curve x: [0,∞) → 𝑅𝑛.  
If f also depends on control parameter 𝑢(∙)  where 𝑢(𝑡) ∈ 𝑅𝑚 , the equation in 2.4 is 
rewritten as:  
{
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡))  (𝑡 > 0)
𝑥(0) = 𝑥0                                     
 (2.5) 
Suppose the initial time be 0 and the final time be 𝑡𝑓, the objective function (or payoff 
function) can be described as:  
𝑆(𝑢(∙)) = 𝜑 (𝑥(𝑡𝑓)) + ∫ 𝐹(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡))𝑑𝑡
𝑡𝑓
0
, (2.6) 
where 𝜑:𝑅𝑛 → 𝑅 and 𝐹: 𝑅𝑛 × 𝑈 → 𝑅 are given. 
The aim of optimal control is to find a control 𝑢∗(∙), which maximizes (or minimizes) 
objective function 𝑆(𝑢(∙)), i.e. 
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𝑆(𝑢∗(∙)) ≥ 𝑆(𝑢(∙)) (2.7) 
To derive the solution of 𝑢∗(∙), the optimal control can be solved using Pontryagin's 
maximum principle. Suppose Hamiltonian function is 
𝐻(𝑥, 𝜆, 𝑢) = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑢) ∗ 𝜆 +  𝐹(𝑥, 𝑢) (2.8) 
where 𝑥, 𝜆 ∈ 𝑅𝑛, 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈, 𝑢∗(∙) is the optimal control, 𝜆 and 𝑥∗(∙) is the corresponding trajectory. 
Also, for 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓 a function 𝜆
∗: [0, 𝑡𝑓] → 𝑅
𝑛 satisfies  
?̇?∗(𝑡) = ∇𝜆𝐻(𝑥
∗(𝑡), 𝜆∗(𝑡), 𝑢∗(𝑡)), (2.9) 
?̇?∗(𝑡) = −∇𝑥𝐻(𝑥
∗(𝑡), 𝜆∗(𝑡), 𝑢∗(𝑡)), (2.10) 
and 
𝐻(𝑥∗(𝑡), 𝜆∗(𝑡), 𝑢∗(𝑡)) = max (𝐻(𝑥∗(𝑡), 𝜆∗(𝑡), 𝑢(𝑡))). (2.11) 
 In addition, the terminal condition is 
?̇?∗(𝑡𝑓) = ∇𝜑 (𝑥(𝑡𝑓)), (2.12) 
 2.3.2 Application of optimal control for dynamic models 
The optimal control methods have been used widely to study infectious diseases and the 
corresponding optimal intervention strategies when the dynamic models are considered.  However, 
the methods introduced in section 2.3.1 may not work for non-dynamic systems (such as statistical 
model), which requires other numerical methods to solve the optimal control problems. Those 
methods are out of the scope and are not included in this section.   
Lashari (53) developed a simple mathematical model to seek the cost effective control 
strategies for the general vector borne disease.  The SIR model was adopted to represent the 
compartments of hosts and the SI model was used to describe the vector population. An iterative 
method, called the semi-implicit finite difference method, was present to find the numerical 
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solution of the control problem. A similar model representing the optimal control of a vector borne 
disease with horizontal transmission was also discussed by Lashari in 2012 (54).  
Jung (55) studied the optimal control of treatments for a two-strain tuberculosis using a 
system of six ordinary differential equations. The objective functional not only minimized the 
number of latent and infectious drug-resistant tuberculosis but also minimized the cost of control 
treatments. In 2009, treatment and prevention from Malaria was discussed by Blayneh (56). The 
objective of optimal control was minimizing the implementing costs. Numerical results showed 
that prevention and treatment strategies lowered the number of exposed individuals and infected 
individuals. Blayneh (57) also developed a more complicated dynamic system with 9 differential 
equations to study the transmission of West Nile Virus in 2010. Using an iterative method, the 
optimality system coupled with two control strategies were solved numerically by Runge-Kutta 
method of order four. The results showed that mosquito-reduction strategies were more effective 
than personal protection. In 2009, Zaman (58) discussed the optimal treatment of an SIR model 
with time delay. Particularly, the optimal control strategies were solved for the transmission of 
Ebola virus. 
In addition, the optimal control problems are also adopted in cellular level disease 
modeling, such as HIV. An ODE system was used to study the interplay between human immune 
system and HIV(59). In this study, chemotherapy was introduced in an early treatment setting and 
the corresponding optimal chemotherapy strategy was solved based on a combination of 
maximizing benefit from T cell counts and minimizing total costs of chemotherapy. Later on, 
Culshaw (60) studied the same optimal treatment problem by maximizing the benefit from levels 
of healthy CD4+ cells and immune response cells instead of only T cell counts as well as 
minimizing the cost of chemotherapy. The ODEs were also used to study the interaction between 
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HIV and T-cells by Joshi (61) in 2002, and an interactive method was adopted to solve the optimal 
control strategies with two drug treatments.  
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Chapter 3 - Modeling Infection Spread and Behavioral Change 
Using Spatial Games 
Chapter 3 is based on the paper “Modeling Infection Spread and Behavioral Change Using Spatial 
Games” to be published in the journal Health Systems, 2015, 4(1): 41-53. 
 Abstract 
This chapter presents a methodology that combines information transmission, contact 
networks, and changes of human behaviors in modeling the dynamics of infectious diseases.  The 
methodology presented is based on a spatial evolutionary game with additional information 
representing human behavior.  This approach is used to model the transmission process of 
infectious disease, which emphasizes the human response and information transmission in a social 
context.  It combines the advantages of evolutionary game theory with modeling the spontaneous 
changes of human behaviors based on the balance of benefits and costs.  The model assumes 
rational participants who use information acquired to make individual decisions.  This novel 
modeling approach shows the global spread of infection considering the individualized behavior. 
 3.1 Introduction 
When an infectious disease spreads out into human communities, individuals may alter 
their behaviors to protect themselves from becoming infected. Such changes include improvement 
of personal hygiene, taking antiviral medicine, voluntary social distancing, voluntary vaccination, 
and other protective measures.  As an example, the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in 2003 caused 
many people to change their behaviors by taking several preventative measures (3,4).  
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Several studies have been conducted in order to understand how these spontaneous 
behavioral changes help mitigate the spread of infection.  Funk reviewed the recent work on the 
influence of human behavior on the spread of infectious diseases, including using game theory to 
study the human response to epidemics (2).  Reluga constructed a differential game to study the 
benefit of social distancing behaviors (6).  Another differential model showing that changes to 
human behaviors significantly impact the spread of epidemics was proposed by Poletti, Ajelli, and 
Merler (7). To model the spontaneous changes of human behaviors, the susceptible individuals 
were assumed to adopt two mutually exclusive behaviors, “normal” and “altered”, based on the 
perceived risk of infection. Regula, Bauch, and Galvani, in an epidemiological game examining 
voluntary vaccination, claimed disease eradication is hard to achieve by voluntary vaccination in 
a homogeneous population (8). All three models only considered the case in a well-mixed 
population and failed to indicate the importance of contact structure. However, a heterogeneous 
and spatially structured population can be more successful when a social contact network is 
incorporated into the model (9-11). Hence, the combination of the impact of a spatially contact 
structure and the impact of spontaneous behavior changes is believed to be an appropriate way to 
improve the existing models.  
Based on these works about spontaneous changes of human behaviors, a key concept is 
emphasized–the balance of benefits and costs from such changes. With the assumption of 
rationality and self-interest, people make decisions according to the information they acquire about 
a disease. Hence, information transmission and individuals’ perception about the prevalence of 
infectious disease play crucial roles in the tradeoff between benefits and costs. To evaluate 
individuals’ assessments of prevalence of infectious diseases based on the information acquired, 
Chen (63) introduced a social sampling method.  It allows participants to make assessments based 
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on partial information, instead of full information assumed by other models. However, this method 
assumes there is no centralized dissemination of information regarding the prevalence of the 
disease.  Funk et al. studied the effect of local information transmission in a social network on 
epidemic outbreaks (64). The model was based on the author’s hypothesis that changes of human 
behavior affected by the information transmission network can restrict the spread of infectious 
diseases.  Kiss developed a model considering sexually transmitted infections based on the 
information transmission (65). It illustrated how an active host population and the transmission of 
information triggered by the disease can eradicate or minimize infection levels.  
Over the course of the epidemic, the spread patterns of the disease could be very different 
between the rural and metropolitan areas due to the population density and contact structure 
variations between different areas.  In addition, human behaviors changes within a largely 
heterogeneous population group during the course of the epidemic could sway the disease’s 
reproduction ratio (R0) over time, instead of the commonly assumed constant R0 for the underlying 
disease suggested in majority the existing literatures.  The changes of the human behaviors or self-
mitigation activities many times are by and large driven by the current information individual 
obtain either by the media, propaganda, or other individuals within their community.  The model 
presented in this article attempt to include these significant factors in our model using a straight 
forward spatial game structure.  We assume the un-infected population can make free will behavior 
changes, such as social distancing, self-quarantining, vaccination, taking preventive medicine, 
self-protection devices, etc. to reduce his or her chances to get infected.  However, these behavior 
changes come with associated "costs," including expenses, loss of income opportunities, costs of 
inconveniences, etc.  Each individual could also possess different perceptions for the information 
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related to the ongoing epidemic and decided to either do nothing or take on different actions to 
reduce his or her chances to acquire the disease.   
In this paper, we demonstrate a methodology that combines the information transmission, 
contact networks, and changes of human behaviors with the dynamics of an epidemic.  The 
methodology uses a spatial evolutionary game to model human behavior change and its impacts 
on the transmission process of infectious disease.  One advantage of adopting a spatial evolutionary 
game is the “spatial decision” The spatial game take the location information into consideration 
when individuals balance their costs and benefits, i.e. individuals in different locations may choose 
different strategies based on their local and global situations.  The other advantage of adopting a 
spatial evolutionary game is the convenience for studying the impacts of local information and 
global information.  We assumed the impact of local information transmission is different from 
the impact of global information transmission. Hence, it is convenient to collect local information 
as well as global information from which individuals base their decisions in a spatially structured 
population. 
The spatial evolutionary game is a combination of classic game theory and cellular 
automaton, representing strategies, players, payoff function, structure of population, and an 
updating rule.  This methodology can analyze various structures of populations using a regular 
lattice (46), scale-free networks (47), and real social networks (48).  This concept requires an 
updating policy based on the payoff function with different updating schemes such as synchronous 
or asynchronous updates.  Several common updating schemes are reviewed by Newth (50) and 
update rules are summarized by Roca, Cuesta, Sanchez (51).  
This paper first presents in Section 3.2 a conceptual model which relates the spatial game 
using information transmission to the spread of epidemics.  Then a mathematical model is 
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constructed in Section 3.3, and a small example and sensitivity analysis is shown in Section 3.4.  
In Section 3.5, we demonstrate the calculations of the reproductive ratio (R0). A brief summary is 
presented in Section 3.6. 
 3.2 Conceptual Model 
The basic idea of changing human behavior based on information dissemination is 
described in Figure 3.1. When the first infected individual is discovered in a community, the 
infectious disease starts spreading in the local neighborhood.  At the same time, information about 
the disease such as transmission patterns, infection rate, prevalence populations and locations, 
mortality, and other relative information is spread through word-of-mouth or informal networks, 
reports on newspaper, radio, and TV or online. People make decisions after acquiring this 
information. Some might take protective measures to prevent being infected.  Therefore, these 
human behavior changes impact the spread of underlying infectious diseases. 
To model the process of changes of human behaviors, a spatial game is applied to the 
epidemic. Combining a spatial game and the epidemic is done by integrating the transmission 
process into the spatial game.  The basic transmission process can be illustrated by employing the 
classic compartmental SIR model which represents susceptible, infected, and recovered 
individuals, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual model 
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Figure 3.2 SIR model 
 
A popular approach to present the  SIR system dynamics model  is using a system of 
ordinary differential equations (66): 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= −
1
𝑁
𝛽𝑆𝐼  
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
=
1
𝑁
𝛽𝑆𝐼 − 𝛾𝐼   
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾𝐼   
Given human behavior when individuals acquire information about infectious diseases 
corresponding to the ongoing epidemic, a susceptible individual can adopt one of two different 
strategies: normal or switch.  Normal strategy means the individual decided to maintain the status 
quo and do nothing to prevent the possible infections and such individuals here are called normal 
individuals.  The name “normal” is based on the “status quo bias” individual facing when making 
decision making.  The switch strategy means an individual will make an effort to protect him or 
herself and such individual is called a switcher. The same concept is also defined as normal and 
altered populations (7). This process is shown in Figure 3.3, and then a mathematical model is 
constructed according to this concept. 
Figure 3.3 SIR model with spatial game 
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 3.3 Mathematical Model 
 3.3.1 Notations 
To explain the whole process clearly, a list of notations is shown in this section. The 
population is assumed to be distributed in an m by n lattice and each location is indicated by (𝑖, 𝑗), 
where 𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑚 and 𝑗 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑛, are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Parameters in the model 
Parameters Interpretation 
m number of rows in the lattice for population distribution 
n number of columns in the lattice for population distribution 
(𝒊, 𝒋) location at the ith row and jth column in the lattice 
The total four compartments in this model are normal individuals, switchers, infected 
individuals, and recovered individuals, all listed in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Notation for compartments 
Parameters Interpretation 
NORMAL(𝒊, 𝒋) number of normal individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) 
S(𝒊, 𝒋) number of switchers in location (𝑖, 𝑗) 
I(𝒊, 𝒋) number of infected individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) 
R(𝒊, 𝒋) number of recovered individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) 
𝑵𝑶𝑹𝑴𝑨𝑳𝒕 (𝒊, 𝒋) number of normal individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) at time t in Eq. (3.11) 
𝑺𝒕 (𝒊, 𝒋) number of switchers in location (𝑖, 𝑗) at time t in Eq. (3.12)  
𝑰𝒕(𝒊, 𝒋) number of infected individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) at time t in Eq. (3.13) 
𝑹𝒕(𝒊, 𝒋) number of recovered individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) at time t in Eq. (3.14) 
Some additional notations for the distribution of population are used to denote the total 
number of individuals and population distribution in local and global perspectives, as shown in 
Table 3.3. 
36 
Table 3.3 Additional notations for population distribution 
Parameters Interpretation 
N (𝒊, 𝒋) total number of individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) 
 𝑺𝒍(𝒊, 𝒋)  portion of N (𝑖, 𝑗) who are switchers in the neighborhood of location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.17) 
 𝑰𝒍(𝒊, 𝒋) portion of N (𝑖, 𝑗) who are infected individuals in the neighborhood of location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.15) 
𝑺𝒈 portion of individuals who are switchers in the population in Eq. (3.18) 
𝑰𝒈 portion of individuals who are infected individuals in the population in Eq. (3.16) 
For the spatial game, several notations are defined and further discussed in the next section. 
A brief description for these notations is shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Additional notations for population distribution 
Parameters Interpretation 
𝑭𝒏(𝒊, 𝒋) payoff value for normal individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.1) 
𝑭𝒔(𝒊, 𝒋) payoff value for switchers in location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.2) 
𝑮() function for the estimated risk for normal individuals in local perspective in Eq. (3.3) 
𝑯() function for the estimated risk for normal individuals in global perspective in Eq. (3.4) 
𝒈() function for switchers externality in local perspective in Eq. (3.5) 
𝒉() function for switchers externality in global perspective in Eq. (3.6) 
𝒌𝒄 average cost of switching strategy in Eq. (3.2) 
𝛌 associated risk reduction due to the switch strategy in Eq. (3.2) 
𝒎𝟏 multiplier of local prevalence status in Eq. (3.3) 
𝒎𝟐 multiplier of global prevalence status in Eq. (3.4) 
𝒄𝟏 multiplier of local externality from switchers in Eq. (3.5) 
𝒄𝟐 multiplier of global externality from switchers in Eq. (3.6) 
𝑷𝒊𝒋(𝒏 → 𝐬) 
probability of an individual switching from strategy normal to strategy switch in location (𝑖, 𝑗) in 
Eq. (3.7) 
𝜽 intensity of selection, i.e. rationality of the decision maker in Eq. (3.7) 
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For the disease transmission process, infection rate, recovery rate, number of effective 
contacts, and the associated parameter are shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Notations for transmission of infectious diseases 
Parameters Interpretation 
𝑷𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔_𝒏(𝒊, 𝒋) transmission rate for normal individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.8) 
𝑷𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔_𝒔(𝒊, 𝒋) transmission rate for switchers in location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.9) 
𝑪𝑰(𝒊, 𝒋) 
total number of effective contacts with infected individuals for normal individuals in location 
(𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.10) 
𝑪𝒊𝒋(𝒔, 𝒕) 
number of effective contacts with infected individuals in neighborhood location (𝑠, 𝑡)  for normal 
individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.10) 
𝑵𝒊𝒋(𝒔, 𝒕) 
total number of effective contacts in neighborhood location (𝑠, 𝑡) for normal individuals in 
location (𝑖, 𝑗) in Eq. (3.19) 
𝜷 infection rate per contact between normal individuals and infected individuals in Eqs. (3.8) and 
(3.9) 
𝜸𝟏 contact reduction rate for switchers in Eq. (3.19) 
𝜸𝟐 infection reduction rate for switchers in Eq. (3.9) 
𝒏𝟏 average number of contacts to individuals in a neighborhood grid(s) except its own grid for a 
normal individual in Eq. (3.19) 
𝒏𝟐 average number of contacts to individuals in the same grid for a normal individual in Eq. (3.19) 
𝝁 Average recovery rate in Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26) 
 3.3.2 Detail Processes of the Model 
The mathematical model describing the transmission of an epidemic consists of four steps 
as shown in Figure 3.4. In these four steps, there is a loop among the last three steps. The first step 
goes through the initialization process. Then a loop goes through the collection process, game 
process, transmission process, and then back to collection process. All details of each process will 
be discussed in the following subsection. 
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Figure 3.4 Process of spatial game in epidemics 
Initialization Collection Game Transmission
1. Prevalence 
Eqs. (15)-(16)
2. # of switchers
Eqs. (17-18)
1. Payoff Function
Eqs (1)-(6)
2. Decision Rule
Eq. (7)
3. Game Update
1. Contact Pattern Eq. (19)
2. Transmission Rate
Eqs. (8)-(10)
3. Recovery
4. Transmission Update
Eqs. (11)-(14)  
 3.3.2.1 Initialization 
At the beginning, the various population distributions are initialized, including normal 
individuals, switchers, infected individuals, and recovered individuals. No recovered and switchers 
populations are generated in the first iteration, and it is assumed only one individual is infected 
initially. 
 3.3.2.2 Collection 
Human responses to an infectious disease depend on many factors such as prevalence of 
the disease, mortality rate, means of transmission, and others. In this simple model, two major 
factors –the prevalence and the amount of switchers –are considered.  The prevalence factor 
represents the potential risk of being exposed to the infectious disease, and the number of switchers 
determines the benefit of switching. Throughout this chapter, we assume that individuals have the 
complete information, i.e. individuals clearly know how many people are infected and the number 
of switchers.  Moreover, two types of information are represented in our model: local and global 
information, each with different impacts on the spatial game.  Thus, four types of information are 
considered in the model: local prevalence, global prevalence, local number of switchers, and global 
number of switchers. 
 3.3.2.3 Game 
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As illustrated in Figure 3.4, the Game step is divided into three main procedures as the 
main part of the spatial game, including payoff function, decision rule, and game update.  The 
details are discussed in the following four subsections. 
Payoff Function 
It is assumed that individuals will adopt the switching strategy if the risk of the infectious 
disease is high enough. Judgment of threat or risk for each individual is mainly based on two 
aspects: the percentage of population infected in their local neighborhoods (local prevalence 
status) and the percentage of infection in the global environment (global prevalence status).  The 
information of local and global prevalence status can be practically obtained through television, 
newspaper, radio, etc.  
With the current information, individuals could decide to change their strategies 
spontaneously based on the benefit and cost, which includes their judgment about potential risk 
and the cost associated with the protective behaviors, which are modeled as the payoff function.  
In addition, switchers could create externality, which means that normal individuals could also 
benefit from switchers’ efforts, since the aggregate effects of switching beyond reducing one’s 
own potential risk of infection is also reducing the overall transmission or the spread of the disease 
(6).  
From this point of view, payoff functions for normal individuals or switchers are defined 
as follows: 
𝐹𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗) = −𝐺(𝐼𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗))𝑔(𝑆𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗)) − 𝐻(𝐼𝑔)ℎ(𝑆𝑔) (3.1) 
𝐹𝑠(𝑖, 𝑗) = −𝑘𝑐 + 𝜆𝐹𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗) (3.2) 
where 
𝐺(𝐼𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗)) = 𝑚1𝐼𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗) (3.3) 
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𝐻(𝐼𝑔) = 𝑚2𝐼𝑔 (3.4) 
𝑔(𝑆𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗)) =
1
1+𝑐1𝑆𝑙(𝑖,𝑗)
 (3.5) 
ℎ(𝑆𝑔) =
1
1+𝑐2𝑆𝑔
 (3.6) 
Given a contact network, Il(i, j) represents the portion of N  (𝑖, 𝑗)  who are infected 
individuals in the neighborhood of location (i ,j), Ig represents the portion of individuals who are 
infected in the entire population, Sl(i, j) represents the portion of N (𝑖, 𝑗) who are switchers in the 
neighborhood of location (i ,j), and Sg represents the portion of individuals who are switchers  in 
the whole population. 
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) define payoff functions for normal individuals, Fn(i, j), and 
switchers, Fs(i, j), in location (i, j), respectively. Normal individuals pay nothing for protective 
behavior since they do not spend any additional efforts for protection. Switchers, however, pay a 
cost for preventive efforts. In Eq. (3.2), the parameter, kc, is denoting the cost of such switching 
strategy. Parameter λ is the associated risk reduction due to the switch strategy.  
Functions G() and H() in Eq. (3.1), which are defined in Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4), denote the 
estimated risk for normal individuals, which is calculated by local and global prevalence status as 
discussed above.  It is hard to require normal individuals to make accurate estimates of the risk; 
however, the prevalence status (e.g., knowledge on the percentage of population that got infected 
based on public information) could be an important reference for them.  In this paper, the estimate 
for the risk and conversion from the risk to the payoff value, based on the real prevalence status, 
is modeled by a simple linear relationship.  Specifically, m1 denotes a multiplier of local prevalence 
status (local information) and m2 denotes a multiplier of global prevalence status (global 
information). These two parameters are defined to help translate the prevalence status to the payoff 
value. 
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Functions g() and h() in Eq. (3.1), which are defined in Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6), denote the 
externality of switchers for local and global environments. As discussed above, switchers create 
local and global externality (potential benefits) for the entire population, not just for themselves.  
Therefore, the more switchers in the location, the safer the place is.  In Eqs (3.5) and (3.6), c1 
denotes the multiplier of “switch strategy” for local externality and c2 denotes the multiplier of 
"switch strategy" for global externality.  
Decision rule 
In every iteration of the game, each susceptible individual makes a decision between being 
a normal individual or being a switcher through balancing the benefits and costs. Individuals will 
change their strategies with a probability according to the payoff. The probability function of 
switching in location (𝑖, 𝑗) is shown as 
𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠) =
1
1+𝑒−𝜃(𝐹𝑠(𝑖,𝑗)−𝐹𝑛(𝑖,𝑗))
 (3.7) 
This update rule is also referred to as the Fermi rule, which is used widely in the literature 
(67,68), based on the Fermi distribution function. In Eq. (7), 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠) denotes the probability of 
an individual switching from strategy normal to strategy switch in location (𝑖, 𝑗) when comparing 
the differences in payoffs between 𝐹𝑠(𝑖, 𝑗) and 𝐹𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗). The parameter θ represents the intensity of 
selection on the differences between both payoff functions, 𝐹𝑠(𝑖, 𝑗) and 𝐹𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗), which models the 
rationality of the decision maker.  If payoffs of the different strategies are the same, i.e., 𝐹𝑠(𝑖, 𝑗) −
𝐹𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗) → 0, individuals would choose either strategy with equal chance. If, the parameter θ itself 
equals zero, individuals will also choose either strategy with the probability of 50%, and in this 
case, the individual is making random choices with equal chance.  When parameter θ approaches 
infinity, players will definitely choose the strategy with the higher payoff.  
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Similarly, we could also define the probability function of switching from switchers to 
normal individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) as 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑠 → 𝑛). Hence, the transmission matrix in spatial game 
between switchers and normal individuals is shown below: 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙              𝑆   
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
𝑆
[
1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠) 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠)
𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑠 → 𝑛) 1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑠 → 𝑛)
]
 
In general, the switching processes for normal individuals and switchers are independent. 
However, in our model we assume 
𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑠 → 𝑛) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝜃(𝐹𝑛(𝑖,𝑗)−𝐹𝑠(𝑖,𝑗))
 
so that we have 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠) + 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑠 → 𝑛) = 1. The transmission matrix can be written as 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙              𝑆   
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
𝑆
[
1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠) 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠)
1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠) 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑛 → 𝑠)
]
 
Game update 
After evaluating the payoffs, each susceptible individual at each spatial location update 
their strategies according to probability defined in Eq. (3.7). Each update period is referred to as 
one turn, whose length can be predefined by the users. In our test model presented in Section 4, 
the update period is assumed to be one day. 
The number of normal individuals and switchers in the susceptible population is 
recalculated at each spatial location as individuals update their strategies.  Hence, initial values of 
the matrices, and the normal and switchers’ distributions, are updated after each iteration. 
 3.3.2.4 Transmission 
In this article, transmission of the disease follows conventional transmission processes 
defined in the standard SIR model (Figure 3.2). The details are given below. 
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Contact Pattern 
The contact pattern is an important factor which affects the dynamics of an epidemic.  Most 
researchers rely on a presumed contact pattern with little or no empirical basis.  In Mossong et al. 
(69), the authors provide the first large-scale quantitative approach to contact patterns relevant to 
how infectious diseases are transmitted.  Theoretically, any type of contact pattern can be applied 
to the model (70).  In this paper, a very simple contact pattern based on the Poisson counting 
process is assumed as described in Section 3.4.  This contact pattern is used to analyze the 
characteristic of the model and the sensitivity of each parameter in the model.  In the future, a more 
complicated and realistic contact pattern will be considered to extend this model. 
Transmission rate 
The transmission process is based on the simple SIR model.  In this paper, different 
transmission rates and contact rates are defined for normal individuals and switchers, respectively. 
For switchers, there is a reduction in transmission rate due to the change of behaviors, such as 
social distancing.  The probability function for transmission of the underlying disease in one 
specific location, say (i,j), is defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑛(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (1 − 𝛽)
𝐶𝐼(𝑖,𝑗) (3.8) 
𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (1 − 𝛾2𝛽)
𝐶𝐼(𝑖,𝑗) (3.9) 
𝐶𝐼(𝑖, 𝑗) = ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑗(𝑠, 𝑡)(𝑠,𝑡)∈𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑  (3.10) 
where γ2 is the infection rate reduction for switchers, 𝐶𝐼(𝑖, 𝑗) denotes the total number of 
contacts with infected individuals in its own location and in its neighborhood for an individual in 
location (𝑖, 𝑗) , and 𝐶𝑖𝑗(𝑠, 𝑡)  denotes the number of contacts with infected individuals in its 
neighborhood location (𝑠, 𝑡) for an individual in location (𝑖, 𝑗), and β denotes the transition rate 
between infected and susceptible individuals. 
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Recovery 
Infected individuals usually stay infected over a period of time depending on the 
underlining disease, and recover from the disease on a certain day with a specific probability. The 
recovery probability distribution can be defined according to the specific disease. 
Transmission update  
Define 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) to be the number of normal individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) at time t, 
𝑆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) to be the number of switchers in location (𝑖, 𝑗)at time t, 𝐼𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) to be the number of infected 
individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗) at time t, and 𝑅𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) to be the number of recovered individuals in 
location(𝑖, 𝑗) at time t. After the transmission process, each location updates its properties as 
follows: 
𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡+1(𝑖, 𝑗) = (𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) + 𝑆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) ∗ (1 − 𝑃(𝑛 → 𝑠)) − ∆(𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗))(3.11) 
𝑆𝑡+1(𝑖, 𝑗) = (𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) + 𝑆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) ∗ 𝑃(𝑛 → 𝑠) − ∆(𝑆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗))   (3.12) 
𝐼𝑡+1(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝐼𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) + ∆(𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) + ∆(𝑆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) −Ω(𝐼𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) (3.13) 
𝑅𝑡+1(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑅𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) +  Ω(𝐼𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) (3.14) 
where ∆(𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) and ∆(𝑆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) denote the number of individuals infected at 
time t, from normal individuals and switchers, respectively. Ω(𝐼𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) denotes the number of 
infected individuals recovered at time t.  𝐼𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗), in (3.13) represents, at time t, the infected 
population in location (𝑖, 𝑗) and 𝑅𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗), in (3.14) represents, at time t, the recovered population 
in location (𝑖, 𝑗). 
 3.4 Test bed 
In this section, a small example is constructed to analyze the characteristics of this model.  
Consider a small region with m by n locations in a regular lattice where m=5 and n=5, and 100 
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individuals who live in each location.  Initialize the population as follows: 𝑁(𝑖, 𝑗) denotes the 
number of individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗), 𝐼(𝑖, 𝑗) denotes the number of infected individuals in the 
location (𝑖, 𝑗) ,  𝑆(𝑖, 𝑗)  denotes the number of switchers in the location(𝑖, 𝑗) , 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿(𝑖, 𝑗) 
denotes the number of normal individuals in location (𝑖, 𝑗), and 𝑅(𝑖, 𝑗) denotes the number of 
recovered individuals in the location (𝑖, 𝑗). On the first day, one infected person exists in the focal 
site and all other individuals are normal individuals. 
The contact pattern is based on the Moore neighborhood (46), which means individuals 
will contact others only in the adjacent eight locations and in their own location.  Hence the number 
of 𝐼𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗), 𝐼𝑔, 𝑆𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗), and 𝑆𝑔 in Eq. (3.1) can be calculated in Eqs. (3.15-3.18).   
𝐼𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗) =
∑ ∑ 𝐼(𝑘,𝑙)
min (𝑗+1,𝑛)
𝑙=max (𝑗−1,1)
min (𝑖+1,𝑚)
𝑘=max (𝑖−1,1)
∑ ∑ 𝑁(𝑘,𝑙)
min (𝑗+1,𝑛)
𝑙=max (𝑗−1,1)
min (𝑖+1,𝑚)
𝑘=max (𝑖−1,1)
 (3.15) 
𝐼𝑔 =
∑ ∑ 𝐼(𝑘,𝑙)𝑛𝑙=1
𝑚
𝑘=1
∑ ∑ 𝑁(𝑘,𝑙)𝑛𝑙=1
𝑚
𝑘=1
 (3.16) 
𝑆𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗) =
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑘,𝑙)
min (𝑗+1,𝑛)
𝑙=max (𝑗−1,1)
min (𝑖+1,𝑚)
𝑘=max (𝑖−1,1)
∑ ∑ 𝑁(𝑘,𝑙)
min (𝑗+1,𝑛)
𝑙=max (𝑗−1,1)
min (𝑖+1,𝑚)
𝑘=max (𝑖−1,1)
 (3.17) 
𝑆𝑔 =
∑ ∑ 𝑆(𝑘,𝑙)𝑛𝑙=1
𝑚
𝑘=1
∑ ∑ 𝑁(𝑘,𝑙)𝑛𝑙=1
𝑚
𝑘=1
 (3.18) 
In this model, assume the number of interactions for each individual follows the Poisson 
distribution and most contacts happen for individuals in the same site. Three parameters are 
defined to determine the interaction patterns, which are γ1, n1, and n2. Parameter γ1 denotes the 
decreasing rate of interactions, which means the switchers will contact fewer individuals than 
normal individuals do; n1 and n2 denote the average number of contacts to individuals in a 
neighborhood grid(s) and to those in the same grid for a normal individual, respectively. 
𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑠, 𝑡)denotes the number of contacts in location (𝑠, 𝑡) for an individual in location (𝑖, 𝑗). Hence, 
the probabilities that an individual has k contacts with his/her neighborhood locality/community 
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and home locality/community are modeled using Poisson distributions, and their definitions are 
given in Eq. (3.19), respectively: 
𝑃(𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑘) =
{
𝑒−𝛾1𝑛1(𝛾1𝑛1)
𝑘
𝑘!
, 𝑘 = 0,1,2⋯  𝑠 = 𝑖 − 1, 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1  𝑡 = 𝑗 − 1, 𝑗, 𝑗 + 1  (𝑠, 𝑡) ≠ (𝑖, 𝑗) 
𝑒−𝛾1𝑛2(𝛾1𝑛2)
𝑘
𝑘!
, 𝑘 = 0,1,2⋯  (𝑠, 𝑡) = (𝑖, 𝑗)                                                                    
 (3.19) 
where 0≤ γ1 ≤ 1 for switchers and γ1 = 1 for normal individuals.  Equation (19) denotes the 
two cases in which contacts happen in the neighborhood locality and in the home locality. Hence, 
the number of individuals in the neighborhood who create contacts has a Poisson distribution with 
the average n1 for normal individuals and the average γ1n1 for switchers.  Similarly, the number of 
individuals in the same cell subpopulation has a Poisson distribution with average n2 for the normal 
individuals and average γ1n2 for switchers.  
The parameters for scenario 1 with switchers are initialized as follows: kc=3. λ=0.5, 
m1=100, m2=10, c1=1, c2=1, θ=1, γ1=0.5, and γ2=0.5. The transmission rate per effective contact 
with an infected person is defined as, β=0.2. The recovery probability distribution is fixed and 
defined as [0.3, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1]. Infected individuals will recover from the disease at the end of the 
first infected day with the probability 0.3, at the end of the second infected day with probability 
0.4, at the end of the third infected day with probability 0.2, and at the end of the fourth infected 
day with probability 0.1. The contact pattern is defined as n1=0.5, and n2=8 (on average an 
individual contacts half of the individual in its neighborhoods and eight individuals in his or her 
own location per day). The model is simulated for a period of 60 days and it runs 100 times. In 
addition, there are two more scenarios: scenario 2 with switchers and scenario without switchers.  
In scenario 2 with switchers, values of four parameters are changed: m1=500, m2=100, γ1 =0.25 
and γ2=0.25. The simulation result is shown in Figure 3.5.  
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Figure 3.5 Total number of infected individuals on each day 
 
In the scenario without switchers, the spread only lasts less than 20 days but leads to 2469 
individuals being infected.  In the scenario 1 with switchers, a total of 2115 individuals are 
infected, which is less than the previous case.  The epidemic lasts around 30 days and close to 84% 
of individuals is infected in this episode. Around the 9th day, the epidemic is at its peak and there 
are nearly 360 individuals on infected status that day, compared to the nearly 1057 infected 
individuals at the peak with no switching.  Obviously, disease transmission is delayed effectively 
due to the switching strategy. Considering higher awareness to information and stronger preventive 
measures through increasing values of m1 and m2 and decreasing values of γ1 and γ2, the epidemic 
is contained effectively in scenario 2. The number of infected individuals keeps less than 50 on 
each day and decreases gradually.  
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Figure 3.6 Change of number of individuals on each compartment over time 
 
The number of normal individuals, switchers, infected individuals and recovered 
individuals on each day in scenario 1 are also shown in Figure 3.6. As the number of infected  
Figure 3.7 Change of portion of normal individuals and switchers 
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Figure 3.8 Switching probability from normal individuals to switchers in location (3,3) 
 
population increases, normal individuals obtain the information about the infectious disease and 
some of them will become switchers, so the number of switchers also increases. After most of 
infected individuals recover, switchers will become back to normal individuals. Hence, there are 
nearly not any switchers eventually. The portion of susceptible individuals on each day who are 
normal individuals and switchers respectively is shown in Figure 3.7 and the switching 
probabilities i.e., 𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑠 → 𝑛) at location (3,3) over time is shown in Figure 3.8. 
The evolutionary process of transmission of the infectious disease in the scenario 1 with 
switchers is shown in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9 The evolutionary process of transmission of the infectious disease for 60 days 
 
                   1st Day                     3rd Day                    5th Day                    7th Day 
 
                   9th Day                    11th Day                   13th Day                  15th Day 
    
                    17th Day                  19th Day                  21th Day                   23rd Day 
  
                    25th Day                  27th Day                   29th Day                  31st Day 
   
                    33th Day                  35th Day                   37th Day                 39th Day 
 
                    40th Day                   41th Day                  42th Day                 60th Day 
(There are no infected individuals in the blue locations; there are less than five infected 
individuals in the green locations; there are less than 10 infected individuals in the yellow 
locations; there are less than 15 infected individuals in the orange locations; and there are more 
than 15 infected individuals in the red locations.) 
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 3.5 Parameters Analysis 
 3.5.1 Sensitivity analysis 
There are a total of nine system parameters in this model, kc, λ, m1, m2, c1, c2, θ, γ1, and γ2, 
respectively. The definitions of these parameters are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. To verify the 
influence of these parameters on the dynamic process of the epidemic, the sensitivity analysis will 
be made for each parameter. However, the goal of the game part is to provide a criterion concerning 
when individuals prefer to keep themselves from epidemics. Hence, the absolute value of payoff 
is meaningless and only relative value which is payoff for normal individuals over payoff for 
switchers is important. From this point of view, the relative value of the parameter is emphasized 
in the sensitivity analysis. For example, if 𝑚1 is 100 and 𝑚2 is 10, this indicates the effect of 𝑚1 
is 10 times that of 𝑚2. Other values can also be set for 𝑚1 and 𝑚2, but values of other parameters 
are required to change correspondingly.  
Figure 3.10 Change of kc 
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The parameter kc evaluates the cost of choosing a strategy switch (e.g., undertaking the 
social distancing) for a susceptible individual. Considering kc, ranging from 0.0 to 20.0, the 
changes of total infected individuals are shown in Figure 3.10. 
When the value of kc (i.e., the costs undertaking the switch strategy) increases, fewer 
susceptible individuals will choose the switch strategy so that more individuals are exposed to the 
risk of infection. In the real world, the value of kc represents the associated cost if a person chooses 
to avoid contacting others, for example, the loss of business or other opportunity incomes, 
purchasing costs for self-protection or isolation equipment, or voluntary vaccination and so on. 
Hence, when the value of kc is big enough, very few susceptible individuals will choose the 
switching strategy so that almost all individuals are infected and the result is very similar to the 
scenario without switchers.  
 3.5.1.2 Impacts of the associated risk reduction due to the switch strategy (𝝀) 
The parameter λ in Eq. (3.2), ranging from 0 to 1 denotes individuals’ estimated benefits 
from the switch strategy (in terms of prevention of the disease). If λ = 0, individuals will evaluate 
that switchers absolutely avoid infection from infected individuals. However, if λ = 1, the switch 
strategy does not help individuals prevent getting the disease at all. The simulated result over the 
possible range is shown in Figure 3.11. 
The trend of this Figure 3.11 is straightforward and self-explanatory. An increasing number 
of individuals are being infected as the estimate effectiveness of switch strategy becomes worse, 
which leads to very small portion of individuals choosing the switch strategy. A larger population 
of normal individuals means more individuals are exposed to the risk, so more individuals are 
infected. 
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Figure 3.11 Total infected population based on different values of 𝝀 
 
 3.5.1.3 Changes of multipliers of local and global prevalence status m1 and m2 
In the spatial game section, m1 and m2 are extremely significant parameters in the proposed 
model, which determine the subjective estimation of risks from susceptible individuals via either 
local or global information or knowledge. The main information sources of estimate of disease can 
be either from local status or global situations. In this paper, local status is defined as more 
important than the global situation since local information is much closer to individuals than is 
global. Although the estimate is the same for normal individuals and switchers, the function of 
parameter kc will be weakened when m1 and m2 are big numbers.  The influence of m1 and m2 are 
set to be similar in our test model since the size of the simulated region is small. Figure 3.12 depicts 
the simulated results when m1 and m2 ranges from 0 to 1000. 
The total number of infected individuals decreases as m1 (local risk perceptions) or m2 
(global risk perceptions) increase. When m1 is small, individuals will have an underestimate about 
the risk of infection and most of individuals will be normal individuals. When m1 becomes 
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significantly large, the influence of kc can be ignored and almost all susceptible individuals chose 
the switch strategy.  The effects for m2 is similar to m1. 
Figure 3.12 Change m1 and m2 
 
 
 3.5.1.4 Changes of estimated externality parameters c1 and c2 
In Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6), parameters c1 and c2 denote the estimated externality of switchers 
for both normal individuals and switchers, respectively. They frequently represent the estimate of 
risk reductions to infectious disease due to switchers. Similarly, the effectiveness of c1 and c2 are 
fairly similar if the simulated region is too small. However, the local impact is assumed to be 
stronger than the global impact (m1 is 10 times of m2), c2 which denotes the global externality of 
switchers has little influence to the switching rate. Figure 13 depicts simulated results based on c1 
and c2 being changed from 0 to 10. 
It is obvious from Figure 3.13 that as the value of c1 increases, the total number of infected 
individuals also increases. The basic reason is the over-estimate to the externality from switchers. 
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exposed to the infectious disease, which will eventually lead to a more-infected population.  The 
effects of c2 are relatively less significant than that of the c1, which mean the externality of the 
normal population is much more dominant comparing to the externality of the switchers. 
Figure 3.13 Total infected population based on different values of c1 and c2 
 
Figure 3.14 Change in selection intensity parameter θ 
 
 3.5.1.5 Change of intensity of selection 𝜽 
The parameter θ in Eq. (3.7) denotes the intensity of selection, which shows the extent of 
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individuals will choose either strategy randomly since the choice of strategy ignores the difference 
in their corresponding payoffs. A large value of θ means strong intensity of selection and the 
decision of individuals’ strategies are vastly contingent upon the difference in payoffs. Figure 14 
shows the influences of different values of θ.  
 3.5.1.6 Changes of parameters related to the decreasing rate of interactions for swithcers  
Figure 3.15 Total infected population based on different values of γ1 and γ2 
 
In Eqs. (3.19) and (3.9), γ1 and γ2 are two essential parameters which determine the real 
effectiveness of the switch strategy. If either of them is equal to zero, the switcher will definitely 
avoid infection from the infected person. In the real world, γ2 will be zero when the individual is 
vaccinated effectively and could be treated as a recovered individual. If the switcher does not 
contact any other individuals, γ1 will be zero and obviously the switcher is not infected. Result of 
changing γ1 and γ2 are shown in Figure 3.15. 
Low value of γ1 and γ2 could effectively prevent individuals from infectious disease. Many 
are still being infected because most individuals do not choose the switch strategy, according to 
the spatial game rule. 
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 3.5.2 Calculating R0 
The basic ratio R0 is defined as “the average number of secondary cases arising from an 
average primary case in an entirely susceptible population” (71).  In the deterministic SIR model, 
𝑅0 could be calculated as the ratio of transmission rate over the recovery rate. In the stochastic SIR 
model on a contacting network, the basic reproductive ratio can be estimated as ?̂?0 by (64,72,73): 
?̂?0 = 𝑇𝐷𝑘 (3.20) 
𝐷𝑘 = ?̅? − 1 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑘)/?̅? (3.21) 
where T is the probability of infection per contact, Dk represents the effective number of 
contacts for each individual in the network, and ?̅? denotes the average contacts for each individual.  
The basic reproductive number ?̂?0 defines a threshold similar to 𝑅0. 
Here, normal individuals and switchers have different values of T and Dk.  At any time t 
on location(𝑖, 𝑗), give us  
?̂?0
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝑇𝑛
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝐷𝐾𝑛 + 𝑝𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝑇𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝐷𝐾𝑠 (3.22) 
𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)/(𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) + 𝑆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) (3.23) 
𝑝𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − 𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) (3.24) 
𝑇𝑛
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝛽/(𝛽 + 𝜇) (3.25) 
𝑇𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝛾2𝛽/(𝛾2𝛽 + 𝜇) (3.26) 
𝐷𝐾𝑛 = ?̅? − 1 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑘)/?̅? (3.27) 
𝐷𝐾𝑠 = 𝛾1?̅? − 1 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾1𝑘)/𝛾1?̅? (3.28) 
where 𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗)
 
represents the proportions of the susceptible population who did not practice 
social distancing on location (𝑖, 𝑗).  A simple linear relationship between ?̂?0
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) and 𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗): as 
the portion of normal individuals increases, a larger outbreak of the infectious disease will happen 
with a larger possibility. We use 𝑅𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) to represent the basic reproductive ratio when there are 
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no switchers on location (𝑖, 𝑗).  Similarly, 𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) denotes the basic reproductive rate when all 
susceptible individuals are switchers on location (𝑖, 𝑗).To prevent the disease from spreading 
globally, the condition ?̂?0(𝑖, 𝑗) < 1 should be satisfied, which implies  
𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) < (1 − 𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗))/(𝑅𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) − 𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)) (3.29) 
𝑅𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑇𝑛
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝐷𝐾𝑛 (3.30) 
𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑇𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝐷𝐾𝑠 (3.31) 
𝑅𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) and 𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) are defined in a similar way to ?̂?0
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗), but for the population in which 
all susceptible individuals are normal individuals and switchers, respectively. 
From the spatial game update Eq. (3.7), we have 
𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜃((1−𝜆)𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑖,𝑗)+𝑘𝑐))
 (3.32) 
If 𝑅𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) < 1,  ?̂?0
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)will be less than 1 even without any switchers.  If 𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) > 1, the 
infectious disease will spread out globally with only self-protective strategies when we do not 
consider any other forces such as some public policies and measures taken to control the epidemic.  
In this case, switchers could only slow down the transmission of infectious disease and reduce the 
number of infected individuals, but could not eliminate the epidemics. If 𝑅𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) >
1 and 𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) < 1, 𝑝𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) from Eq. (32) can be plugged into the Eq. (29), solve the inequality for 
𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗), we have 
𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) <
−𝜃𝑘𝑐−𝑙𝑛 ((𝑅𝑛
𝑡 (𝑖,𝑗)−1)/(1−𝑅𝑠
𝑡(𝑖,𝑗)))
𝜃(1−𝜆)
= 𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 (3.33) 
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 is the threshold from which the infectious disease will be controlled due to the 
switchers’ impacts. When 𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) < 𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 , the infectious disease cannot spread out; otherwise 
switchers who changed their behaviors because of information dissemination cannot eradicate the 
epidemics.   
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If we assume the local information is much more effective than global information, we 
have 
𝑆𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗) >
1
𝑐1
(
−𝑚1𝐼𝑙(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑚2𝐼𝑔
1+𝑐2𝑆𝑔
+𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙
− 1) ≈
1
𝑐1
(
−𝑚1𝐼𝑙(𝑖,𝑗)
𝐹𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙
− 1) (3.34) 
If this simple inequality is satisfied, ?̂?0(𝑖, 𝑗)  will be less than 1 which means that 
individuals’ self-protective behaviors could eliminate the transmission of infectious disease. 
 3.5.3 Discussion 
One key point behind this model is to study the incentives that motivate individuals to 
become switchers and how switchers effectively avoid getting infected by potential epidemics.  
Based on a sensitivity analysis of the model, most of the parameters have significant impacts on 
the disease-spreading processes; however, some are difficult to manage and control. For example, 
the parameters kc, and θ can vary significantly from one individual to another with different 
occupations, different education level, different ethnical cultures, etc. Hence, parameters which 
are relatively easy to control will be the focus of the study.  Parameters γ1 and γ2 in Eqs. (3.19) and 
(3.9) are good examples. More powerful antibiotic medicines, immunization, broadcast or 
education of prevention methods by the federal and local governments could effectively reduce 
the values of γ1 and 2, since switchers who adopted these strategies could have better resistances 
to the disease. This is one way to make switchers better protected. On the other side, government 
should lead susceptible individuals to recognize epidemic situations correctly and give them 
sufficient incentives to become switchers.  Two other important factors are the speculative 
prevalence of the infectious disease (individual's perception of the prevalence of disease) by each 
individual, as the parameters m1 and m2 denoted in Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4). It is hard to collect 
complete and real-time disease-spreading information on all normal individuals.  Two main 
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information sources are local information and more global information such as mass media (TV, 
radio, internet, social media and newspapers).  Underestimating impact or spread of the disease 
could lead to a worsening situation.  In such cases, increasing the dissemination of information 
will develop awareness of the infection risk to susceptible individuals and may convince them to 
protect themselves. 
Although it is always better to prevent infectious disease from spreading, there is the 
possibility of vast unnecessary spending to promote protective measurements. A criterion 
generally used to evaluate the risk of an infectious disease is R0, which our model found that it can 
be different in different locations and is changed over time, representing the changes of human 
behaviors.  Effective dissemination of information related to the infectious disease can control the 
proportion of switchers based on the assumption in our model. Hence, different information 
transmission strategies can be used by the government based on the value of R0 at that time.  If R0 
is smaller than one, no further information about the disease is necessary to be released to the 
public. 
 3.6 Summary 
In this paper, a general spatial game model was presented to model the dynamics of 
transmission of an infectious disease, considering spontaneous changes of human behavior based 
on information acquired related to the disease.  The model includes the consideration of 
information synthesis, individual decision making based on the tradeoffs between the benefits and 
costs of changing his or her behavior, information evaluation based on both local and global 
information with a heterogeneous population distribution. Without the loss of generality, a 
classical SIR model is assumed to be the underlying infectious disease behavior. A simple example 
was used to illustrate the characteristics of the model and to analyze how each of the modeling 
61 
parameters impacts the results. Most of the modeling parameters have significant impacts toward 
the underlying epidemic and we found some of them are very difficult to control. We believed that 
an overestimate of impacts of the infectious disease always helps to control the epidemic but 
sometimes at a prohibitively high and unnecessary cost. Hence, an effective strategy of information 
dissemination can be used to balance the benefits and costs, and the value of R0 is an important 
criterion to determine the best information dissemination strategy for the government. 
Interestingly, the results from our computational experiments have shown that the disease's 
reproduction rate R0 changes throughout the course of the epidemic and it various from location to 
location due to the different population structure at different spatiality. 
In addition, there are still some limitations in our model.  First, a very simple contact pattern 
is given. In our model, individuals only contact their neighbors in the Moore neighborhood. 
However, long-distance travel and other type of contacts are not considered. Second, complete 
information assumption is not realistic. In reality, information about the infectious disease is not 
accurate and different individuals have different judgments. So a more complex rule to calculate 
individuals’ estimates is required. Third, only SIR model is considered in the paper, additional 
efforts are still needed to incorporate the more complicated models such as SIRS model, SEIR 
model, and lethal rate of diseases into the spatial game. 
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Chapter 4 - Information Dissemination and Human Behaviors in 
Epidemics  
Chapter 4 is based on the manuscript “Information Dissemination and Human Behaviors in 
Epidemics” submitted to plos one. 
 Abstract 
Individuals experiencing an epidemic may change their behaviors to prevent themselves 
from infection by balancing the benefits and costs based on the information about the infectious 
disease. This study incorporated two types of information, local information, which impacts local 
human contacts, and global information, which impacts people’s travel behaviors, into a spatial 
evolutionary game to determine individuals’ decisions. This paper constructs a new behavior-
switching-based susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model using a spatial evolutionary game to 
study the impact of human behaviors and information dissemination to the spread of infectious 
disease. This model was evaluated and analyzed using numerical simulations for the population in 
State of Kansas. Particularly, individuals’ perception to the risk based on the local information 
were deeply discussed, which could help us better understand the human behaviors and improve 
communication between policy makers and the public. 
 4.1 Introduction 
The influence of human behaviors on infectious disease transmission has been a focused 
area of study for recent decade. Individuals often change their behaviors to prevent infection, 
including improving personal hygiene, taking antiviral medicine, implementing voluntary social 
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distancing, receiving voluntary vaccination, and other protective measures (4). These voluntary 
behaviors are referred to as spontaneous changes of human behaviors.  
Funk (2) reviewed recent work on the influence of human behavior on the spread of 
infectious diseases. The rationality of self-protective behaviors based on information about 
infectious diseases has caused increased application of game theory to epidemiology (74-81). 
However, the literature only applies game theory to the mixed homogeneous population without 
considering the contact pattern. Hence, a study for the combined impacts of a spatially contact 
structure and spontaneous behavior changes using game theory would significantly improve 
existing models. 
In addition, information transmission about the spread of infectious disease and 
individuals’ perception to risk must be considered in order to study human behaviors. Chen (63) 
introduces a social sampling method to evaluate individuals’ assessments of infectious disease 
prevalence based on acquired information. The model in (65) considers sexually transmitted 
infections, accounting for information transmission and individuals’ responses to the infectious 
disease and showing that information transmission can reduce the prevalence of the infection. 
A study described in (82) recently investigated a methodology that combines information 
dissemination, contact networks, and human behavior changes in order to model the dynamics of 
infectious diseases. A spatial evolutionary game was adopted to study the impact of human 
behavior changes on the dynamics of disease transmission. Human responses were determined by 
the spatial evolutionary game, based on the balance of benefits and costs evaluated from the 
information related to infectious disease, such as prevalence, severity, etc. Two types of 
susceptible individuals were considered: normal individuals and switchers. Switchers are typically 
more conservative than normal individuals and tend to protect themselves and reduce risks. All 
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susceptible individuals collected information about the infectious diseases (particularly indicating 
the number of infected individuals and the number of switcher) locally and globally and then made 
decisions based on that information. The impact of information to individuals’ decisions (choose 
to be normals or switchers) referred to as the payoff in the spatial evolutionary game. Individuals 
could change their minds or stay on their current status (normal or switcher) based on their own 
and their neighbors’ payoff values. Hence, the contact structures among individuals also played a 
key role in the spatial evolutionary game since these contact structures heavily impact the payoff 
values which explicitly determined individuals’ decisions.  
The spatial evolutionary game model in (82) successfully describes impacts of changes of 
human behaviors and information dissemination to the spread of infectious diseases, however, it 
is an unstructured system which is not easy to use analytical methods to analyze the system.  In 
this paper, we applied it into a classical dynamic system which is commonly adopted to study 
epidemics and prove consistency between two models. To clarify the differences of these two 
models, the spatial evolutionary game model is named as (SEGM) and the modified dynamic 
model developed in this paper is named as (MDM). In addition, a new concept related to the impact 
of local information dissemination is introduced and discussed in this paper.  
Section 4.1 of this paper includes a brief introduction, and Section 4.2 presents construction 
of a mathematical model to study the dynamic transmission of infectious disease using a spatial 
evolutionary game. Equilibrium analysis is shown in Section 4.3, and Section 4.4 demonstrates a 
numerical simulation and a comparison of simulation results using SEGM and MDM. The long-
distance scenario is also introduced. A brief summary and discussion is presented in Section 4.5. 
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 4.2 Mathematical Model 
The basic assumptions in this paper, which are identical to the assumptions in (82), are 
briefly reviewed in this section, and the new modified dynamic model (MDM) is presented as one 
of the major objectives of this article. This model considers three main aspects of the an epidemic, 
including disease transmission, information dissemination, and change of human behaviors. Each 
of them is discussed in subsections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3, respectively. Section 4.2.4 introduces 
the spatial evolutionary game, and MDM model is constructed in Section 4.2.5 and extended in 
Section 4.2.6. 
 4.2.1 Process description 
Ordinary differential equations (ODEs) are commonly used to model disease transmission. 
One of the most classic models is 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= −
1
𝑁
𝛽𝑆𝐼  (4.1) 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
= −
1
𝑁
𝛽𝑆𝐼 − 𝛾𝐼  (4.2) 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾𝐼  (4.3) 
where S represents the number of susceptible individuals, I represents the number of 
infected individuals, R represents the number of recovered individuals, and N represents the 
number of individuals in the population. The model above is the classic susceptible-infected-
recovered (SIR) model without demography (71).  
 4.2.2 Information Transmission  
Increasing development of transportation and communication technologies has increased 
the spreading rate of infectious disease and the transmission of disease information. Individuals 
can acquire the information about the disease and current epidemics through a myriad of mediums, 
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including news broadcasts on television or radio, internet, face-to-face communication, or 
education about prevention from infectious disease. The acquired amount and accuracy of 
information consequently impact how individuals react to disease transmission and influence their 
decisions during an epidemic outbreak. Chen (63) studied how the quality of information affects 
the transmission of infectious disease. 
In this paper, we assume individuals are well informed, meaning that individuals always 
acquire complete and correct information (no rumor spread among individuals) in all locations. In 
addition, information about the infectious disease is characterized as local information and global 
information. Local information, defined as information about the disease in neighborhoods within 
a certain distance from an individual’s location, locally impacts individuals’ contacts. Global 
information, defined as information about disease transmission in all locations, impacts 
individuals’ decisions and travel behaviors. Both local and global information are considered 
within individuals’ decision-making processes.  
 4.2.3 Change of Human Behaviors  
Based on infectious disease information, some individuals may take protective measures 
to prevent infection and others may not, thereby revealing two distinct types of susceptible 
population: normal individuals and switchers. Normal individuals believe very little chance exists 
for their infection, so they do not attempt to change their behaviors to keep themselves from getting 
infected. Switchers, however, estimate the risk and assume a high probability of infection so they 
change their behaviors (such as taking antibiotic medicine, wearing face mask, avoiding crowded 
places, etc.) to attempt to avoid infection. Although switchers can be categorized according to the 
extent of their changes in behaviors, we assumed all switchers to be identical for this study, and 
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we did not consider multiple levels of switchers to retain model simplicity. We modified the classic 
SIR model to our MDM model, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
In order to reduce exposure to disease, switchers commonly use the strategy of social 
distancing, which includes reducing the number of contacts, such as avoiding crowded places, 
limiting friend contacts, or avoiding school or work. Social distancing also includes reducing the 
intensity of contacts, such as receiving vaccination if applicable, taking antiviral medicine, or 
wearing face masks. However, because any of these actions require increased cost (monetary cost, 
loss of incomes, or leading to inconvenience to their lives, etc.) for switchers, individuals must 
balance their costs and benefits during the decision-making process. Moreover, individuals may 
routinely change their minds based on daily updates of new epidemic information. Considering 
change of contacts pattern and evolutionary decision process， the spatial evolutionary game was 
applied to the model Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 SIR model 
 
 4.2.4 Spatial Evolutionary Game  
The spatial evolutionary game combines both classic game theory and cellular automaton, 
in representing strategies, players, payoff function, structure of population, and an updating rule. 
Nowak and May (83) first introduced the spatial evolutionary game in order to study the local 
cooperation phenomena for a classic problem, called “prisoner dilemma”. This methodology 
analyzes various structures of populations using a regular lattice (47), scale-free networks (48), 
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and real social networks (49).  Szabo and Fath  (49) reviewed evolutionary games on graphs. In 
addition, the spatial evolutionary game requires an updating policy based on the payoff function 
with updating schemes such as synchronous or asynchronous updates. Newth (50) reviewed 
several common updating schemes, and Roca, Cuesta, and Sanchez (51) summarized update rules. 
An example of classical spatial evolutionary game in lattice is introduced in (84), and a 
simplified example is shown as follows. Assume two types of players play a game, and two 
strategies are available to each player. The payoff matrix is shown in Figure 4.2. Players choose 
strategy A or strategy B, and payoff value could be a, b, c, or d corresponding to players’ strategies. 
Figure 4.3 describes the location of each player. The contact pattern in this game is von Neumann 
neighborhood (four nearest neighborhood). A player would play the game with all neighbors, and 
the summation of payoff value in the game against each neighbor is the final payoff value for each 
player. The result is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.2 Payoff Matrix 
 A B 
A a b 
B c d 
 
After each turn, players could reconsider their strategies based on their payoff values as 
well as other players’ payoff values. In addition, players update their strategies synchronously or 
asynchronously. 
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Figure 4.3 Spatial Evolutionary Game Example  
 
 4.2.5 MDM model 
This section extends the classic SIR ODEs model of Eqs. (4.1) – (4.3) to a local commute 
model with the spatial evolutionary game based on a local contact network, which is called 
modified dynamic model, in short, MDM. Individuals may work in another location besides their 
home or visit neighboring businesses or families daily. Frequent commuting behaviors are 
included in the local commute model. Considering population heterogeneities, the classic model 
could be modified to involve spatial structure. For example, as illustrated in Figure 4, the network 
could be adopted to present different locations, and an index x could be used to indicate the specific 
location in the map. Each location contains a population with four possible types of individuals: 
normal, switchers, infected, and recovered individuals. Individuals could interact with others in 
the same location or in connected neighborhood locations, and the contact rate depends on the 
distance between two locations. For example, individuals in location 2 could interact with 
individuals in locations 1, 2, 3, 4, or 7 with probabilities depending on distances between two 
locations.  
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Figure 4.4 Network with Metapopulation  
 
The modified SIR model built on the network (such as the one in Figure 4) for the disease 
transmission process is 
𝑑𝑆𝑛
𝑑𝑡
(𝑥) = −𝛽𝑛𝑆𝑛(𝑥)𝜆𝑛(𝑥) − (1 − 𝜌(𝒙))𝑆𝑛(𝑥) + 𝜌(𝒙)𝑆𝑎(𝑥)  (4.4) 
𝑑𝑆𝑎
𝑑𝑡
(𝑥) = −𝛽𝑎𝑆𝑎(𝑥)𝜆𝑎(𝑥) + (1 − 𝜌(𝒙))𝑆𝑛(𝑥) − 𝜌(𝒙)𝑆𝑎(𝑥)  (4.5) 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
(𝑥) = 𝛽𝑛𝑆𝑛(𝑥)𝜆𝑛(𝑥) + 𝛽𝑎𝑆𝑎(𝑥)𝜆𝑎(𝑥) − 𝛾𝐼(𝑥)  (4.6) 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
(𝑥) = 𝛾𝐼(𝑥)  (4.7) 
where 
𝜆𝑛(𝑥) = ∑ 𝐼(𝑦)𝐾𝑛(𝑥 − 𝑦)/𝑁(𝑦)𝑦∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙   (4.8) 
𝜆𝑎(𝑥) = ∑ 𝐼(𝑦)𝐾𝑎(𝑥 − 𝑦)/𝑁(𝑦)𝑦∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙   (4.9) 
and 
𝑆𝑛(𝒙)     Number of normal individuals at location x, 
𝑆𝑎(𝒙)     Number of switchers at location x, 
𝜌(𝒙) Percentage of normal individuals to total susceptible individuals at location x 
𝐾𝑛(𝒙 − 𝒚)   Contact probability function for normal between location 𝒙 and location 𝒚, 
𝐾𝑎(𝒙 − 𝒚)    Contact probability function for switchers between location 𝒙 and location 𝒚, 
𝐼(𝒙)       Number of infected individuals at location x, 
𝑅(𝒙)     Number of recovered individuals at location x, 
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𝑁(𝒚)    Total number of individuals at location y, 
𝛽𝑛   Infection rate of individuals adopting normal behavior, 
𝛽𝑎   Infection rate of individuals adopting switcher behavior, 
𝛾     Recovery rate 
Eqs. (4.4) and (4.5) use two infection rates, βn and βa, for normal individuals and switchers, 
respectively, where assuming βa < βn. The contact rates, 𝜆𝑛(𝑥)  and 𝜆𝑎(𝑥) are for normal 
individuals and switchers in location x , respectively, and they are calculated in Eqs. (4.8) and 
(4.9), where Kn() and Ka() are kernel functions that represent the possibilities that one individual 
may contact others in a certain location (i.e. same location or neighboring location). Individuals 
could interact with others in the same location or other locations with different possibilities. 
depending on the distance between two locations and the number of infected individuals in the 
location where susceptible individuals visit. 
Considering individuals’ decision-making processes, the payoff functions, 𝐹𝑛(𝑥)  and 
𝐹𝑎(𝑥)in Eqs. (4.10) – (4.11), for the normal individuals and switchers, respectively, are defined 
similarly to  (82): 
𝐹𝑛(𝒙) = −
𝑚1 ∑ 𝐼(𝒚𝒍)𝑦𝑙∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
∑ 𝑁(𝒚𝒍)𝑦𝑙∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
1+
𝑐1 ∑ 𝑆𝑎(𝒚𝒍)𝑦𝑙∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
∑ (𝑆𝑎(𝒚𝒍)+𝑆𝑛(𝒚𝒍))𝑦𝑙∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
−
𝑚2 ∑ 𝐼(𝒚𝒈)𝑦𝑔∈𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙
∑ 𝑁(𝒚𝒈)𝑦𝑔∈𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙
1+
𝑐2 ∑ 𝑆𝑎(𝒚𝒈)𝑦𝑔∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
∑ (𝑆𝑎(𝒚𝒈)+𝑆𝑛(𝒚𝒈))𝑦𝑔∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
  (4.10) 
𝐹𝑎(𝒙) = −𝑘𝑐 + 𝛼𝐹𝑛(𝒙)  (4.11) 
And the percentage for an individual to switch his/her behaviors are defined as and logistic 
function based on the difference between the normal individuals and switchers, 
𝜌(𝒙) =
1
1+𝑒−𝜃(𝐹𝑛(𝒙)−𝐹𝑎(𝒙))
 (4.12) 
where 
𝑘𝑐   Fixed cost for social distancing behavior, 
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𝑚1  Parameter related to estimated risk  based on local prevalence, 
𝑚2  Parameter related to estimated risk based on global prevalence, 
𝑐1  Parameter related to estimated risk  based on local switchers, 
𝑐2  Parameter related to estimated risk based on global switchers, 
0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1    Parameter related to discount of estimated risk by switcher, 
𝜃 Parameter related to switch rate of normal individuals based on the difference of payoff 
Local and global information of prevalence (proportion of the number of infected 
individuals to the total population) and the number of switchers were considered as they relate to 
susceptible individuals’ decisions. In Eqs. (4.10) and (4.11), we assumed that risks could be a 
negative value; therefore, payoff values for both normal individuals and switchers are always non-
positive. However, switchers incurred an additional cost, kc, for the preventive measure, on the 
other hand the switcher’s risk for infection is consequently less than that for normal individuals, 
as denoted by discount parameter 0 ≤ α ≤1 in Eq. (4.11). The difference of payoff values between 
normal individuals and switchers determines the percentage of normal individuals in Eq. (4.12). 
 4.2.6 MDM with Long-Distance Travel Model  
Beside local commuting behaviors, individuals may also travel to large cities or tourist 
resorts for shopping, vacations, business, or social engagements, causing those locations to become 
network centers that connect to various distant locations. Individuals may only visit the center 
monthly, quarterly, or yearly instead of daily. As illustrated in Fig. 4.4, if location 5 represents a 
center node, then the corresponding modified network is shown in Figure 4.5. The dashed lines 
represent contacts resulting from long-distance travels. Considering such long distance travels, the 
system of Eqs. (4.4) – (4.12) remains the same, but kernel functions Kn() and Ka() 
correspondingly change based on the probability of contacts for long-distance travels.  
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Figure 4.5 Network for Long-Distance Travels 
 
If infection cases occur in the center node, switchers may cancel their travels for their own 
safety, depending on the number of cases in their destinations. The probability of travel 
cancellations for switchers based on the number of cases is defined as 
𝑝𝑐 = ln (
𝑒𝐼(𝒙)+𝑑
𝐼(𝒙)+𝑑
), (4.13) 
where e is the natural logarithm, I(x) is the number of infectious individuals at location x 
(destination), and d is a constant that determines the increasing rate of cancellation. Switchers who 
cancel travels are assumed to stay in their location and contacts with others their current location 
since they will not contact with individuals in their planned destination for travel. The value of 𝑝𝑐 
impacts kernel function Ka() since the contact probability distribution changes due to travel 
cancellations. For example, if switchers in location 3 have probability distributions of 10%, 10%, 
75%, and 5% to contacts in locations 1, 2, 3, and 5, respectively, and half the switchers cancel their 
travel plans, then the modified probability distribution is 10%, 10%, 77.5%, and 2.5%, 
respectively.   
 4.3 Equilibrium Analysis 
Using The system of Eqs. (4.4)–(4.13) admits the disease-free equilibrium (DFE) (Sn; Sa; 
I; R) = (𝑆𝑛
∗; 𝑆𝑎
∗; 0; 0) for each location x with the fixed ratio of normal individuals and switchers, 
thereby satisfying 
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𝑆𝑛
∗ (𝑥)
𝑆𝑛
∗ (𝑥)+𝑆𝑎
∗(𝑥)
= 1/(1 + 𝑒−𝜃𝑘𝑐) (4.14) 
𝑆𝑛
∗(𝑥) + 𝑆𝑎
∗(𝑥) = 𝑁(𝑥) (4.15) 
The solution of 𝑆𝑛
∗(𝑥) and 𝑆𝑎
∗(𝑥) yields 
𝑆𝑛
∗(𝑥) = N(x)𝑒𝜃𝑘𝑐/(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑘𝑐) (4.16) 
𝑆𝑎
∗(𝑥) = 𝑁(𝑥)/(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑘𝑐) (4.17) 
In the epidemiology, R0 is one significant indicator to evaluate the force of infection of the 
infectious disease, and it is defined as “the average number of secondary cases arising from an 
average primary case in an entirely susceptible population” (71). When R0 is less than 1, the DFE 
is stable, meaning that the spread of infectious disease could be controlled. When R0 is larger than 
1, however, the DFE is unstable. One homogeneous population without any contact structure 
contained 
𝑅0 =
𝛽𝑛𝑆𝑛
∗+𝛽𝑎𝑆𝑎
∗
𝛾𝑁
 (4.18) 
Considering spatial structure and one infected individuals in location x, Eq. (4.18) can be 
rewritten as 
𝑅0 =
𝛽𝑛 ∑ 𝑆𝑛
∗ (𝑦)𝐾𝑛(𝑥−𝑦)𝑦∈𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟 +𝛽𝑎 ∑ 𝑆𝑎
∗(𝑦)𝐾𝑎(𝑥−𝑦)𝑦∈𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟
𝛾𝑁(𝑥)
 (4.19) 
where R0 is related to the initial location, contact probabilities, and the population in each location, 
meaning that R0 is not fixed in this model. Usually the largest one calculated for all counties is 
adopted as the real 𝑅0. The calculation of R0 in Eq. (4.19) is consistent with R0 in Eq. (4.18) when 
the spatial contact structure is removed. For simplicity, Eq. (4.19) can be rewritten as 
𝑅0 =
𝑅𝑛𝑒
𝜃𝑘𝑐
1+𝑒𝜃𝑘𝑐
+
𝑅𝑎
1+𝑒𝜃𝑘𝑐
 (4.20) 
where Rn is the value of R0 for the population in which all susceptible individuals are normal 
individuals, and Ra is the value of R0 for the population in which all susceptible individuals are 
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switchers. If Ra is greater than 1, the infectious disease will outbreak even when all susceptible 
individuals are switchers. If Rn is less than 1, the infectious disease can be controlled even when 
all susceptible individuals are normal individuals. Therefore, the spread of infectious disease may 
be stopped by a change in human behavior only when Ra < 1 < Rn.  
Birth rate and death rate were not included in this model, so no endemic equilibrium existed 
in the system of Eqs. (4.4)–(4.13). The system would stabilize until all infected individuals were 
recovered. 
 4.4 Numerical study 
 4.4.1 Model comparison 
This section included numerical simulations for SEGM model in  (82) and MDM model 
using a county map of the state of Kansas with county-level population in order to compare the 
SEGM model to the MDM model. The map was shown in Figure 4.6 (*Source: this map is from 
http://geology.com/county-map/kansas.shtml). Population distribution was collected from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (Census 2010 Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File). 
Figure 4.6 County Map of Kansas  
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SEGM model and MDM model were compared using the following three settings: 
deterministic commuting contacts, stochastic commuting contacts, and long-distance travel. 
Although the contact pattern significantly affected dynamics of an epidemic, most researchers 
relied on a presumed contact pattern with little or no empirical basis. Theoretically, any type of 
contact pattern could be applied to the model. Only local contacts were allowed in the first two 
contact patterns, meaning that individuals could only contact others in the same county or in a 
neighboring county. In the third contact pattern we assumed that individuals would travel to some 
cities which are not their neighborhood for business or recreation. Testing the three contact patterns 
proved that results from the MDM model are consistent with results in SEGM model.  
For all the simulation runs, the first infected individual was located in the northwest corner 
county of Cheyenne. Results in six counties were tested for comparison, including Cheyenne 
(source), Thomas (neighbor of Cheyenne – subgraph a), Ness (two counties away from Cheyenne 
– subgraphs b and c), Riley (far away from source in the north – subgraph d) , Sedgwick (county 
with second largest population in Kansas – subgraph e), and Johnson (county with the largest 
population in Kansas – subgraph f) in Figures 7, 8, 9, 12, 17 ,and 18. Parameters were initialized 
as follows: α = 0.5, 𝑘𝑐 = 1, 𝜃 = 1, 𝛾 = 0.294,𝑚1 = 100,𝑚2 = 10, 𝑛1 = 100, 𝑛2 = 10.  The 
following subsections present spatial-temporal comparisons to prove the consistency of simulation 
results for two models. 
 4.4.1.1 Deterministic Commuting Contacts 
In this section, we assume that individuals contact a fixed number of people each day, 
denoted as 𝑛2. The number of contacts for normal individuals and switchers differs, and parameter 
𝛾2 denotes the discount rate of contacts for switchers. Similarly, protective behaviors could reduce 
the infection rate for switchers; parameter 𝛾1 denotes the corresponding discount rate. 𝛽 represents 
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the infection rate per contact between infected individuals and susceptible individuals. All 
parameters used in models should be consistent in order to compare two models. The parameter 
relationships between two models are 
𝛽𝑛 = −𝑛2𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛽)  (4.21) 
𝛽𝑎 = −𝛾2𝑛2𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛾1𝛽)   (4.22) 
where 𝑛2, 𝛽, 𝛾1, and 𝛾2 were parameters also used in  (82). All other parameters are identical for 
two models. 
According to comparison results in Figure 4.7, the number of infected individuals in each 
county was consistent in two models, spatially and temporally. Wherever the county locates does 
not impact the consistency of results from two models and the plots show that two curves are 
almost overlap for all tested six counties. In addition, the further from the source of the infectious 
disease, the later the infection occurred.  
 4.4.1.2 Stochastic Commuting Contacts  
All assumptions in this subsection are identical to assumptions in Section 4.4.1.1 with the 
exception of the number of contacts on each day. Instead of using a fixed number of contacts, let 
the number of contacts Nc on each day follow the Poisson distribution according to the contact 
assumption in  (82): 
 𝑃(𝑁𝑐 = 𝑘) =
𝑒−𝛾1𝑛2(𝛾1𝑛2)
𝑘
𝑘!
  (4.23) 
Parameters 𝛽𝑛 and 𝛽𝑎 in MDM model were consequently changed to be 
𝛽𝑛 = −𝑁𝑐ln (1 − 𝛽)  (4.24) 
𝛽𝑎 = −𝛾2𝑁𝑐ln (1 − 𝛾1𝛽)  (4.25) 
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Figure 4.7 Model Comparison under Deterministic Contacts  
  
 (Red line is the plot of SEGM model; black line is the plot of MDM model.) 
Ten replications were run for each model, and results are presented in Figure 4.8. The red 
curve represents results for SEGM model; the black curve represents results for MDM model. 
Results from both models were similar, as evidenced by overlapping of most of the curves.  
 
 (a)  (b) 
 (c)  (d) 
 (e)  (f) 
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Figure 4.8 Model Comparison under Stochastic Contacts  
 
 (Red line is the plot of SEGM model; black line is the plot of MDM model.) 
 4.4.1.3 Long-Distance Travel  
Sedgwick and Johnson Counties, the two counties with most population in Kansas, were 
selected as network centers in our long-distance contact model. People in all other counties were 
assumed to travel to these counties for shopping or business.   
 (a)  (b) 
 (c)  (d) 
 (e)  (f) 
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Stochastic contacts remained in this simulation, and 10 replications were run for each 
model. Results from the two models were similar. In addition, the spread of infectious disease was 
faster than the spread shown in the local contacts pattern, as shown in Figures 4.9e and 4.9f 
(compared to Figures 4.8e, 4.8f, 4.7e, and 4.7f). Infectious disease typically is more readily 
transmitted to large cities when long-distance travel is involved in the model. 
Due to the high volume of transportation and large populations within Sedgwick and 
Johnson Counties, infectious diseases are rapidly transmitted to areas surrounding those network 
centers. Peak time for the number of infected individuals in Johnson County is approximately 100 
days earlier compared to that in the model without long distance travel. Fig. 4.10 shows the number 
of infected individuals in each county on the third simulation day. Cheyenne County showed one 
infected case as the source location of infectious disease, but Johnson County indicated three cases. 
Because the spread of infectious disease is extremely fast in Johnson County due to large 
population, avoidance of long-distance travel to network center may be a crucial strategy for 
decreasing the spread of infectious disease. 
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Figure 4.9 Model Comparison under Long-Distance Travel  
 
 (Red line is the plot of SEGM model; black line is the plot of MDM model.) 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
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Figure 4.10 Numbers of Infected Individuals in Each County in Kansas  
 
 4.4.2 Impacts of Changes of Human Behaviors 
This section included discussion of the impacts to disease transmission dynamics due to 
changes of human behaviors temporally and spatially on state and county scales, respectively. 
Long-distance travel was involved, and commute contacts are assumed to be deterministic.  
Figure 4.11 Numbers of Infected Individuals in Kansas  
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Figure 4.12 Numbers of Infected Individuals in Various Counties in Kansas 
 
Comparisons of the number of total infected individuals in the entire state of Kansas and 
in various counties in Kansas are shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12, respectively.  
In Figures 4.11 and 4.12, the black line (“no game”) indicates no changes of human 
behaviors in epidemics; the red line (“with game”) indicates that changes of human behaviors were 
considered. On a statewide scale, human behaviors significantly impacted the dynamics of disease 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
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transmission, lowering the total number of infected individuals and delaying the peak time of 
epidemics. On a county scale, identical impact patterns were obtained for all counties in Kansas, 
implying that the distance between the studied county and the source county for patient 0 did not 
affect the impacts of human behaviors to the spread of infectious diseases, so does the distance 
between small counties and network centers due to our homogeneous assumption of risk estimates 
for each county. Individuals’ perspectives of the infectious disease based on prevalence were 
scaled by parameters m1 and m2 in Eq. (4.10), indicating local information and global information, 
respectively. Global information impacts were assumed to be identical for all individuals, but local 
information impacts potentially varied in different. The following section discussed the impact of 
local information (parameter m1) in details.  
 4.4.3 Impacts of Risk Estimates Based on Local Information  
As mentioned in Section 4.2, individuals’ perspectives of an infectious disease based on 
local information may differ by location. As a multiplier of local prevalence in Eq. (4.10), 
parameter m1 essentially bridges the local information and risk estimates by individuals. 
Individuals’ behaviors are determined by the game update rule, which is calculated by the 
differences of payoff values for normal and switchers, while the payoff value is primarily impacted 
by the product of m1 and local prevalence, as explained in  (82). Therefore, local information is 
translated to payoff by m1 to motivate individuals to choose either normal or alternatives, thereby 
implicitly affecting the dynamics of the epidemic. In addition, the value of m1 could be changed 
due to intervention strategies. Public health education, policies of vaccination, and quarantine 
measures could also alter an individual’s risk estimate of the infectious disease, leading to changes 
in m1. Consequently, impacts of m1 must be studied further in order to understand human behaviors 
in epidemics. Analyses for m1 are discussed in the following subsections.  
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 4.4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis for m1 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted in this section in order to understand the impact of m1 
on the dynamics of disease transmission. The range of m1 was set from 0 to 5000, and the step size 
was set at 500.  
Figure 4.13 Numbers of Infected Individuals with an Altered Value of m1 
 
Figure 4.14 Numbers of Switchers with an Altered Value of m1 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.13, the peak of number of infected individuals in Kansas decreased 
as the value of m1 increased from 0 to 5000. The higher the value of m1 was, the more risk 
individuals estimated, proving that individuals were more self-protective if m1 become larger, 
consequently decreasing the numbers of infected individuals, as shown in Figure 4.13. Similarly, 
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as shown in Figure 4.14, an increasing value of m1 led to an increasing number of switchers 
throughout the state of Kansas. An identical pattern of changes also occurred in all counties. 
 4.4.3.2 Stochastic Commuting Contacts  
In this section, the assumption of m1 in Eq. (4.10) is changed to be heterogeneous in order 
to indicate that the value of m1 could vary by location. Because network centers were the most 
severe areas of epidemics in Kansas, they were assigned a higher value of m1 than other areas, 
allowing individuals in network centers to have more motivations to choose protective behaviors. 
Results demonstrated how this strategy impacted the dynamics of disease transmission and verified 
whether or not infectious disease could be mitigated when epidemics were controlled only in 
network centers.  
Figure 4.15 Comparison of Numbers of Infected Individuals in Kansas with Altered 
m1 for network centers 
 
Figs. 15 and 16 illustrate changes in the number of infected individuals and the number of 
switchers in Kansas under MDM model and denotes the model with various values of m1 in 
network centers, respectively. The “old” curve represents the MDM model, and the “new” curve 
denotes the model with various values of m1 in network centers. Significantly high numbers of 
switchers were evident throughout the state of Kansas due to the high value of m1 in metropolitan 
areas, resulting in fewer infected individuals and a delayed peak time. However, as shown in Figs. 
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17 and 18, the network center (in subgraphs (e) and (f)) had significantly fewer infected individuals 
because of the increased number of switchers, but other counties in Kansas were not significantly 
impacted. The “new” curves and the “old” curves did not differ significantly in the counties of 
Cheyenne, Thomas, Ness, and Riley; therefore, increasing changing human behaviors in network 
centers could reduce the overall numbers of infected individuals, however, cannot impact the 
dynamics of disease transmission in other areas.  
Figure 4.16 Comparison of Numbers of Switchers in Kansas with Altered m1 for 
network centers 
 
 
The epidemic could be mitigated further with a high value of m1 for all areas, as shown in 
Figure 19 (“all high” curve). The number of infected individuals can be significantly decreased 
when individuals choose protective behaviors in all counties in Kansas. However, with 
consideration of social costs, control of spread of infectious disease changes to an optimization 
problem that requires effective control of disease transmission and minimization of total costs. 
This topic exceeds the scope in this paper, but it will be studied in our future study.  
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Figure 4.17 Comparison of Numbers of Infected Individuals in Various Counties with 
Altered m1 for Network Centers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
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Figure 4.18 Comparison of Numbers of Switchers in Various Counties with Altered 
m1 for Network Centers  
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
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Figure 4.19 Numbers of Infected Individuals with High Values of m1  
 
 4.4.3.3 Impacts of memory for individuals’ risk estimates  
Impacts of local information to individuals may not only vary by locations as described in 
Section 4.4.3.2, but also vary by individuals and time in a heterogeneous population. In particular, 
basic perceptions and cognitions researchers have shown that “biased media coverage, misleading 
personal experiences, and the anxieties generated by life’s gambles cause risks to be misjudged 
(sometimes overestimated and sometimes underestimated), and judgments of fact to be held with 
unwarranted confidence” (85). The perception of risk to the infectious disease does not stay to the 
same extent all the time. Individuals are affected by both of their memories on prior information 
as well as the new information. For instance, after a slow exponential increase of changes of human 
behaviors in the beginning of 2009 H1N1 pandemic in Italy, there is a sudden and sharp increase 
of growth rate occurred in the next month due to the new cases reported (7). On the other hand, a 
quick drop in the attention to protect themselves from an infectious disease frequently occurs when 
the epidemic is over the peak or people are getting used to the disease prevalence reports by the 
media (86). Hence, it is our belief that individuals’ decisions are impacted by their prior knowledge 
and the number of newly infected individuals. The memory mechanism was also assumed for 
protective behaviors in several other existing literatures (7,87,88). In this section, we attempt to 
model the memory mechanism via a stochastic differential equation of a Itô drift-diffusion process 
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with a drifting factor and a random walk (89). Itô drift-diffusion process is commonly used in 
mathematical finance to model stock price and the first time to be recognized to illustrate the 
changes of individuals’ perception to risks in epidemic.  The drifting factor could represent the 
average change rate of individuals’ perception to the risk based on the prior knowledge and new 
information, and the random walk could represent the diversity of individuals. Hence, the 
dynamics of m1 is defined as a Itô drift-diffusion process with a drift factor 𝜇𝑡(𝑥)  and the 
uncertainty factor 𝜎(𝑥)  as follows: 
𝑑𝑚1(𝒙)
𝑚1(𝒙)
= 𝜇𝑡(𝑥)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎(𝑥)𝑑𝑍𝑡  (4.26) 
where Z = {Zt : t∈[0,∞)} is standard Brownian motion with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 
1. 
Individuals were kept updated for the new information and gradually forgot the prior 
knowledge. Hence, the information cumulating and memory fading effects were necessary to be 
applied to the study of average perception of risks to the infectious disease 𝜇𝑡(𝑥)  at time t and 
location x. The variation term 𝜎(𝑥) represents a heterogeneous risk estimate in different locales as 
well as various individuals’ risk perception to the underlying epidemic in a diverse population. 
The information cumulating process was modelled by a hill equation, which could provide a 
reasonable boundary for the change rate of individuals’ perception between 0 and 1. Hill equation 
is extensively used in biochemistry and pharmacology and we believe that the behavior of hill 
equation can properly describe the changes of individuals’ perception to the risk. The memory 
fading process was modelled as a negative exponential function with argument infection 
prevalence. As prevalence increases, the fading effects were assumed to be weaker since large 
prevalence could increase individuals’ risk estimates. According to the cumulating information 
assumption and memory fading assumption, calculation of 𝜇𝑡(𝑥) was shown as follows: 
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𝜇𝑡(𝑥) = 𝐻(𝐿𝑡(𝑥), 𝑛) − 𝜀  (4.27) 
Where 
𝐿𝑡(𝑥) = −∑ (
𝑑𝑆𝑛
𝑑𝑡
(𝑦𝑙) +
𝑑𝑆𝑎
𝑑𝑡
(𝑦𝑙))𝑦𝑙∈𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙  (4.28) 
𝐻(𝐿𝑡(𝑥), 𝑛) =
(𝐿𝑡(𝑥))
𝑛
(𝐾)𝑛+(𝐿𝑡(𝑥))𝑛
 (4.29) 
Where 𝐿𝑡(𝑥) represents the newly infected population in location x at time t, 𝜀is a constant 
which acts as a negative exponential in Eq. (4.26) and K is the equilibrium constant and n is the 
hill coefficient in hill equation.  
Figure 4.20 Hill Equation 
 
When the hill coefficient n is greater than 1, the H(*) is monotone increasing with 𝐿𝑡(𝑥) 
and the lower bound and upper bound are 0 and 1, respectively. What’s more, it increases very 
slowly in the beginning which means the first few new cases of infection have small impact on 
individuals’ decision, while the impacts are amplified as more and more individual are infected. 
After a quick increasing period, the increase of impacts of information slows down since most of 
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individuals already recognize the severity of the disease transmission. An example of plots of 
general hill equations with different n is shown in Figure 4.20. In this example, the equilibrium 
constant is set to be 2 and Z represents the variable 𝐿𝑡(𝑥) in Eq (4.29).  
Figure 4.21 Altered m1 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
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Figure 4.22 Changes in the Numbers of Infected Individuals 
 
One numerical simulation was conducted to study the impacts of m1 on the dynamics of 
disease transmission based on the memory mechanism. We assumed that 𝜎2(𝑥) = 0.2, and we ran 
five replications. The changes of m1 and the numbers of infected individuals by county are shown 
in Figure 4.21 and Figure 4.22, respectively. Overall, the value of m1 slightly decreased in the 
beginning and then exponentially increased due to the increasing number of infected individuals. 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
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Moreover, there is a time delay between the increase of m1 and the increase of infected individuals 
since some individuals would choose “wait and see” (35) and not all individuals changed their 
behaviors immediately. Susceptible individuals gradually recognized the severity of infection so 
that perception to the risk increased as more and more individuals were infected. In addition, the 
average number of infected individuals in Figure 4.22 was slightly lower than those in Figure 
4.17(red line), since the increased value of m1 could only impact individuals’ decision (i.e. more 
susceptible individuals choose switchers), not explicitly mitigating the spread of infectious disease. 
 4.5 Discussion 
Spontaneous changes of human behaviors during an epidemic has recently attracted 
increasing research attention for the recent decade. Assessment of whether benefits of protective 
actions outweigh the corresponding costs after estimating the payoff according to information and 
infectious disease risk perception significantly impacts the determination of appropriate behaviors 
for individuals. Game theory, a commonly used tool to study conflicts and cooperation between 
decision makers, provides a mathematical framework to discuss individuals’ decision-making 
processes. A spatial evolutionary game specifically combines spatial association between 
individuals’ contacts and disease information and temporal impacts of information to the dynamics 
of human decisions, thereby increasing understanding of the impacts of heterogeneous population 
and human behaviors on disease transmission dynamics.  
This paper applied the spatial evolutionary game used in  (82) to a classic dynamic system 
for the spread of infectious disease. The classic compartmental SIR model has been widely used 
for epidemic study, including changes in human behaviors due to the spread of infectious diseases. 
The numerical simulation first proved the consistency of two models, thereby validating the 
effectiveness of the spatial evolutionary game. Then the impacts of changes of human behaviors 
96 
on the dynamics of disease transmission and how information impacts human behaviors were 
discussed using the numerical simulation. Results showed that protective behaviors decrease the 
numbers of infected individuals and delay the peak time of infection. Increased numbers of 
switchers and preemptive actions can more effectively mitigate disease transmission; however, 
changes in human behavior requires a high social cost (such as avoidance of crowded places 
leading to absent in school, workplace, or other public places). An appropriate response to the 
epidemic and wise selection of corresponding intervention strategies is our ultimate goal to prevent 
infectious diseases. Therefore, individuals’ perceptions of risks based on available information 
were discussed under various assumptions. Heterogeneous responses to an epidemic showed 
maximum reasonableness since individuals have unique cognitions based on personalized 
memories and understandings of new information. Itô drift-diffusion process was formulated 
according to this assumption, and the drift factor was defined as a memory mechanism which 
included two parts: cumulating information and memory fading. Hill equation and negative 
exponential function were used to describe the cumulating information process and memory fading 
process, respectively.  
In this paper, MDM model was only studied through numerical simulation. In order to fully 
understand the behavior of dynamic system, stability analysis and bifurcation analysis should be 
conducted later. In addition, further studies should combine changes in human behaviors and 
intervention strategies to identify optimal information dissemination in order to minimize social 
costs and the numbers of infected individuals. Stability analysis and optimization in epidemic were 
studied for different infectious diseases, such as Visceral Leishmaniasis (90,91). In addition, 
optimal control strategies for prevention of infectious disease transmission should be studied 
considering changes of human behaviors coupled with intervention strategies. In order to increase 
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understanding of the variation of individuals’ responses to infectious disease, a small scale of 
population, including individualized behaviors, should be taken into consideration for modeling 
human behaviors. Correspondingly, intervention strategies should be temporally and spatially 
characterized. As such, an agent-based model, which was used to simulate other diseases, such as 
Sepsis (92,93), could be used as a tool to study the complex system with interactions among 
changes of human behaviors, disease transmission, and intervention strategies (public policy). If 
successful, this research should improve communication between policy makers and the public by 
directing educational efforts and predicting public response to infectious diseases and new risk 
management strategies (regulations, vaccination, quarantine, etc.).  
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Chapter 5 - Zoonotic Visceral Leishmaniasis Transmission: 
Modeling, Backward Bifurcation, and Optimal Control 
Chapter 5 is based on the paper “Zoonotic Visceral Leishmaniasis Transmission: Modeling, 
Backward Bifurcation, and Optimal Control” published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (2016), 
doi:10.1007/s00285-016-0999-z. 
 Abstract 
Visceral Leishmaniasis (VL), a vector-borne disease caused by protozoan flagellates of the 
genus Leishmania, is transmitted by sand flies. After malaria, VL is the second-largest parasitic 
killer, responsible for an estimated 500,000 infections and 51,000 deaths annually worldwide. 
Mathematical models proposed for VL have included the impact of dogs versus wild canids in 
disease dissemination and models developed to assist in control approaches. However, quantitative 
conditions that are required to control or eradicate VL transmission are not provided and there are 
no mathematical methods proposed to quantitatively calculate optimal control strategies for VL 
transmission. The research objective of this work was to model VL disease transmission system 
(specifically Zoonotic VL), perform bifurcation analysis to discuss control conditions, and 
calculate optimal control strategies. Three time-dependent control strategies involving dog 
populations, sand fly population, and humans are mainly discussed. Another strategy sometimes 
used in attempts to control zoonotic VL transmission, dog culling, is also evaluated in this paper. 
Keywords 
Visceral Leishmaniasis, Zoonotic Disease Transmission, Backward Bifurcation, Optimal 
Control 
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 5.1 Introduction 
Visceral Leishmaniasis (VL) is a protozoan disease caused by parasites of the genus 
Leishmania and transmitted through the bite of infected sand flies. After malaria, VL is the second-
largest parasitic killer in the world, occurring in 65 countries with a majority (90%) of cases in 
poor rural and suburban areas of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Brazil. The 
current annual estimate of VL mortality is more than 50,000 (5), an assumed underestimation 
because not all cases are reported and VL is often undiagnosed or unrecognized. VL has been 
become one of the most prevalent public health concerns because of its high morbid mortality. It 
is generally characterized by an acute stage with generalized symptoms, including fever, cachexia, 
hepatomegaly, splenomegaly, and pancytopenia. 
VL can be classified into Zoonotic Visceral Leishmaniasis (ZVL) and Anthroponotic 
Visceral Leishmaniasis (AVL). ZVL is caused by Leishmania infantum transmitted by the bite of 
an infected sand fly from sylvatic animal reservoir (such as wild canids and rodents, or domestic, 
such as the domestic dog) to humans. ZVL is widely distributed from the Mediterranean Basin, 
parts of the Middle East and North Africa, and the Americas. Since the early 2000s, an outbreak 
of ZVL also has been identified in American Foxhounds in the United States (94). In contrast, 
AVL can be transmitted directly from humans to humans by the bite of an infected sand fly (95). 
AVL is found primarily in India (Bihar State) and other parts of the Indian Subcontinent (96), and 
in Sudan and South Sudan and caused by Leishmania donovani (97). Once a person is infected, 
the parasite migrates to internal organs such as the liver, spleen (hence "visceral"), and bone 
marrow. Lack of treatment almost always results in death of the host. 
Several mathematical models have been constructed to describe VL transmission. Stauch 
(96) modeled the spread of VL in the Indian Subcontinent by modified SEIR model in terms of 
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AVL characteristics and extended it to a ZVL model with animal reservoirs. Vector-related 
intervention was recommended in combination with treatment-related intervention in order to 
control VL transmission. Ribas (98) used a mathematical model adapted from one proposed by 
Burattini (99) to assess interaction between humans, sand flies, and dogs. The risk of requiring the 
infection R was calculated and optimal control strategy was estimated based on the formula of 
calculating R. It provided a combination of two ways to control ZVL transmission instead of 
culling seropositive dogs: insecticide-impregnate collar and vector control. However, they fail to 
provide a quantitative condition to control or eradicate VL transmission and did not propose 
mathematical methods to quantitatively calculate optimal control strategies. 
In this paper, a mathematical model was developed to describe the ZVL transmission 
process in Brazil using a modified SEIR model, particularly focused on the reservoir (dogs) 
because of the crucial role played by these animals in disease transmission. Castillo-Chavez (100) 
suggested that the zoonotic disease model may exhibit backward bifurcation, in which local 
asymptotically stable disease free equilibrium (DFE) coexists with a locally-asymptotically stable 
endemic equilibrium when R0 < 1. Using the reasonable range for each parameter in our 
mathematical model, a backward bifurcation analysis was performed, resulting in the conclusion 
that backward bifurcation may exhibit in ZVL transmission. In this case, the condition R0 < 1 may 
lead to an endemic equilibrium instead of DFE. Therefore, R0 < 1, the classical requirement for 
the control of infectious disease spread, although necessary, is no longer sufficient for ZVL 
elimination. Another significant parameter, Rc, was calculated, thereby demonstrating that it 
coexists in two equilibrium, disease-free equilibrium and endemic equilibrium, when Rc < R0 < 1. 
In addition, optimal control was discussed to give support in decision for controlling disease 
transmission. A general mathematical method was used to analyze optimal control strategies and 
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numerical analysis was described to illustrate implementation of this method. Based on numerical 
results, optimal control strategies are discussed. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 5.2 details a new mathematical model for 
ZVL transmission; Section 5.3 demonstrates the phenomenon of backward bifurcation existing in 
the model; Section 5.4 calculates optimal control strategies based on Pontryagins maximum 
principle and discusses impacts to disease control with various control costs and effectiveness of 
control strategies; Section 5.5 concludes the paper and suggests future work.  
 5.2 Mathematical Model 
In this section, a basic model for ZVL transmission dynamics among dogs-sand flies-
humans system is constructed. Parameters used in the model are listed in Table 5.1.  
ZVL is transmitted by female sand flies, with Lutzomyia longipalpis being the primary 
vector in the Americas. In this paper, we use the word "sand flies", primarily indicating L. 
longipalpis and other species of sand flies which are not ZVL vectors are not considered. Dogs 
serve as the primary reservoir host for the transmission of parasites to humans (dead-end hosts for 
ZVL (101)), and dogs are the principal risk factor for human infections with ZVL in endemic areas 
(102,103). A system diagram of ZVL transmission among dogs, sand flies, and humans is shown 
in Figure 6.1 in which populations for the three systems are assumed to be homogenous. In 
addition, the recovered dog may be changed back to infectious dogs if they are removed from 
treatment (dotted line from Rd to Id in Figure 5.1). However, this process is not shown in our model 
and we assumed that all recovered dogs are always under treatment. For humans, recovered 
humans are not necessarily immune and may be re-infected, but there is now evidence that some 
level of immunity can be achieved. In this paper, we assume recovered individuals either obtain 
the immunity or prevent themselves from getting infected. In addition, the VL cannot be 
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transmitted from human to human, sand flies or dogs, so this assumption will not affect the spread 
of the VL. Moreover, absent from the parameters is the potential replacement of culled dogs with 
young 
Table 5.1 Parameters in the model 
Parameters Interpretation 
𝝀𝒅 Recruitment rate of susceptible dogs 
𝝀𝒇 Recruitment rate of susceptible sand flies 
𝝀𝒉 Recruitment rate of susceptible humans 
𝟏/𝝁𝒅 Average lifespan of dogs 
𝟏/𝝁𝒇 Average lifespan of sand flies 
𝟏/𝝁𝒉 Average lifespan of humans 
𝒃𝒇𝒅 Average biting rate per infected sand fly to dogs 
𝒃𝒇𝒉 Average biting rate per infected sand fly to humans 
𝜷𝒇𝒅 Transmission probability from an infected sand fly to a susceptible dog 
𝜷𝒅𝒇 Transmission probability from an infected dog to a susceptible sand fly 
𝜷𝒇𝒉 Transmission probability from an infected sand fly to a susceptible human 
𝒅𝒅 VL-induced death rate of dogs (including culled dogs) 
𝒅𝒇 VL-induced death rate for sand flies 
𝒅𝑰 VL-induced death rate of humans 
𝒅𝑯 Death rate of hospitalized humans 
𝒎𝒇 Migration rate of sand flies 
𝟏/𝝉𝒅 Incubation period in dogs 
𝟏/𝝉𝒇 Incubation period in sand flies 
𝟏/𝝉𝒉 Incubation period in humans 
𝜹𝒉 Hospitalization rate of humans 
𝒓𝒅 Recovery rate of infected dogs 
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𝒓𝑰 Natural recovery rate of infected humans 
𝒓𝑯 Recovery rate of hospitalized humans 
animals, which is frequently adopted in many endemic areas, but are very hard to ascertain for the 
purpose of generality of the model. 
Figure 5.1 System diagram of ZVL transmission model 
 
In the above system, dogs were classified into four compartments: susceptible dogs (Sd), 
exposed/infected (but not infectious) dogs (Ed), infectious dogs (Id), and recovered dogs (Rd). 
Susceptible dogs could be transferred to exposed dogs, exposed/infected dogs could be transferred 
to infectious dogs, and infectious dogs could recover and become recovered dogs. Similarly, sand 
flies were distributed among susceptible sand flies (Sf), exposed/infected sand flies (Ef), and 
infectious sand flies (If). A modified SEIR model for human system is defined as susceptible 
humans (Sh), exposed (during incubation period) humans (Eh), infected humans (Ih), hospitalized 
humans (Hh), and recovered humans (Rh). The mathematical model for three sub-systems is shown 
below.  
 5.2.1 Dog population 
𝑑𝑆𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑑 −
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝐼𝑓𝑆𝑑
𝑁𝑑
− 𝜇𝑑𝑆𝑑 (5.1) 
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𝑑𝐸𝑑
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝐼𝑓𝑆𝑑
𝑁𝑑
− 𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝐸𝑑 (5.2) 
𝑑𝐼𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑑 − 𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝑑𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝐼𝑑 (5.3) 
𝑑𝑅𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝑅𝑑 (5.4) 
where Sd denotes the number of susceptible dogs, Ed denotes the number of exposed/infected dogs, 
Id denotes the number of infectious dogs, Rd denotes the number of recovered dogs, and Nd denotes 
the total number of dogs. 
The above model is a classic SEIR model. In equation (5.1), a constant birth rate 𝜆𝑑 was 
used for susceptible dogs, the amount of 𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝐼𝑓𝑆𝑑/𝑁𝑑  susceptible dogs were moved from 
compartment Sd (susceptible population) to Ed (exposed/infected population) due to ZVL 
transmission where 𝑆𝑑/𝑁𝑑 denotes the contact rate between susceptible dogs and sand flies, and 
𝜇𝑑𝑆𝑑 susceptible dogs were removed because of natural death. Similarly, in equation (5.2) 𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑑 
exposed/infected dogs (from compartment Ed) became infectious dogs (into compartment Id) and 
𝜇𝑑𝐸𝑑  exposed dogs were removed due to natural death. In equation (5.3), a portion of 𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑑 
infectious dogs recovered and converted to Rd, but 𝑑𝑑𝐼𝑑  more infectious dogs died due to the 
disease or culling strategy, in addition to 𝜇𝑑𝐼𝑑 natural deaths. Recovered dogs remained under 
treatment and were assumed to not be reinfected and 𝜇𝑑𝑅𝑑 ones were removed because of natural 
death. In addition, Ed could be seropositive but not culled or dead due to the disease (This was 
assumed as these animals are, at least in theory, infected but not yet tested). 
 5.2.2 Sand fly population 
𝑑𝑆𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑓 −
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑑𝑆𝑓
𝑁𝑑
− 𝑚𝑓𝑆𝑓 − 𝜇𝑓𝑆𝑓 (5.5) 
𝑑𝐸𝑓
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑑𝑆𝑓
𝑁𝑑
− 𝜏𝑓𝐸𝑓 − 𝑚𝑓𝐸𝑓 − 𝜇𝑓𝐸𝑓 (5.6) 
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𝑑𝐼𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜏𝑓𝐸𝑓 − 𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑓 − 𝑚𝑓𝐼𝑓 − 𝜇𝑓𝐼𝑓 (5.7) 
where Sf denotes the number of susceptible sand flies, Ef denotes the number of exposed/infected 
sand flies, If denotes the number of infectious sand flies. 
The above model is a SEI model similar to the system in Section 5.2.1 but without the 
recovered stage. With a constant birth rate 𝜆𝑓  for susceptible sand flies, 𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑑𝑆𝑓/𝑁𝑑 
susceptible sand flies moved from compartment Sf (susceptible) to Ef (exposed/infected) due to 
ZVL transmission via contacts between infectious dogs and susceptible sand flies, and 𝜇𝑓𝑆𝑓 
susceptible sand flies were eliminated because of natural death. The portion of 𝜏𝑓𝐸𝑓 exposed sand 
flies became infectious sand flies, and 𝜇𝑓𝐸𝑓 exposed sand flies are expired due to natural death. In 
equation (5.7), the portion of 𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑓 more infectious sand flies expired due to the disease, in addition 
to 𝜇𝑓𝐼𝑓 natural deaths. Infectious sand flies cannot recover from the disease. Moreover, 𝑚𝑓(𝑆𝑓 +
𝐸𝑓 + 𝐼𝑓) sand flies were assumed to emigrate from the system. 
 5.2.3 Sand fly population 
𝑑𝑆ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆ℎ −
𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛽𝑓ℎ𝐼𝑓𝑆ℎ
𝑁ℎ
− 𝜇ℎ𝑆ℎ (5.8) 
𝑑𝐸ℎ
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛽𝑓ℎ𝐼𝑓𝑆ℎ
𝑁ℎ
− 𝜏ℎ𝐸ℎ − 𝜇ℎ𝐸ℎ (5.9) 
𝑑𝐼ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜏ℎ𝐸ℎ − 𝛿ℎ𝐼ℎ − 𝑑𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝑟𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝜇ℎ𝐼ℎ (5.10) 
𝑑𝐻ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛿ℎ𝐼ℎ − 𝑑𝐻𝐻ℎ − 𝑟𝐻𝐻ℎ − 𝜇ℎ𝐻ℎ (5.11) 
𝑑𝑅ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝐻𝐻ℎ + 𝑟𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝜇ℎ𝑅ℎ (5.12) 
where Sh denotes the number of susceptible individuals, Eh denotes the number of exposed 
individuals, Ih denotes the number of infected individuals, Hh denotes the number of hospitalized 
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individuals, and Rh denotes the number of recovered individuals, and Nh denotes the total number 
of humans. 
The above model is a modified SEIR model with compartment Hh, which represents the 
number of individuals who are taken to the hospital by family and/or health authorities with regards 
to infected and symptomatic people. A constant birth rate 𝜆ℎ exists for susceptible individuals. In 
Eq. (5.8), the amount of 𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛽𝑓ℎ𝐼𝑓𝑆ℎ/𝑁ℎ  susceptible individuals moved from compartment Sh to 
Eh due to ZVL transmission, and 𝜇ℎ𝑆ℎ susceptible individuals were removed because of natural 
death. For exposed individuals in Eq. (5.9), 𝜏ℎ𝐸ℎ became infected individuals, and 𝜇ℎ𝐸ℎ exposed 
individuals were removed due to natural death. In Eq. (5.10), 𝛿ℎ𝐼ℎ infected individuals are taken 
to the hospital and move to compartment Hh and dIIh of them died due to the disease before they 
went to the hospital. We assume few infected individuals, rIIh, recovered and moved to recovered 
individuals. For hospitalized individuals in Eq. (5.11), rHHh recovered and converted to recovered 
individuals and dHHh expires because of disease. In Eq. (5.12), recovered individuals could not be 
reinfected so that only 𝜇ℎ𝑅ℎ are removed due to natural death. 
 5.2.4 Well-poseness of the solutions 
Considering the physical meaning of ZVL transmissions, only nonnegative initial 
conditions are used and negative solutions are not allowed. All parameters in the system are 
nonnegative as well. In this section, we prove that all solutions in Eqs (5.1) - (5.12) are nonnegative 
if initial conditions are nonnegative and they are bounded. 
Proof: According to Theorem 2.1 in (104) which is 
"Assume that whenever 𝜙 𝜖 𝐷  satisfies 𝜙 ≥ 0, 𝜙𝑖(0) = 0  for some i and 𝑡 𝜖 𝑅 , then 
𝑓𝑖(𝑡, 𝜙) ≥ 0. If 𝜙 𝜖 𝐷 satisfies 𝜙 ≥ 0 and 𝑡0 𝜖 𝑅, then 𝑓𝑖(𝑡, 𝜙) ≥ 0." 
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It is easy to test that all of our equations satisfy the conditions in the above theorem so that 
we know 𝑆𝑑(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝐸𝑑(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝐼𝑑(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑅𝑑(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑆𝑓(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝐸𝑓(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝐼𝑓(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑆ℎ(𝑡) ≥
0 ,  𝐸ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0 ,  𝐼ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0 ,  𝐻ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0 , and 𝑅ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0 , if 𝑆𝑑(0) ≥ 0 , 𝐸𝑑(0) ≥ 0 ,  𝐼𝑑(0) ≥
0, 𝑅𝑑(0) ≥ 0, 𝑆𝑓(0) ≥ 0, 𝐸𝑓(0) ≥ 0, 𝐼𝑓(0) ≥ 0, 𝑆ℎ(0) ≥ 0, 𝐸ℎ(0) ≥ 0, 𝐼ℎ(0) ≥ 0, 𝐻ℎ(0) ≥ 0, 
and 𝑅ℎ(0) ≥ 0. 
Based on Eqs (5.1) - (5.12), we have 
𝑑𝑁𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑑 − 𝑑𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝑁𝑑 (5.13) 
𝑑𝑁𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑓 − 𝑚𝑓𝑁𝑓 − 𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑓 − 𝜇𝑓𝑁𝑓 (5.14) 
𝑑𝑁ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆ℎ−𝑑𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝑑𝐻𝐻ℎ − 𝜇ℎ𝑁ℎ (5.15) 
where 𝑁𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑 + 𝐸𝑑 + 𝐼𝑑 + 𝑅𝑑 , 𝑁𝑓 = 𝑆𝑓 + 𝐸𝑓 + 𝐼𝑓 , 𝑁ℎ = 𝑆ℎ + 𝐸ℎ + 𝐼ℎ + 𝐻ℎ + 𝑅ℎ . When  𝑡 →
∞, we have 𝑁𝑑 < 𝜆𝑑/𝜇𝑑 , 𝑁𝑓 < 𝜆𝑓/(𝑚𝑓 + 𝜇𝑓),  𝑁ℎ < 𝜆ℎ/𝜇ℎ  since 𝑑𝑑 , 𝐼𝑑 , 𝑑𝑓 , 𝐼𝑓 , 𝑑𝐼 , 𝐼ℎ, 𝑑𝐻, 𝐻ℎ ≥
0. Hence, Nd, Nf, and Nh are bounded. Then Sd, Ed, Id, Rd, Sf, Ef, If, Sh, Eh, Ih, Hh, and Rh are bounded 
since they are all nonnegative. 
 5.2.5 Calculation of R0 
The basic ratio R0 is defined as “the average number of secondary cases arising from an 
average primary case in an entirely susceptible population” (71). This ratio can be solved based on 
disease free equilibrium (DFE). 
The entire system (Eqs. (5.1)-(5.12)) has a DFE given by 
𝐸0 = (𝑆𝑑
∗ , 𝐸𝑑
∗ , 𝐼𝑑
∗ , 𝑅𝑑
∗ , 𝑆𝑓
∗, 𝐸𝑓
∗, 𝐼𝑓
∗, 𝑆ℎ
∗ , 𝐸ℎ
∗ , 𝐼ℎ
∗ , 𝐻ℎ
∗ , 𝑅ℎ
∗)=( 
𝜆𝑑
𝜇𝑑
, 0, 0, 0,
𝜆𝑓
𝜇𝑓+𝑚𝑓
, 0, 0,
𝜆ℎ
𝜇ℎ
, 0, 0, 0, 0 ). (5.16) 
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Linear stability of E0 can be established using the next generation operator method (105). 
Matrices F (for the rate of appearance of new infections) and V (for the rate of transfer of 
individuals) are given, respectively, by: 
F= 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0 0 0 0
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝑆𝑑
∗
𝑁𝑑
∗ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝑆𝑓
∗
𝑁𝑑
∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑆ℎ
∗
𝑁ℎ
∗ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (5.17) 
V=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑘1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−𝜏𝑑 𝑘2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −𝑟𝑑 𝜇𝑑 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 𝑘4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −𝜏𝑓 𝑘5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 𝑘6 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −𝜏ℎ 𝑘7 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −𝛿ℎ 𝑘8 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −𝑟𝐼 −𝑟𝐻 𝜇ℎ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (5.18) 
Where 𝑘1 = 𝜏𝑑 + 𝜇𝑑 , 𝑘2 = 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑑𝑑 + 𝑢𝑑 , 𝑘4 = 𝜏𝑓 + 𝑚𝑓 + 𝜇𝑓, 𝑘5 = 𝑑𝑓 + 𝑚𝑓 + 𝜇𝑓,  𝑘6 =
𝜏ℎ + 𝜇ℎ, 𝑘7 = 𝛿ℎ + 𝑑𝐼 + 𝑟𝐼 + 𝜇ℎ , 𝑘8 = 𝑑𝐻 + 𝑟𝐻 + 𝜇ℎ, 𝑁𝑑
∗ = 𝑆𝑑
∗   and  𝑁ℎ
∗ = 𝑆ℎ
∗ . 
Therefore, the basic reproduction number, denoted by R0, is given by 
𝑅0 = 𝜌(𝐹𝑉
−1) =  
𝑏𝑓𝑑√𝑘1𝑘2𝑘4𝑘5𝛽𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜏𝑑𝜏𝑓𝑆𝑑
∗𝑆𝑓
∗
𝑘1𝑘2𝑘4𝑘5𝑁𝑑
∗ . (5.19) 
where 𝜌 is the spectral radius (dominant eigenvalue in magnitude or maximum of the absolute 
values of eigenvalues of the matrix). The threshold quantity R0, the basic reproduction number of 
the disease, represents the average number of secondary cases that one infected case can generate 
if introduced into a completely susceptible population. Hence, using Theorem 2 of (105), we 
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established the following result: disease free equilibrium, E0, of the system (Eqs. (5.1) - (5.12)), is 
locally asymptotically stable (LAS) if R0 < 1 and unstable if R0 > 1. 
In general, when R0 is less than 1, a small influx of infected sand flies into the community 
does not lead to large outbreaks, and the disease is eliminated in the end (since DFE is LAS). 
However, as we demonstrate in Section 5.3, the disease may persist even when R0 < 1. 
 5.3 Backward Bifurcation 
 5.3.1 Backward bifurcation 
In (100), the conjecture was made that the zoonotic disease model may exhibit backward 
bifurcation. In order to find endemic equilibria of the system (equilibrium in which at least one of 
the infected components is non-zero), the following steps was taken. 
𝐸1 = (𝑆𝑑
∗∗, 𝐸𝑑
∗∗, 𝐼𝑑
∗∗, 𝑅𝑑
∗∗, 𝑆𝑓
∗∗, 𝐸𝑓
∗∗, 𝐼𝑓
∗∗, 𝑆ℎ
∗∗, 𝐸ℎ
∗∗, 𝐼ℎ
∗∗, 𝐻ℎ
∗∗, 𝑅ℎ
∗∗)  represents any arbitrary 
endemic equilibrium of the model. Let 𝜃𝑑
∗∗ =
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝐼𝑓
∗∗
𝑁𝑑
∗∗ ,    𝜃𝑓
∗∗ = 
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑑
∗∗
𝑁𝑑
∗∗ ,   𝜃ℎ
∗∗ =
𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛽𝑓ℎ𝐼𝑓
∗∗
𝑁ℎ
∗∗ , where 
𝑁𝑑
∗∗ = 𝑆𝑑
∗∗ + 𝐸𝑑
∗∗ + 𝐼𝑑
∗∗ + 𝑅𝑑
∗∗,  𝑁ℎ
∗∗ = 𝑆ℎ
∗∗ + 𝐸ℎ
∗∗ + 𝐼ℎ
∗∗ + 𝐻ℎ
∗∗ + 𝑅ℎ
∗∗. 
Solving the equations at steady state gives 
𝑆𝑑
∗∗ =
𝜆𝑑
𝜃𝑑
∗∗+𝜇𝑑
 (5.20) 
𝐸𝑑
∗∗ =
𝜃𝑑
∗∗𝜆𝑑
𝑘1(𝜃𝑑
∗∗+𝜇𝑑)
 (5.21) 
𝐼𝑑
∗∗ =
𝜃𝑑
∗∗𝜏𝑑𝜆𝑑
𝑘1𝑘2(𝜃𝑑
∗∗+𝜇𝑑)
 (5.22) 
𝑅𝑑
∗∗ =
𝜃𝑑
∗∗𝜏𝑑𝜆𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑘1𝑘2𝜇𝑑(𝜃𝑑
∗∗+𝜇𝑑)
 (5.23) 
 𝑆𝑓
∗∗ =
𝜆𝑓
𝜃𝑓
∗∗+𝑘3
 (5.24) 
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𝐸𝑓
∗∗ =
𝜃𝑓
∗∗𝜆𝑓
𝑘4(𝜃𝑓
∗∗+𝑘3) 
 (5.25) 
𝐼𝑓
∗∗ =
𝜃𝑓
∗∗𝜆𝑓𝜏𝑓
𝑘4𝑘5(𝜃𝑓
∗∗+𝑘3) 
 (5.26) 
𝑆ℎ
∗∗ =
𝜆ℎ
𝜃ℎ
∗∗+𝜇ℎ
 (5.27) 
𝐸ℎ
∗∗ =
𝜃ℎ
∗∗𝜆ℎ
𝑘6(𝜃ℎ
∗∗+𝜇ℎ) 
 (5.28) 
𝐼ℎ
∗∗ =
𝜃ℎ
∗∗𝜆ℎ𝜏ℎ
𝑘6𝑘7(𝜃ℎ
∗∗+𝜇ℎ) 
 (5.29) 
𝐻ℎ
∗∗ =
𝜃ℎ
∗∗𝜆ℎ𝜏ℎ𝛿ℎ
𝑘6𝑘7 𝑘8(𝜃ℎ
∗∗+𝜇ℎ) 
 (5.30) 
𝑅ℎ
∗∗ =
𝜃ℎ
∗∗𝜆ℎ𝜏ℎ(𝛿ℎ𝑟𝐻+𝑟𝐼𝑘8)
𝑘6𝑘7 𝑘8𝜇ℎ(𝜃ℎ
∗∗+𝜇ℎ) 
 (5.31) 
Substituting Eqs. (5.20) - (5.31) in 𝜃𝑑
∗∗  and 𝜃𝑓
∗∗  and simplifying after algebraic 
manipulations respectively gives 
𝜃𝑑
∗∗ =
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝜏𝑓𝜆𝑓𝑘1𝑘2𝜇𝑑𝜃𝑓
∗∗(𝜃𝑑
∗∗+𝜇𝑑)
(𝜃𝑓
∗∗+𝑘3)𝑘4𝑘5[𝑘2𝜇𝑑𝜆𝑑(𝑘1+𝜃𝑑
∗∗)+𝜏𝑑𝜆𝑑𝜃𝑑
∗∗(𝜇𝑑+𝑟𝑑)]
 (5.32) 
𝜃𝑓
∗∗ =
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜏𝑑𝜇𝑑𝜃𝑑
∗∗
𝑘2𝜇𝑑(𝑘1+𝜃𝑑
∗∗)+𝜏𝑑𝜃𝑑
∗∗(𝜇𝑑+𝑟𝑑)
 (5.33) 
Substitution of (5.33) in (5.32) shows that non-zero equilibria of the model satisfies the 
following quadratic (in terms of 𝜃𝑑
∗∗) 
𝑎0(𝜃𝑑
∗∗)2 + 𝑏0(𝜃𝑑
∗∗) + 𝑐0 = 0 (5.34) 
where 𝑎0 = 𝑘4𝑘5𝜆𝑑[𝑘2𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜏𝑑𝜇𝑑
2 + 𝑘2
2𝑘3𝜇𝑑
2 + 𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜏𝑑
2𝜇𝑑(𝜇𝑑 + 𝑟𝑑) + 2𝑘2𝑘3𝜇𝑑𝜏𝑑(𝜇𝑑 +
𝑟𝑑) + 𝑘3𝜏𝑑
2(𝜇𝑑 + 𝑟𝑑)
2] , 𝑏0 = 𝑘1𝑘2𝑘4𝑘5𝜇𝑑𝜆𝑑[𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜏𝑑𝜇𝑑 + 2𝑘2𝑘3𝜇𝑑 + 2𝑘3𝜏𝑑(𝜇𝑑 + 𝑟𝑑) −
𝑘1𝑘2𝑘3𝑅0
2], 𝑐0 = 𝑘1
2𝑘2
2𝑘3𝑘4𝑘5𝜇𝑑
2𝜆𝑑(1 − 𝑅0
2). 
 The quadratic equation can be analyzed for the possibility of multiple endemic 
equilibriums (57). We achieved positive equilibrium of the system by solving for 𝜃𝑑
∗∗ from the 
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quadratic equation (5.34) and substituting the results (positive value of 𝜃𝑑
∗∗) into expressions in 
Eqs. (5.20) - (5.31). From above formula, the coefficient a0 of (5.34) is always positive and c0 is 
positive (negative) if R0 is less than (greater than) one, respectively. Therefore, the following result 
is established: 
Theorem 1: The system has: 
i. a unique endemic equilibrium exist if 𝑐0 < 0; 
ii. a unique endemic equilibrium exist if 𝑏0 < 0, and 𝑐0 = 0 or 𝑏0
2 − 4𝑎0𝑐0 = 0; 
iii. two endemic equilibriums exist if 𝑐0 > 0, 𝑏0 < 0, and 𝑏0
2 − 4𝑎0𝑐0 > 0; 
iv. no endemic equilibrium exist otherwise. 
This method, also used in a Dengue model (105), is a general way to evaluate the system. 
Theorem 1 (Case i) clearly demonstrates that the model has a unique endemic equilibrium when 
R0 > 1. Case (iii) indicates the possibility of backward bifurcation in which local asymptotically 
stable DFE co-exists with a locally-asymptotically stable endemic equilibrium when R0 < 1. In this 
case, we possibly reach an endemic equilibrium instead of DFE even when R0 < 1, depending on 
how many infections occur in the population at the beginning. A critical value of R0, denoted by 
Rc, is given by setting 𝑏0
2 − 4𝑎0𝑐0 = 0. Considering the physical meaning of each parameter, we 
could numerically test that only one solution of Rc is possible among four roots of the equation. 
To simplify the notation, let 𝑏1 = 𝑘1𝑘2𝑘4𝑘5𝜇𝑑𝜆𝑑 , 𝑏2 = 𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜏𝑑𝜇𝑑 + 2𝑘2𝑘3𝜇𝑑 + 2𝑘3𝜏𝑑(𝜇𝑑 +
𝑟𝑑), 𝑏3 = 𝑘1𝑘2𝑘3, 𝑐1 = 𝑘1
2𝑘2
2𝑘3𝑘4𝑘5𝜇𝑑
2𝜆𝑑, we have: 
𝑅𝑐 =
√−𝐵0+
√𝐵0
2−4𝐴0𝐶0
2
2𝐴0
2
 (5.35) 
where 𝐴0 = 𝑏1
2𝑏3
2, 𝐵0 = 4𝑎0𝑐1 − 2𝑏1
2𝑏2𝑏3, 𝐶0 = 𝑏1
2𝑏2
2 − 4𝑎0𝑐1. 
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Rc is critical because no endemics equilibrium exists when R0 < Rc. To successfully control 
the spread of ZVL, the reproduction number should be brought below Rc. Condition R0 < 1 is not 
sufficient for a complete control of the spread of ZVL described; therefore, backward bifurcation 
would occur for values of R0 such that Rc < R0 < 1. 
Before analyzing the conditions of backward bifurcation, we presented numerical solutions 
for a given range of each parameter using Mathematica. For example, we simulated the model with 
a set of parameters that satisfies the condition of Case (iii) which also satisfies the reasonable range 
for each parameter. 
The values applied are λ𝑑 = 25, λ𝑓 = 65, λℎ = 25, 𝜇𝑑 = 0.0014, 𝜇𝑓 = 0.022, 𝜇ℎ = 8.3e - 5, 
𝑏𝑓𝑑  = 0.1, 𝑏𝑓ℎ  = 0.1, 𝛽𝑓𝑑  = 0.5,  𝛽𝑑𝑓  = 0.7, 𝛽𝑓ℎ  = 0.5, 𝑑𝑑  = 0.017, 𝑑𝑓  = 0, 𝑑𝐼  = 0.0067, 𝑑𝐻  = 
0.0003, m𝑓 = 0.0001, 𝜏𝑑 = 0.1, 𝜏𝑓 = 0.167, 𝜏ℎ = 0.0167, 𝛿ℎ = 0.8, 𝑟𝑑 = 0.005, 𝑟𝐼 = 0.12, and 𝑟𝐻 = 
0.95 (57,96). With this set of parameters, 𝑅𝑐 = 0.968 < 1 and 𝑅0 = 0.985 < 1 (so that, 𝑅𝑐 < 𝑅0 < 
1). The infectious dog population versus 𝑅0 with the associated bifurcation diagram is depicted in 
Figure 6.2. In Region A, disease free equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable which indicates 
that the disease cannot spread out and the status would change back to disease free equilibrium if 
we have a few infected individuals in the beginning , while in Region B, one disease-persistent 
equilibrium is stable (little perturbation could not change the equilibrium status) and the other is 
unstable (little perturbation could change the status of the system and change to another 
equilibrium status, i.e. disease free equilibrium), thereby showing the coexistence of two stable 
equilibria when 𝑅𝑐  < 𝑅0  < 1 and confirming that the system exhibits backward bifurcation. 
Disease-persistent equilibrium is stable in Region C. Results shown in Figure 5.2 are summarized 
in Table 5.2. 
113 
To analyze the relationship between Rc and all possible parameters involved, we decide to 
focus on the parameters that are likely amenable to control and possibly represent the reality in the  
field (dogs, sand flies, and humans). In optimal control section, reduction of infection rate to dogs 
and humans, and use of insecticide against sand flies are considered. Hence, 𝛽𝑓𝑑, 𝛽𝑓ℎ, and 𝜇𝑓 are 
studied in order to figure out their impacts on R0 and Rc. 
Figure 5.2 Bifurcation diagram of the system 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of backward bifurcation shown in Figure 5.2 
Region R0 Type of steady states Stability of steady state 
A < 0.968 DFE Stable 
B 0.968 ~ 1 A DFE and two 
endemic equilibria 
The DFE and one endemic equilibrium are stable 
while the other endemic equilibrium is unstable 
C > 1 A DFE and one 
endemic equilibrium 
The DFE is unstable while the endemic equilibrium 
is stable 
 
114 
The value of Rc is not dependent on the parameter 𝛽𝑓𝑑 while the value of R0 increases as 
𝛽𝑓𝑑 increases. And therefore, we could find a range (shown in Fig. 5.3(a)) which satisfies the 
condition Rc < R0 < 1 if we could change the infection rate to dogs. 
It is surprising that neither of R0 and Rc are dependent on the parameter 𝛽𝑓ℎ, implying that 
the infection rate to humans does not affect the value of R0 and Rc. Hence, humans do not contribute 
to the spread of disease since dogs and sand flies are not infected by humans. Although controlling 
the infection rate to humans will not impact the stability of disease free equilibrium, it is still very 
important when we discuss the optimal control strategies since reduction of the number of infected 
humans is one of our objectives. The optimal control strategies will be discussed in the next 
section. 
For the last parameter 𝜇𝑓, it can affect the values of both of R0 and Rc. The relationship 
between R0 and 𝜇𝑓 and between Rc and 𝜇𝑓 is shown in figure 5.3(b). There is only a narrow range 
which satisfies the condition Rc < R0 < 1. However, the value of R0 is very sensitive to the value 
of 𝜇𝑓 , which shows that use of insecticide against sand flies is a good strategy if the insecticide is 
effective towards increasing the mortality rate of sand flies.  
Figure 5.3 Impacts of parameters on backward bifurcation  
 
  (a)      (b) 
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A more general simulation is modeled using Mathematica which allow us to adjust the 
values of several model parameters and observe the simulation results in a dynamic fashion. Figure 
5.4 shows a screenshot of this dynamical model which illustrates backward bifurcation for ZVL. 
𝐼𝑑
∗∗ represents the number of infectious dogs at the endemic equilibrium point. The green curve 
represents a stable endemic equilibrium and the red dot curve represents an unstable endemic 
equilibrium. The intersection between two curves is a critical threshold Rc for backward bifurcation 
(which is represented using a red line in Figure 5.4). When R0 < Rc, we only have one disease free 
equilibrium. When Rc < R0 < 1, we have three equilibria: one stable disease free equilibrium, one 
unstable endemic equilibrium, and one stable endemic equilibrium. It turns out that if we have an 
endemic equilibrium in which the number of infectious dogs is in the range of the green line, we 
cannot control the spread of ZVL even if R0 < 1. In the Figure 5.2, R0 is calculated in terms of 
given parameters and it is in the range between Rc and 1. In this case, it is possible that we cannot 
control the spread of ZVL if we already have a certain number of infectious dogs. 
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Figure 5.4 General simulation with various parameter values  
 
Analysis and simulation result established the following result: the model constructed in 
Section 5.2 underwent backward bifurcation when Case (iii) of Theorem 1 holds and Rc < R0 < 1. 
5.3.2 Stability of the endemic equilibrium 
To discuss the stability of the endemic equilibrium, we need to determine the eigenvalues 
of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the endemic equilibrium (106,107). Considering the 
complexity of the system, the calculation of eigenvalues is meaningful. However, we are interested 
in the stability of endemic equilibrium around R0 = 1. And therefore, the centre manifold theory is 
considered. 
Let 𝜙 = 𝛽𝑓𝑑 as the bifurcation parameter, when 𝑅0 = 1, we have 𝜙 =
𝑘1𝑘2𝑘4𝑘5𝜆𝑑(𝜇𝑓+𝑚𝑓)
𝜇𝑑𝜆𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑑
2 𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜏𝑑𝜏𝑓
. 
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The Jacobian matrix of the dogs-sand flies-humans system at DFE when 𝜙 = 𝛽𝑓𝑑, is given 
below: 























































hHI
h
h
fhfh
hfhfh
f
d
fdffd
d
fdffd
dd
d
fd
fdd
rr
k
k
kb
b
k
k
N
Sb
k
N
Sb
r
k
bk
b
J












000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
8
7
6
5
4*
*
3*
*
2
1
(5.36) 
We use Mathematica to calculate the eigenvalue of the Jacobian 𝐽(𝜙) and note that there 
is a simple zero eigenvalue. Hence, the centre manifold theory can be used to analyze the dynamics 
of the dogs-sand flies-humans system. 
Let ω = (𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3, 𝜔4, 𝜔5, 𝜔6, 𝜔7, 𝜔8, 𝜔9, 𝜔10, 𝜔11, 𝜔12)
𝑇  be the right eigenvector 
associated with zero eigenvalue, we have 
𝜔1 = −
𝜆𝑑𝑘1𝑘2𝑘3𝑘4𝜔6
𝛽𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑑𝜆𝑓𝜇𝑑
2𝜏𝑑
 (5.37) 
𝜔2 = −
𝜆𝑑𝑘2𝑘3𝑘4𝜔6
𝛽𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑑𝜆𝑓𝜇𝑑𝜏𝑑
 (5.38) 
𝜔3 = −
𝜆𝑑𝑘3𝑘4𝜔6
𝛽𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑑𝜆𝑓𝜇𝑑
 (5.39) 
𝜔4 =
𝜆𝑑𝑟𝑑𝑘3𝑘4𝜔6
𝛽𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑑𝜆𝑓𝜇𝑑
2 (5.40) 
𝜔5 = −
𝑘4𝜔6
𝑘3
 (5.41) 
𝜔6 = 𝜔6 (5.42) 
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𝜔7 = −
𝜏𝑓𝜔6
𝑘5
 (5.43) 
𝜔8 = −
𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑏𝑓ℎ𝜏𝑓𝜔6
𝑘5𝜇ℎ
 (5.44) 
𝜔9 =
𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑏𝑓ℎ𝜏𝑓𝜔6
𝑘5𝑘6
 (5.45) 
𝜔10 =
𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑏𝑓ℎ𝜏𝑓𝜏ℎ𝜔6
𝑘5𝑘6𝑘7
 (5.46) 
𝜔11 =
𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛿ℎ𝜏𝑓𝜏ℎ𝜔6
𝑘5𝑘6𝑘7𝑘8
 (5.47) 
𝜔12 =
𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑏𝑓ℎ(𝛿ℎ𝑟𝐻+𝑑𝐻𝑟𝐼+𝜇ℎ𝑟𝐼+𝑟𝐻𝑟𝐼)𝜏𝑓𝜏ℎ𝜔6
𝜇ℎ𝑘5𝑘6𝑘7𝑘8
 (5.48) 
Similarly, the corresponding left eigenvector v = (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11, v12)
T 
, where v1 = 0, v2 = v2, v3 = 
𝑘1𝑣2
𝜏𝑑
, v4 = v5 = 0, v6 = 
𝜆𝑑𝑘1𝑘2𝑘3𝑣2
𝛽𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑑𝜆𝑓𝜇𝑑𝜏𝑑
, v7 = 
𝜆𝑑𝑘1𝑘2𝑘3𝑘4𝑣2
𝛽𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑓𝑑𝜆𝑓𝜇𝑑𝜏𝑑𝜏𝑓
, v8 = v9 = v10 = 
v11 = v12 = 0. 
To simplify the notation, let Sd = x1, Ed = x2, Id = x3, Rd = x4, Sf = x5, Ef = x6, If = x7, Sh = x8, 
Eh = x9, Ih = x10, Hh = x11, and Rh = x12. In addition, assume 
𝑑𝑆𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓1, 
𝑑𝐸𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓2, 
𝑑𝐼𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓3, 
𝑑𝑅𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓4, 
𝑑𝑆𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓5, 
𝑑𝐸𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓6, 
𝑑𝐼𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓7, 
𝑑𝑆ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓8, 
𝑑𝐸ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓9, 
𝑑𝐼ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓10, 
𝑑𝐻ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓11, 
𝑑𝑅ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓12. 
Let 
𝑎 =
1
2
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝜔𝑗𝜔𝑘
𝑛
𝑖,𝑗,𝑘=1
𝜕2𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝜕𝛽𝑓𝑑
(𝐸0, 0) (5.49) 
𝑏 = ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝜔𝑗
𝑛
𝑖,𝑗=1
𝜕2𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝜕𝛽𝑓𝑑
(𝐸0, 0) (5.50) 
If b ≠ 0, the value of a (either positive or negative) determines the nature of the endemic 
equilibria near the R0 = 1. In our system, we know v1 = v4 = v5 = v8 = v9 = v10 = v11 = v12 = 0, so we 
only need to consider v2, v3, v6, and v7. In addition, the second derivative of f3, and f7 are equal to 
0, so 
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𝑎 =
1
2
(𝑣2 ∑ 𝜔𝑗𝜔𝑘
𝑛
𝑗,𝑘=1
𝜕2𝑓2
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝜕𝑥𝑘
(𝐸0, 0) + 𝑣6 ∑ 𝜔𝑗𝜔𝑘
𝑛
𝑗,𝑘=1
𝜕2𝑓6
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝜕𝑥𝑘
(𝐸0, 0)) (5.51) 
𝑏 = 𝑣2 ∑ 𝜔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝜕2𝑓2
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝜕𝛽𝑓𝑑
(𝐸0, 0) (5.52) 
Solve a and b, we have 𝑎 = −𝑚11𝜙 + 𝑚22, b = 𝑣2𝜔7𝑏𝑓𝑑 ≠ 0, where 
𝑚11 = 𝑣2𝜔7(𝜔2 + 𝜔3 + 𝜔4)𝑏𝑓𝑑𝜇𝑑/𝜆𝑑 (5.53) 
𝑚22 =
𝑣6𝜔3𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝜇𝑑
𝜆𝑑
(𝜔5 −
𝜆𝑓𝜇𝑑𝜔1𝜔2𝜔3𝜔4
𝜆𝑑(𝜇𝑓+𝑚𝑓)
) (5.54) 
Based on the theorem in (108), if ∅ >
𝑚22
𝑚11
,  then a < 0 and the system undergoes a forward 
bifurcation and there are locally asymptotically stable endemic equilibria near DFE for R0 > 1; 
while if ∅ <
𝑚22
𝑚11
, the system has a backward bifurcation and there are unstable endemic 
equilibrium near DFE for R0 < 1. 
The epidemiological significance of backward bifurcation is that the classical requirement 
of R0 < 1, although necessary, is no longer sufficient for disease elimination. In such a scenario, 
disease elimination depends on initial sizes of sub-populations (state variables) of the model. In 
other words, backward bifurcation in the ZVL transmission model suggests feasibility of 
controlling ZVL when R0 < 1 could be dependent on initial sizes of the sub-population of the 
model. Therefore, methods for disease control must be improved. 
 5.4 Optimal Control 
In this section, we extend the model in Section 5.2 to include density-dependent mortality 
rates in sand fly populations and recruitment rate in each susceptible population. 
Define the density-dependent mortality rate for sand flies 𝜇𝑓 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑁𝑓, where 𝜇1 is the 
density-independent death rate in the sand fly population, 𝜇2 is proportionality constant and Nf is 
the total number of sand flies. Similarly, we replaced previous recruitment rates to density-
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dependent recruitment rate by 𝜆𝑑 → 𝜆𝑑 + 𝜌𝑁𝑑, 𝜆𝑓 → 𝜆𝑓𝑁𝑓, and 𝜆ℎ → 𝜆ℎ + 𝛾ℎ𝑁ℎ, where 𝜌 and 𝛾ℎ 
are proportionality constants showing the impact of density on recruitment rates. 
In the dog population, the associated force of infection was reduced by a factor of (1- u1(t)), 
where u1(t) measures the level of successful prevention measures (vaccine protection). From the 
literature review, canine leishmaniasis (known as CanV or CanVL) was considered one of a few 
parasitic diseases likely to be controllable by vaccination (109,110). The strategy of culling dogs 
carries ethic and humanitarian issues, and it is not included as part of the three time-dependent 
control strategies in our studies but the model can easily address this issue by varying parameter 
dd in the model (i.e., Eq.(5.3) in Section 5.2.1). 
In the sand fly population, control strategy u2(t) represented the level of insecticide used 
for sand fly control administered at sand fly breeding sites. Consequently, the reproduction rate of 
the sand fly population was reduced by a factor of (1 - u2(t)). The assumption was made that the 
mortality rate of sand fly increases at a rate proportional to u2(t), where r0 > 0 is a rate constant. 
In the human population, the associated force of infection was reduced by a factor of (1-
u3(t)), where u3(t) measures the level of successful prevention (personal protection) efforts. 
Therefore, u3(t) indicates the use of alternative preventive measures to minimize or eliminate sand 
fly-human contacts. 
Accounting for the above assumptions and extensions, the extended ZVL model with 
control strategy terms was constructed: 
𝑑𝑆𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑑 + 𝜌𝑁𝑑 −
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝐼𝑓𝑆𝑑(1−𝑢1(𝑡))
𝑁𝑑
− 𝜇𝑑𝑆𝑑 (5.55) 
𝑑𝐸𝑑
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑓𝑑𝐼𝑓𝑆𝑑(1−𝑢1(𝑡))
𝑁𝑑
− 𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝐸𝑑 (5.56) 
𝑑𝐼𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜏𝑑𝐸𝑑 − 𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝑑𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝐼𝑑 (5.57) 
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𝑑𝑅𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝑅𝑑 (5.58) 
𝑑𝑆𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑓𝑁𝑓(1 − 𝑢2(𝑡)) −
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑑𝑆𝑓
𝑁𝑑
− 𝑚𝑓𝑆𝑓 − (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑁𝑓)𝑆𝑓 − 𝑟0𝑢2(𝑡)𝑆𝑓 (5.59) 
𝑑𝐸𝑓
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑏𝑓𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑑𝑆𝑓
𝑁𝑑
− 𝜏𝑓𝐸𝑓 − 𝑚𝑓𝐸𝑓 − (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑁𝑓)𝐸𝑓 − 𝑟0𝑢2(𝑡)𝐸𝑓 (5.60) 
𝑑𝐼𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜏𝑓𝐸𝑓 − 𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑓 − 𝑚𝑓𝐼𝑓 − (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑁𝑓)𝐼𝑓 − 𝑟0𝑢2(𝑡)𝐼𝑓 (5.61) 
𝑑𝑆ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆ℎ + 𝛾ℎ𝑁ℎ −
𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛽𝑓ℎ𝐼𝑓𝑆ℎ(1−𝑢3(𝑡))
𝑁ℎ
− 𝑢ℎ𝑆ℎ (5.62) 
𝑑𝐸ℎ
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑏𝑓ℎ𝛽𝑓ℎ𝐼𝑓𝑆ℎ(1−𝑢3(𝑡))
𝑁ℎ
− 𝜏ℎ𝐸ℎ − 𝑢ℎ𝐸ℎ (5.63) 
𝑑𝐼ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜏ℎ𝐸ℎ − 𝛿ℎ𝐼ℎ−𝑑𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝑟𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝑢ℎ𝐼ℎ (5.64) 
𝑑𝐻ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛿ℎ𝐼ℎ−𝑑𝐻𝐻ℎ − 𝑟𝐻𝐻ℎ − 𝑢ℎ𝐻ℎ (5.65) 
𝑑𝑅ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝐻𝐻ℎ + 𝑟𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝑢ℎ𝑅ℎ (5.66) 
Moreover, the rate of change of the total populations of dogs, sand flies, and humans is 
respectively given by 
𝑑𝑁𝑑
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑑 + 𝜌𝑁𝑑 − 𝑑𝑑𝐼𝑑 − 𝜇𝑑𝑁𝑑 (5.67) 
𝑑𝑁𝑓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑁𝑓[𝜆𝑓(1 − 𝑢2(𝑡)) − 𝑚𝑓 − (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑁𝑓) − 𝑟0𝑢2(𝑡)] − 𝑑𝑓𝐼𝑓 (5.68) 
𝑑𝑁ℎ
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆ℎ + 𝛾ℎ𝑁ℎ − 𝑑𝐼𝐼ℎ − 𝑑𝐻𝐻ℎ − 𝜇ℎ𝑁ℎ (5.69) 
According to the extended model above, an optimal control problem with the objective 
function is formulated by 
𝐽(𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3) = ∫ (𝐴1𝐸ℎ(𝑡) + 𝐴2𝐼ℎ(𝑡) + 𝐴3𝑁𝑓(𝑡) + 𝐵1𝑢1
2(𝑡) + 𝐵2𝑢2
2(𝑡) + 𝐵3𝑢3
2(𝑡))
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡 (5.70) 
The objective is to minimize exposed and infected human populations, the total number of 
sand flies, and the cost of implementing the strategy. In Eq. (5.70), A1, A2, and A3 represent weight 
constants of the exposed, infected human and the total number of sand flies. In addition, B1, B2, 
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and B3 are weight constants for dogs' prevention from disease, sand flies control, and human 
protection, respectively and 𝐵1𝑢1
2(𝑡), 𝐵2𝑢2
2(𝑡), and 𝐵3𝑢3
2(𝑡) describe the costs associated with 
dogs’ prevention, sand flies control, and human protection, respectively. These costs result from 
various sources. For example, cost associated with the first strategy primarily originates from the 
use of vaccination, cost associated with the second strategy primarily originates from the 
insecticide application, and cost associated with the third strategy originates from public health 
education to human populations, and testing equipment investments. We assumed that the costs 
are proportional to the square of the corresponding control function. Our goal was to determine 
optimal control functions (𝑢1
∗, 𝑢2
∗ , 𝑢3
∗) such that 
𝐽(𝑢1
∗, 𝑢2
∗ , 𝑢3
∗) = min (𝐽(𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3)|(𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3) ∈ Γ) (5.71) 
Subject to the extended system, where Γ = {(𝑢1,𝑢2,𝑢3)|𝑢𝑖(𝑡) is Lebesgue measurable on 
𝑜𝑛 [0, 𝑇], 0 ≤ 𝑢𝑖(𝑡) ≤ 1, 𝑖 = 1,2,3} is the control set. The existence of an optimal control for the 
extended system would be proved and the optimality system would be derived. 
 5.4.1 Existence of an optimal control 
Theorem 2: Consider the objective function J given by Eq. (5.70) with (𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3) ∈ Γ 
subject to the constraint state system (Eqs. (5.55) - (5.66)). There exists (𝑢1
∗, 𝑢2
∗ , 𝑢3
∗) ∈ Γ such that 
𝐽(𝑢1
∗, 𝑢2
∗ , 𝑢3
∗) = min (𝐽(𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3)|(𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3) ∈ Γ). 
Proof: The integrand of the objective function given by Eq. (5.70) is convex on the closed, 
convex control set 𝛤. Conditions for the existence of optimal control are satisfied because the 
model is linear in the control variables and bounded by a linear system in the state variables (111). 
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 5.4.2 Optimality system 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle (112) can be used for necessary conditions for an optimal 
control problem; the principle converts the problem into a problem of maximizing Hamilton H, 
with respect to 𝑢1,𝑢2,𝑢3: 
𝐻 = 𝐴1𝐸ℎ(𝑡) + 𝐴2𝐼ℎ(𝑡) + 𝐴3𝑁𝑓(𝑡) + 𝐵1𝑢1
2 + 𝐵2𝑢2
2 + 𝐵3𝑢3
2 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑓𝑖
12
𝑖=1  (5.72) 
where 𝑓𝑖 is the right-hand side of the differential equation of i-th state variable. Application 
of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle and the optimal control theory achieved the following 
theorem: 
Theorem 3 Given an optimal control 𝑢∗ = (𝑢1
∗, 𝑢2
∗ , 𝑢3
∗) and corresponding state solutions 
𝑆𝑑 ,  𝐸𝑑 ,  𝐼𝑑 , 𝑅𝑑, 𝑆𝑓 , 𝐸𝑓 , 𝐼𝑓 , 𝑆ℎ, 𝐸ℎ, 𝐼ℎ, 𝐻ℎ, and 𝑅ℎ  of the corresponding state system, there 
adjoint functions, 𝜆𝑖, exist for i=1,2,…,12, satisfying 
' 2 2 2
1 5 6 1 1 1
2
2 1 1
/ / ( (1 ) / (1 ) / )
( (1 ) / (1 ) / )
df fd d f d df fd d f d d fd fd f d d fd fd f d
fd fd f d d fd fd f d
b I S N b I S N b I S u N b I u N
b I S u N b I u N
         
  
         
   
 (5.73) 
' 2 2 2
2 5 6 1 1
2
2 1 3
/ / ( (1 ) / )
( (1 ) / )
df fd d f d df fd d f d fd fd f d d
d d fd fd f d d d
b I S N b I S N b I S u N
b I S u N
       
     
     
     
 (5.74) 
' 2
3 3 4 5
2 2
6 1 1
2
2 1
( d ) ( / / )
( / / ) ( (1 ) / )
(1 ) /
d d d d df fd d f d df fd f d
df fd d f d df fd f d fd fd f d d
fd fd f d d
r r b I S N b S N
b I S N b S N b I S u N
b I S u N
      
     
 
       
     
 
 (5.75) 
' 2 2 2
4 4 5 6 1 1
2
2 1
/ / ( (1 ) / )
(1 ) /
d df fd d f d df fd d f d fd fd f d d
fd fd f d d
b I S N b I S N b I S u N
b I S u N
         
 
     
 
 (5.76) 
'
5 3 7 2 6 2
5 1 2 2 2 0 2
( / )
( / (1 ) u )
f f df fd d d
f df fd d d f f f
A I E b I N
m b I N S N u r
     
     
     
       
 (5.77) 
'
6 3 7 2 5 2 2 6 1 2 2 0 2( ) ( (1 )) ( u )f f f f f f f fA I S u m E N r                          (5.78) 
'
7 3 6 2 1 1 2 1 5 2 2
7 1 2 2 0 2 8 3 9 3
(1 ) / (1 ) / ( S (1 ))
( d u ) (1 ) / (1 ) /
f fd fd d d fd fd d d f f
f f f f fh fh h h fh fh h h
A E b S u N b S u N u
m I N r b S u N b S u N
         
       
         
          
 (5.79) 
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' 2
8 8 3 3
2
9 3 3
( (1 ) / (1 ) / )
( (1 ) / (1 ) / )
h h fh fh f h h fh fh f h
fh fh f h h fh fh f h
b I S u N b I u N
b I S u N b I u N
     
  
      
    
 (5.80) 
' 2 2
9 1 10 9 3 8 3( (1 ) / ) ( (1 ) / )h h h fh fh f h h h fh fh f h hA b I S u N b I S u N                     (5.81) 
' 2
10 2 11 10 12 8 3
2
9 3
( ) ( (1 ) / )
(1 ) /
h h I h I I h fh fh f h h
fh fh f h h
A d r r b I S u N
b I S u N
         
 
           
 
 (5.82) 
' 2 2
11 11 12 8 3 9 3( ) ( (1 ) / ) (1 ) /H h H H h fh fh f h h fh fh f h hd r r b I S u N b I S u N                    (5.83) 
' 2 2
12 12 8 3 9 3( (1 ) / ) (1 ) /h h fh fh f h h fh fh f h hb I S u N b I S u N              (5.84) 
The terminal conditions are 
(T) 0i   for i=1,2,…,12 (5.85) 
Moreover, optimal control
*
1u ,
*
2u ,
*
3u  are given by 
2 1*
1
1
( )
max 0,min 1,
2
fd fd f d
d
b I S
u
B N
     
   
   
 (5.86) 
5 0 5 6 7*
2
2
( )
max 0,min 1,
2
f f f f fN r S E I
u
B
         
   
   
 (5.87) 
9 8*
3
3
( )
max 0,min 1,
2
fh fh f h
h
b I S
u
B N
     
   
   
 (5.88) 
Proof:   
Adjoint equations and transversality conditions can be obtained using Pontryagin’s 
Maximum Principle such that 
'
1
d
H
S


 

, 1(T) 0  ; 
'
2
d
H
E


 

, 2(T) 0  ; …, 
'
12
h
H
R


 

, 12(T) 0  . 
The optimal control 
*
1u ,
*
2u ,
*
3u  can be solved from the optimality conditions, 
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1
0,
H
u



 
2
0,
H
u



 
3
0
H
u



. 
 5.4.3 Numerical results 
We numerically calculated optimal control strategies based on the iterative method used in 
(57). Given initial state conditions without controls, we solved the state di 
erential Eqs. (5.55) - (5.66) forward in time using the fourth order Runge-Kutta method. According 
to results of state values and the given final value in Eq. (5.85), we solved adjoint values in Eqs. 
(5.73) - (5.84) backward in time, using the fourth order Runge-Kutta method. Both updates of state 
values and adjoint values were utilized to calculate optimal control strategies in Eqs. (5.86) - 
(5.88). This process was repeated until a steady state was achieved. This algorithm is given below. 
Step 1: 
Initialize state variables: 
(0), (0), (0), (0), (0), (0), (0), (0), (0), (0), (0), (0)d d d d f f f h h h h hS E I R S E I S E I H R  
Initialize optimal control strategies: 
1 2 3, ,u u u  
Step 2: 
 Given small value 1 2 3, ,    and final time value T: 
 While change of state values > 1 , or change of adjoint values > 2 , or change of 
controls > 3 : 
I. Solve state values forward in time from 0 to T based on Eqs (5.55) - (5.66), 
using the fourth order of Runge-Kutta. 
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II. Solve adjoint values backward in time from T to 0 based on Eqs (5.73) – 
(5.84), using the fourth order of Runge-Kutta. 
III. Solve control strategies 1 2 3, ,u u u  using Eqs (5.86) – (5.88). 
Step 3: 
 Find optimal control strategies: 
 
* * *
1 1 2 2 3 3, ,u u u u u u    
The fourth order of Runge-Kutta method adopted here is given below. 
( , )
dy
f y t
dt
  
1 1 2 3 4
1
( 2 2 )
6
i iy y k k k k h       
where 
1 ( , )i ik f y t  
2 1
1 1
( , )
2 2
i ik f y k h t h    
3 2
1 1
( , )
2 2
i ik f y k h t h    
4 3( , )i ik f y k h t h    
h is step size, given by 1i ih t t  . 
Table 5.3 Parameter values in numerical analysis 
Parameter Values 
𝜆𝑑 0.02 
𝜆𝑓 0.05 
𝜆ℎ 0.05 
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1/𝜇𝑑 700 
1/𝜇ℎ 12000 
𝑏𝑓𝑑 0.1 
𝑏𝑓ℎ 0.1 
𝛽𝑓𝑑 0.5 
𝛽𝑑𝑓 0.7 
𝛽𝑓ℎ 0.5 
𝑑𝑑 0.01 
𝑑𝑓 0 
 𝑑𝐼 0.0067 
𝑑𝐻 3e-4 
𝑚𝑓 1e-4 
1/𝜏𝑑 10 
1/𝜏𝑓 6 
1/𝜏ℎ 60 
𝛿ℎ 0.8 
 𝑟𝑑 0.01 
𝑟𝐼 0.12 
𝑟𝐻 0.95 
𝜌 1e-3 
𝜇1 0.02 
𝜇2 5e-6 
𝑟0 0.2 
𝛾ℎ 2.85e-3 
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Parameter used in this section is defined in Table 5.3. The initialization of dogs, sand flies, 
and human population is given by Sd(0)=100, Sf(0)=10000, Sh(0)=100, If(0)=10, and Id(0)=5.  We 
proposed that control effectiveness could not be 100% effective for each control; then we reduced 
the upper bound of each control to observe the impact of control. The upper bounds of each control 
strategy u1, u2, and u3, were considered as 60%, 50%, and 60%, respectively.  
Figure 5.5 describes scenarios for state variables Eh, Ih, and If for the case which A1=1, 
A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=1, B2=1, and B3=1, meaning the reduction of exposed human, infected human, 
and number of sand flies are equally important and the cost of three control strategies are similar. 
Optimal control strategies are shown in Figure 5.6. 
From the result in Figure 5.5, the number of exposed humans, infected humans, and 
infected sand flies were effectively controlled by the corresponding control strategies. However, 
the cost of each control did not have to be equal. When B1=10, B2=1, and B3=3, meaning the dogs 
prevention measurement costs more, the control strategies are changed correspondingly. Figure 
5.7 illustrates control strategies u1, u2, and u3 in this scenario.  
As the increase of the cost of u1, the optimal strategies are changed. The strategy for dog 
disease preventions was adopted much less than the previous scenario, shown in Figure 5.7(a). It 
is reasonable because increased costs lead to decreased use in order to minimize our objective 
function. Use of u2 and u3 also decreases after around 100 days. From Fig. 5.8(a) and 5.8(b), the 
number of exposed humans and infected humans both increase slightly due to the lower use of 
three strategies, while the number of sand flies keeps the same which is shown in Fig. 5.8(c). 
Hence,  
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Figure 5.5 Simulation with controls A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=1, B2=1, and B3=1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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Figure 5.6 Control strategies with A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=1, B2=1, and B3=1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 (c) 
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Figure 5.7 Control strategies with A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=100, B2=1, and B3=1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
the change of the cost of implementing first strategy impacts controlling the number of exposed 
humans and infected humans but the number of sand flies. 
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Similarly, the impacts of u2 and u3 are evaluated through changing the cost of each strategy, 
which is shown in Figures 5.9 to 5.12. Compared to the first strategy, the second strategy has the 
similar impact to the system, as shown in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10. The use of u2 decreases when  
Figure 5.8 Simulation with A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B2=1, and B3=1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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Figure 5.9 Control strategies with A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=1, B2=100, and B3=1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
its cost changes from 1 to 100. Meanwhile, the use of u1 and u3 also decrease. As a response, the 
number of exposed humans and infected humans increase and the number of sand flies remains 
the same. 
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Figure 5.10 Simulation with A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=1, and B3=1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
In Fig. 5.11 and Fig. 5.12, it shows the impact of changing the cost of the third strategy. 
As the cost increase from 1 to 100, the use of u3 is reduced, while the use of u1 and u2 keep the 
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same. As a result, it leads to more exposed humans and infected humans and the number of sand 
flies remain the same. 
Figure 5.11 Control strategies with A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=1, B2=1, and B3=100 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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Figure 5.12 Simulation with A1=1, A2=1, A3=1e-5, B1=1, and B2=1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
In sum, the overall use of the corresponding strategy decreases leading to the increased 
number of exposed and possibly infected humans, as the estimated cost for disease prevention in 
dogs, sand flies, and humans increase. Further, our simulation (presented in Figures 5.8, 5.10, and 
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5.12) indicate that the number of sand flies does not change significantly as the cost of the control 
strategies increase, whereas the number of exposed and infected humans increase. This indicates 
that the number of sand flies has a greater impact for minimizing our objective function. To control  
Figure 5.13 Simulation with upper bound of control u3 = 0.1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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Figure 5.14 Control strategies with upper bound of control u3 = 0.1 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
the number of sand flies, the use of u2 (i.e., insecticide used to control sand flies) has to remain at 
high level. This is supported by our simulations of (unchanged) insecticide use for the first 150 
days even if the cost of insecticides increases from 1 to 100 (Figures 5.7, 5.9, 5.11). Taken together, 
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our results indicate that controlling the number of sand flies is the most effective and recommended 
methodology to control ZVL transmission. 
In addition, change of effectiveness of control strategies impacts the dynamics of the entire 
system from Eq. (5.55) to Eq. (5.66). Let upper bound of u3 = 0.1, meaning that the effectiveness 
of human prevention from disease is extremely low. The number of exposed human, infected 
human, and infected sand flies are depicted in Figure 5.13. Compared to Figure 5.5, an increasing 
number of exposed and infected human populations is evident in Figure 5.13 due to the lessened 
control strategy effectiveness of prevention measurement for humans. In Figure 5.14, the use of 
each control strategy is shown and there is no big difference for the use of the first strategy and 
the second strategy. 
Figure 5.15 Sensitivity analysis of culling dog strategy 
 
Based on the above analyses, it is shown that control of ZVL transmission using the three 
strategies (u1, u2, u3) is doable. In addition to the above strategies, culling dogs is often adopted as 
a control strategy for ZVL. Although culling dogs has been used, its efficacy has frequently been 
questioned. Our analysis of the parameter dd, (in Eq. (5.57)) especially when the other three 
approaches are not available, clearly show culling to be ineffective (Figure 5.15), regardless of the 
culling rate. 
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 5.5 Conclusion 
Here, a three-system mathematical model for ZVL transmission with dogs, sand flies, and 
humans, was developed using a modified SEIR model. Backward bifurcation analysis suggested 
that R0 < 1 is not a sufficient condition to control the spread of disease in this model, and both 
disease-free equilibrium and endemic equilibrium can coexist under certain conditions. Therefore, 
the condition R0 < Rc is required in order to control or eradicate the disease. A specific 
mathematical method to calculate optimal control strategies was given in this paper. Pontryagins 
maximum principle, previously used to identify optimal control strategies against West Nile (57) 
or other vector-borne diseases (53), was also used here to determine possible optimal control 
strategies for ZVL. The results obtained for optimal control were highly dependent on the cost of 
each strategy and the effectiveness of each control strategy. Interestingly, our results (optimal 
system analysis) suggest that as the estimated cost for disease prevention increases, the overall use 
of the corresponding strategy or strategies decreases leading to the increased number of exposed 
and possibly infected humans. Further, our simulation (presented in Figures 5.8, 5.10, and 5.12) 
indicate that the number of sand flies does not change significantly as the cost of the control 
strategies increase, whereas the number of exposed and infected humans increase. This indicates 
that the number of sand flies has a greater impact for minimizing our objective function. To control 
the number of sand flies, the use of u2 (i.e., insecticide used to control sand flies) has to remain at 
high level. This is supported by our simulations of (unchanged) insecticide use for the first 150 
days even if the cost of insecticides increases from 1 to 100 (Figures 5.7, 5.9, 5.11). Taken together, 
our results indicate that controlling the number of sand flies is the most effective and recommended 
methodology to control ZVL transmission. Culling dogs is not an effective strategy to control the 
disease transmission. Although the simulation result shows ZVL may be controlled effectively 
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adopting the corresponding control strategies, the parameter A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3 used in the 
objective function are quite subjective. Therefore, further studies will focus on validation of the 
model in terms of real data and on actual control costs and effectiveness in various scenarios, 
especially for different endemic areas of ZVL.  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions, Contributions, and Future Works 
 6.1 Conclusions 
Human behaviors, as one of the most important factors which impact the dynamics of 
disease transmission, play a key role on mitigating and controlling the epidemic. In this 
dissertation, two types of human behaviors, spontaneous changes of human behaviors and enforce 
measure by public authority (intervention strategy), are studied in order to quantify their impacts 
to the infectious disease transmission and seek the optimal control strategies. The developed 
methodologies can be applied to human diseases (such as H1N1, SARS) as well as animal diseases 
(such as Visceral Leishmaniasis).  Analytical and numerical simulation results are derived to help 
us better understand the disease transmission dynamics and recommend the corresponding control 
strategies. 
Main conclusions drawn from this dissertation are: 
1. Spontaneous changes of human behaviors could be quantified using a spatial 
evolutionary game with information dissemination. Specifically, individuals 
acquire information relating the infectious disease (such as prevalence) from mass 
media or their social contacts, and then decide if they need to take actions to protect 
themselves. Hence, the spatial evolutionary game well represented the process from 
information to risk reception by individuals, then to decision making, finally to 
behaviors’ changes.  
2. It has a higher possibility for individuals in endemic areas to take preventive 
measures, i.e. there are more switchers in the area where more individuals are 
infected. Hence, local information has more impact on human behaviors and 
disease transmission. 
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3. Local information is translated to payoff by m1 to motivate individuals to choose 
either normal or alternatives, thereby implicitly affecting the dynamics of the 
epidemic. Sensitivity analysis showed that m1 was sensitive to the system and an 
increasing value of m1 led to an increasing number of switchers. Considering 
heterogeneity of m1 in different counties, similar impact patterns were derived for 
each county. Even for long distance model, changes of m1 in network centers cannot 
impact the disease transmission in other counties. 
4. To demonstrate the heterogeneity of individuals in the same location (which is 
assumed to be homogeneous population in each county), a Itô drift-diffusion 
process with a drifting factor and a random walk was considered to study the risk 
reception. Memory mechanism represents the dynamic of the estimated average 
risk reception for individuals and the variance represents the deviation of risk 
reception from average value due to the differences of individuals in the same 
location. 
5. Numerical simulations for SEGM model in  (82) and MDM model using a county 
map of the state of Kansas with county-level population were conducted to compare 
the SEGM model to the MDM model. Our results showed that the results from two 
models are consistent which validated SEGM model.  
6. Spontaneous changes of human behaviors can help mitigate the spread of infectious 
diseases, i.e. more switchers lead to less infected individuals. However, more 
switchers also lead to more social costs (cost to convince individuals to choose 
switcher, cost for switchers to protect themselves, etc.). The optimal control 
strategies are needed to be addressed. 
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7. Backward bifurcation phenomenon was proved for the transmission of ZVL, i.e. 
the disease free equilibrium and endemic equilibrium coexists when R0 is smaller 
than 1.  Hence, the condition R0<1 cannot guarantee that we could eliminate ZVL. 
The similar scenario may occur for other zoonotic disease and the ODE system 
considering contact structure.  
8. The optimal control theory was applied to study the intervention strategies for the 
mitigation of transmission of ZVL. Our results indicate that controlling the number 
of sand flies is the most effective and recommended methodology to control ZVL 
transmission. Culling dogs is not an effective strategy to control the disease 
transmission. 
 6.2 Contributions 
Major contributions of this dissertation to the area of computational modeling, decision 
making on human behaviors, and epidemiology are listed as follows: 
1. For the first time, this research developed a new spatial evolutionary game to study 
the changes of human behaviors in epidemics. This methodology successfully 
demonstrates how individuals change their behaviors from acquiring information, 
to risk perception, then to decision making, and finally to behaviors’ changes. It is 
also the first time, for my best knowledge, to apply the spatial evolutionary game 
to epidemiological areas.  
2. This research developed new mathematical models to study spontaneous changes 
of human behaviors temporally and spatially. Particularly, impact of local 
information and global information to human behaviors are distinguished and a 
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detailed discussion about impact of local information is emphasized in this research 
since the local information is assumed to be more crucial than global information. 
3. For the first time, the Ito drift-diffusion process is used to study the accumulated 
risk perception which the average risk assessment is estimated by the memory 
mechanism and the heterogeneity of individuals is represented by random walk 
process. 
4. This research demonstrates the backward bifurcation existing in the transmission 
of ZVL when certain conditions are satisfied. Stability analysis and bifurcation 
analysis are performed to help understand the dynamics of the spread of ZVL.  
5. This study, for the first time, applied optimal control method to seek the most cost-
effective control strategies to mitigate the ZVL transmission. The optimal control 
strategies were derived and efforts on controlling the number of sandflies are 
recommended. 
 6.3 Future Works 
Major future works to the area of decision making on human behaviors, and mitigation of 
infectious diseases are listed as follows: 
1. In order to fully understand the behavior of dynamic system, analytical study, such 
as stability analysis and bifurcation analysis, should be conducted later.  
2. Further studies should combine changes in human behaviors and intervention 
strategies to identify optimal information dissemination in order to minimize social 
costs and the numbers of infected individuals. 
3. In order to increase understanding of the variation of individuals’ responses to 
infectious disease, a small scale of population, including individualized behaviors, 
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should be taken into consideration for modeling human behaviors. 
Correspondingly, intervention strategies should be temporally and spatially 
characterized. As such, an agent-based model could be used as a tool to study the 
complex system with interactions among changes of human behaviors, disease 
transmission, and intervention strategies (public policy).  
4. For ZVL transmission, further studies will focus on validation of the model in terms 
of real data and on actual control costs and effectiveness in various scenarios, 
especially for different endemic areas.  
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